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ABSTRACT
POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRACY
Douglas M. Weck
Supervisor: Stephen R. Perry
Political institutions and actors have a moral responsibility to secure the equal
freedom of those subject to their rule. It is in virtue of that responsibility that political
authorities can possess certain moral rights to rule. Here, I argue that such political
authorities can possess moral rights to create and employ the positive law to secure equal
freedom. In doing so, I will address a number of common problems that theories of
political authority face, including the subjection problem, the problem of consent, and the
particularity problem, among other things. I also present an account of the role that
democracy can play in an adequately framed theory of legitimate political authority.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
For a variety of reasons, it is unfortunate that the question of whether a state has
political legitimacy — a moral right to rule — has become synonymous with the question
of whether there is a general moral obligation to obey the law. According to most theorists,
that misfortune should be because we should not reasonably expect to be able to provide a
theory that successfully establishes the existence of such an obligation. Defending such an
obligation is too difficult, even impossible. First, there is the well-known concern that such
an obligation would be at odds with an individual’s apparently more fundamental right and
responsibility to be autonomous, to judge things for themselves and to take responsibility
for their actions. Authority, it is argued, requires an individual to give up their independent
judgment about what to do and to make important moral decisions simply according to
what others say. Second, but related, is the charge that such an obligation could only be
the product of a voluntary exercise of choice, such as consent or a robust willful acceptance
of benefits from the state. But, any obligation to obey the law, at least as the state sees it,
is not contingent on such undertakings, and it is unlikely that most individuals do or could
voluntarily undertake that obligation. Third, it is quite easy to point to the legislative,
executive, and judicial failures of the past, and we reasonably expect a future replete with
additional failures. The historical non-existence of such an obligation, even within modern
liberal democracies, should reasonably cause us to be pessimistic about the possibility or
likelihood of any such obligation existing in the future. Fourth, many violations of law are
apparently harmless. The desert stop sign is a common example. How can running a stop
sign in the desert with no one else is sight be morally wrong? No harm, no foul, the
1

argument goes. Fifth, the notion that a moral obligation can come into existence simply in
virtue of an act of law has been likened to pulling something out of thin air. How can moral
obligations arise simply in virtue of the law’s say so, rather than in virtue of whatever moral
considerations independently support such obligations?

Finally, the philosophical

literature is replete with failed attempts to establish or explain the possibility of a general
obligation to obey the law: consent theory, associativism, the natural duty of justice, and
the principle of fair play, to name a few.
Ultimately, I will address each of those views at some point in this dissertation. If
we want to defend the possibility of politically legitimate states and related ideas, we will
have to come to terms with many of those difficulties. In any event, I want to begin by
discussing how a general moral obligation to obey the law can actually be too easy to
establish, with the goal of making a basic point about any plausible theory of the legitimacy
of the state.
Imagine a primitive state. This state has de facto political power, meaning that
individuals within its jurisdiction will generally acquiesce to what it says. The state claims
that individuals have a moral obligation to obey its law, and its subjects even believe that
to be the case. It backs up its law with force and punishes those who violate the law.
However, this primitive state is unlike the modern states that we are familiar with. This
primitive state only has a single law. That law prohibits individuals from intentionally
killing other individuals absent self-defense. That’s it. It does not care to do anything else.
It seems fairly straightforward that there is a general moral obligation to obey the
law in the primitive state that I just described. Its single legislative act mirrors a basic
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moral requirement that nearly any reasonable theorist would agree must be followed and
upheld with force. Any individual subject to that law is morally required to obey that law.
The primitive state would have a moral right to secure compliance with that law by
threatening to punish violators, intervening to protect individuals against attempts on their
lives, and punishing those who violate that law. If we believed that a general obligation to
obey the law is a morally significant objective for theories of political legitimacy and
modern states, states that have vast and complex legal structures and institutions, then that
desiderata would be easy to achieve. Modern states could simply eliminate all of their laws
save for the prohibition against purposeful killing.
Any plausible theory of the legitimacy of the state should characterize the primitive
state that I have just described as extremely defective. It is illegitimate. That is so
notwithstanding that it obviously carries the mantel of a general moral obligation to obey
the law. And, no theory would recommend that modern states jettison all but that single
legal prohibition. What we should conclude is that the primitive state would not have a
moral right to keep its job. Why is that?
The key to thinking about the legitimacy of the state and the moral rights that states
have is that states have incredibly important moral jobs. What I mean by that is that states
have certain necessary moral responsibilities, or moral duties, that make up their job
description. At a minimum, we expect our states to do certain things and not to do certain
things. For the moment, I want to leave that job description undescribed. But, needless to
say, the primitive state that I have described would not live up to the job description
articulated within anyone’s most basic political theory of the state. We, and our political
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morality, expect much more of our states and our political leaders than what the primitive
state has to offer.
To deflate the import of the example, one might object that there isn’t really a
general moral obligation to obey the law in the primitive state that I described. Of course
there is a moral obligation not to kill other people without provocation, but what the
primitive state has done is merely reproduce what is independently morally required.
When we talk about a general moral obligation to obey the law, we are referring to
something different and more interesting, namely an obligation to obey the law because
it’s the law. 1 What that means is that the moral obligation to obey a particular law arises
from the fact that it is a valid law and not, or at least not completely, because the action
that the law prohibits is independently morally prohibited.

That is the so-called

requirement that any moral obligation to obey the law be a “content-independent”
obligation. Such an obligation is supposed to be morally binding because it is a valid legal
obligation, not because of the independent moral merits of the content of the law in
question.
Throughout this dissertation, I will have more to say about the moral purpose that
content-independence serves.

Nonetheless, the primitive-state example can be

reformulated to accommodate that point without altering the basic argument that political

1

Cf. Stephen Perry, “Law and Obligation,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 50
(2005): 270 (“[T]he most theoretically interesting justification for a general obligation to
obey will . . . begin with the fact that we are dealing with a system of directives and then
ask which moral property or properties of the system, considered as a whole, might give
rise to an obligation to obey each of its directives regardless of their individual moral
content.”).
4

legitimacy in some sense involves a threshold satisfaction of a certain, perhaps minimal,
job description. Many defenders of the idea that legal obligations can be morally obligatory
have focused on the moral importance of certain kinds of coordinated social activities that
only states have the capacity to bring about. 2 Such coordination is achieved through public
decision making by the state.
We can simply reformulate the primitive-state example in terms of a legal
obligation that is addressed to bringing about some sort of morally important coordinated
activity. Let’s say that the primitive state, instead of legislating that intentional killings are
prohibited, legislates and enforces a law that requires all individuals to drive on the right
side of the road. 3 That again is all the primitive state does. Coordination of activity on
roads is a morally important end, and the law’s arbitrary insistence that individuals drive
on one side of the road rather than the other serves that end. Coordination is achieved
because individuals can simply look to the rules of the road to determine how they should
drive. The moral obligation to abide by the legal rules of the road, in this case a single
rule, is perhaps one of the least controversial examples of a content-independent statecreated moral obligation that one can come up with. And, the previous point still holds
true. A primitive state that makes a single demand that all those subject to its authority
drive on the right side of the road would have satisfied the requirement that there be a

2

E.g., John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980), 23133; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986), 49-50; Stephen
R. Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of
Law, ed. Brian Leiter and Leslie Green, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),
57-58.
3
If another example of morally necessary coordination would be preferred, it can easily be
swapped in, and the argument can proceed along those lines.
5

general obligation to obey the law. But, it should not pride itself in that because it surely
has no legitimacy; it has no moral right to keep its job. Instead, it must do more.
One of the points I will make in the chapters that follow is that the state is morally
necessary and has a morally necessary job because of its capacity to solve certain widescale coordination problems through the issuance of legal rules despite reasonable moral
disagreement between equal moral persons. The state’s coordinative capacity and its
ability to serve as an arbiter of disagreement are morally necessary to secure a life in which
individuals can live independently of each other in ways that are consistent with each and
every individual’s freedom to live their own lives. The state’s job description, therefore,
is to secure equal freedom amongst its citizens. That job includes solving certain moral
problems that would arise without a state and coordinating systematic legal solutions to
moral problems that arise from living amongst one another, including creating and
maintaining legal solutions to private law, criminal justice, healthcare, the environment,
the economy, basic constitutional rights, and so on. Rightful coordination demands that a
legal rule bind primarily in virtue of its status as a valid law that resolves reasonable
disagreement, rather than it bind simply in virtue of some sort of independent assessment
by individuals of what they believe is the morally best approach. Toward that end, I build
off certain ideas found in Kantian political theory. 4

4

While at points I rely heavily on ideas in Kant’s political philosophy, the arguments are
not meant to be explications of Kant’s own writings. Instead, the goal is to present a view
that is Kantian in spirit but that relies on and engages with modern day disputes within the
jurisprudence and political theory literature.
6

This dissertation proceeds in the following chapters. The present chapter focuses
on the basic question of what it means to say that the legitimate state has a moral right to
rule in cases in which the state, like any modern state that we are familiar with, is not
perfect. I assess several models for that right in light of the notion that a theory of
legitimacy needs to be responsive to the idea that state’s have certain moral responsibilities
in virtue of which they are enabled with the rights that they can legitimately possess. I
argue that a minimal conception of legitimacy will invoke the notion of a threshold
responsibility in virtue of which the ruler can claim a modest right to continue in the
position of performing the moral task.
Chapter Two focuses on the moral right to equal freedom of all persons, a right that
is inherent in all liberal political theories. I argue that a fundamental aspect of the idea that
persons are free and equal is that they have a moral right to equal freedom, which means
that each individual must have legal rights that secure their capacities to pursue their own
ends in a way that is not subject to the will of another. I argue that moral indeterminacy
and reasonable disagreement necessitates an authoritative legal order that publicly defines
and coordinates our personal rights. Basically, it is the state’s job to exercise its moral
authority through the law to secure equal freedom by publicly and decisively defining, and
coordinating our rights. I maintain that the law is up for the task and that rights cannot
serve their practical purpose of protecting individual equal freedom absent laws and legal
actors to systematically define and secure our rights. Law serves the dual purpose of
securing our rights and a form of equality. Chapter Two emphasizes the static character of
some laws, with a focus on the law’s ability to secure and to coordinate legitimate
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expectations. Chapter Two also addresses the voluntarist objection that legitimate political
authority requires consent.
Chapter Three emphasizes the dynamic character of legal authority and the broader
collective tasks that legitimate political authority serves. There I argue that the law plays
a fundamental role in coordinating the behavior of individuals subject to its authority for
the purpose of achieving large-scale collective objectives in a fair manner. Specifically, I
maintain that securing equal freedom is a collective project in which we can be forced to
share responsibility in a fair manner.

In the course of doing so, I address several

comparable accounts that ground the authority of the law in both the need for coordination
and the principles of fairness.
Chapter Four explains the broader idea of specificationism that was in the
background of the discussions in Chapters Two and Three. I argue that the law’s task is to
publicly define what actions count and do not count as being consistent with the freedom
of other individuals. The law legitimately serves that function when it mandates a
specification that is drawn from a larger set of reasonable interpretations of what freedom
demands. I draw on several examples to explain how freedom can be consistent with a
variety of ways in which we might order collective living and responsibility.
Chapter Five is about democratic authority and its relationship to equality. Here I
argue that where popular political control can effectively secure equal freedom, then
political authority must be democratic to be legitimate. Otherwise, those who are in
political power would be treating those subject to their rule as inferiors and subjecting them
to their own private purposes. Here, I discuss several competing accounts of democratic
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legitimacy, concluding that there are a range of “democratic” forms of government that are
consistent with the underlying requirements of equal treatment.
Finally, Chapter Six briefly addresses the particularity objection. A number of
theories of political authority falter because they cannot explain the particularity or
specialness of the relation between a state and its citizens. For example, in the everyday
case, Pennsylvania citizens are required to abide by the laws of Pennsylvania, not the laws
of New Jersey or France. In Chapter Six, I articulate the basic problem. Then, I explain
why it is important to distinguish between particularized authority in contrast with
particularized obligation. That distinction, I argue, allows us to avoid the problematic
conclusion that individuals only have political obligations to their own state or their own
citizens. In the end, I argue that particularity is primarily grounded in instrumental
considerations about the ability of a given state to coordinate behavior and secure rights.
National borders, in a sense, serve as proxies for a state’s effectiveness rather than limits
on its responsibilities.
1.1 - The Moral Task Framework
As the primitive-state examples indicate, states have huge moral responsibilities —
jobs — that go well beyond merely satisfying a general moral obligation to obey the law.
Any adequate theory of political legitimacy will have to grapple with that fact. The idea
that states have jobs and that their doing or not doing their job impacts their legitimacy
suggests a specific form of argument that theories of political legitimacy should follow.
First, any adequate account of the state’s political legitimacy will have to offer an
explanation of the state’s job description in broad or specific detail. Put in different terms,
9

it will identify the legitimate state’s moral role, responsibility, function, purpose, point, or
task. Part of that explanation will address the issue of why the state, rather than some other
human institution, is uniquely suited and/or morally necessary to do that job. One upshot
of this first requirement is that the legitimacy of any given state can be measured by the
extent to which it is doing its job. Accordingly, its legitimacy may be partial rather than
an all or nothing thing.
Second, a theory of political legitimacy will then explain why the state has a
legitimate claim to any of a broad range of moral rights in virtue of its job and its
discharging its moral responsibilities. We can ask why the state’s job demands that it be
enabled with certain moral rights. Those moral rights are what John Rawls refers to as
“enabling rights,” rights that are had so as to “fulfill certain duties that are prior in the order
of grounds.” 5 The upshot of that latter point is that the nature and scope of a state’s rights
should be determined by its underlying moral responsibilities and the extent to which it is
living up to its job.
According to some, the state’s right to rule is a right to command and be obeyed.
That is best understood as the claim that the state is enabled with a moral power to impose
obligations on those subject to its authority. 6 But a moral power is not the only category
of enabling right that the legitimate state might claim to possess. Wesley Hohfeld has
explained that there are four distinct species of right, with each species of right having a

5

John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2007), 144. See also Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Claim-Rights,” Ethics
123, no. 2 (2013): 206-07.
6
For this point, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 24, and Perry, “Political Authority and
Political Obligation,” 1.
10

distinct logical form. The basic framework is captured in Hohfeld’s table of “jural
correlatives”:
Right:

Claim Right

Privilege

Power

Correlative to:

Duty

No Claim Right Liability

Immunity
Disability7

The top row captures the four different species of rights. The columns designate jural
correlates, namely pairs of “incidents” that logically entail one another. To say that the
state possesses a general moral power-right to obligate its citizens is to say that its citizens
are generally morally liable to have an obligation imposed on them. That liability is
essentially what any individual’s purported moral obligation to obey the law actually
consists in. 8 States of course claim to have the moral power to change their citizens’ moral
situations in any number of other ways. 9 For example, the state might have a moral power
to confer rights or take them away. What that means is that a state’s citizens are liable to
be conferred rights or have them taken away. Nonetheless, the state’s enabling right to rule
might consist in any number of Hohfeldian rights adequately described, such as a claimright to use coercion, a privilege-right to do the same, or simply a claim-right to continue
in the role as ruler. I will have more to say about those rights later, but suffice to say that
there are a host of distinct, non-mutually-exclusive enabling rights that the state might

7

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning,” The Yale Law Journal 23, no. 1 (November 1913): 30. The basic
Hohfeldian scheme is described in Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Harvard
University Press, 1990), 37-60, and Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights,” Philosophy &
Public Affairs 33, no. 3 (2005): 224-37.
8
Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 1.
9
Ibid.
11

possess in light of its moral responsibilities. What is most important is that any candidate
theory of political legitimacy must explain the nature and scope of the Hohfeldian right
invoked and do so with reference to the state’s moral responsibility.
The structure of argument that I have just described is not novel and can be broadly
described as a “moral-task framework” of political legitimacy. Elisabeth Anscombe
described the general form of such a theory, in which rights arise in those who bear certain
necessary moral tasks: “If something is necessary, if it is, for example, a necessary task in
human life, then a right arises in those whose task it is, to have what belongs to the
performance of the task.” 10
The moral task framework is appealing because it isolates and connects two central
questions in political philosophy. First, what is the moral point of the state? There is no
shortage of candidates, often explicitly identified as such but often not, in the existing
literature:
Hobbes: “[T]he procurement of the safety of the people . . . [and] by safety
here is not meant a bare preservation, but also other contentments of life,
which every man by lawful industry . . . shall acquire to himself” 11
Locke: “[T]he enjoyment of [] Properties in Peace and Safety.” 12

10

G.E.M. Anscombe, Collected Philosophical Papers Vol: III (John Wiley & Sons, 1991),
145. Leslie Green describes such accounts under the heading of a “task-efficacy account.”
Leslie Green, “The Duty to Govern,” Legal Theory 13 (2007): 179.
11
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1994),
ch. XXX, ¶ 1.
12
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University
Press, 1988), II, ch. XI, § 134.
12

Hume: “[P]reserving peace and order among mankind.” 13
Kant: “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s
choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in
accordance with a universal law.” 14
Rawls: “[S]ociety as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one
generation to the next.” 15
Raz: “[T]heir role and primary normal function is to serve the governed. . .
. It is to help them act on reasons which bind them.” 16
Finnis: “[C]o-ordinating action to the common purpose or common
good.” 17
For any candidate moral purpose, we can ask: Is that really the state’s job? Is that all the
state has to do? Is that exclusively or specially the state’s job? And, why? The role of the
state in liberal society is obviously an important question. Once those questions are asked
and answered in the abstract, then we can begin to ask of any actual state whether it is
doing its job and what that means for its legitimacy.
The second component of the moral task framework asks another important
question: What moral rights do states have in light of their jobs? That is in part an inquiry
into how the state must or can go about doing its job? As noted above, such rights are

13

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp
(Oxford University Press, 1998), § 4 (emphases omitted).
14
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge University Press,
1996), 387.
15
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), 15.
16
Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 56.
17
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 232.
13

“enabling rights.” The basic idea is that certain moral rights are crucial for the state to
discharge its moral responsibilities. Insofar as those rights aid the state in fulfilling its
moral purpose(s) those rights are minimally instrumental in nature. 18 This view fits well
with the idea in jurisprudence that the law, through which the state exercises its moral rights
to rule, is in part a tool with a moral function or purpose. 19 Scott Shapiro has emphasized
this recently in his “planning theory” of law. According to Shapiro, the law, which he
understands to be a kind of massive shared plan, is a tool, a technology even, that can be
used to manage decisions, motivations, and social activity more generally. 20 The state
obviously has other tools at its disposal, such as printing presses, traffic lights, police
vehicles, and construction equipment, among other things. But the state’s capacity to
utilize those tools fundamentally boils down to its being able to rightfully exercise its moral
authority through the law. Taxes are raised through laws that impose obligations to pay
taxes. Budgets are passed with laws, and money is ordered to be directed to certain
agencies. State workers build roads after they are ordered by other state workers who have
the authority to tell them what to do. The state’s moral right to rule therefore pervades
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even the most tangible aspects of statecraft. Understanding the nature of that authority is
therefore paramount.
Any adequate theory of political legitimacy cannot work outside the moral task
framework. That is in part exhibited by looking at theories that attempt to do so. Before
addressing such accounts specifically, lets look at another example of how easy it can be
to generate a general moral obligation to obey the law, an example that fails to address the
two moral task questions. An easy way to assume an obligation to obey the law is to
promise your mother that you will always obey the law. We can imagine a number of
reasons why one might do that. Perhaps your mom has anxiety about you going to jail,
perhaps she just happens to be a supporter of the state that you both live under. The reason
does not very much matter. Insofar as we can agree that individuals have a moral obligation
to uphold their promises, one would have a general obligation to their mother to abide by
the law.
The difficulty with the scenario just described is that although it has offered a moral
ground for your obligation to follow the law, that ground has nothing to do with the
legitimacy of the state or the law. It tells us nothing about what job we expect the state to
do. It tells us nothing about the rights the state has with respect to you. It tells us nothing
about why the state exercises its authority by issuing laws. It does not even tell us whether
states are good things generally or whether your state in particular is any good. We’ve
only described a moral relationship between you and your mother. You very well could
have promised to abide by the demands of someone else, such as the local psychic or life
coach. The account in no way addresses the state, or its rights and responsibilities with
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respect to you at all. What is more, the obligation in the above case is not even any of the
state’s business. It is not its role to make sure that you uphold your idiosyncratic promises
to your mother. It is your mother’s right to hold you to account if you break the promise.
It is her business, not the state’s, at least according to the promise-to-your-mom account of
the obligation to obey the law.
A number of contemporary theories of political legitimacy face a similar difficulty
largely because they fail to connect the two issues that form the core of the moral task
framework. Instead, they seek out sources of legitimacy in places that have very little to
do with the state or the law. In doing so, they fail to offer any apparent account of what
moral rights the state has and for what purpose it has them. Take Ronald Dworkin’s wellknown associative-obligation theory of political legitimacy. 21

Dworkin is rightly

motivated to offer an account of the obligation to obey the law. He maintains that “no
general policy of upholding the law with steel could be justified if the law were not, in
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It is interesting that Dworkin conceives of the problem of political obligation as a part
of his more general theory of the nature of law. Dworkin thinks that a rule or principle is
law if “[it] figure[s] in or follow[s] from “the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural
due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal
practice.” Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986), 225. Yet,
neither his theory of law nor his theory of political legitimacy identify any apparent
function for legal rules, legal systems, or the state, aside from the purposes of those values
more generally. Moreover, Raz thinks things are even worse for Dworkin’s account insofar
as Dworkin’s theory of law is at cross purposes with what Raz believes is actually the moral
function of legal rules, namely to mediate between person’s and the reasons that apply to
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general, a source of genuine obligations.” 22 That is an important claim, which I will return
to later on. Dworkin conceives of the obligation to obey the law as an “associative
obligation,” which is an obligation that arises within human associations that satisfy certain
conditions. He observes, correctly I think, that membership in certain social groups, like
friendships and families, can generate obligations between members. Those obligations
are not necessarily a consequence of choice or consent, which makes them appealing
candidates for political obligations given the political reality that not many people willfully
choose to assume such obligations. Instead, they depend in some way on the moral value
of participation in specific categories of social groups. Dworkin then identifies what he
believes are the common features of those membership-based social practices, features that
can ground special obligations amongst members of those social groups, with the goal of
explaining political legitimacy along those lines. Dworkin explains that “the members of
a group must by and large hold certain attitudes about the responsibilities they owe one
another if these obligations are to count as genuine fraternal [or associative] obligations.” 23
Those attitudes must exhibit four features. First, members of the group must view their
“responsibilities as special, holding distinctly within the group, rather than as general duties
its members owe equally to persons outside it.” 24 Second, “they must accept that these
responsibilities are personal: that they run directly from each member to each other
member.” 25 Third, “members must see these responsibilities as flowing from a moral
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general responsibility each has of concern for well-being of others in the group.” 26 Finally,
“members must suppose that the group’s practices show . . . equal concern for all
members.” 27 If those conditions are met in a political community, like friendships and
families, special obligations will arise amongst and between members of the political
community.
The initial difficulty is that it is not at all clear how attitudes about moral
responsibilities amongst group members can generate actual moral responsibilities. That
difficulty would apply to how the account explains any associative obligations within any
social group. Instead, we need a moral argument for why those attitudes amongst members
are morally justified or reasonable, or even morally required. Those issues aside, the state
does not seem to condition its exercises of authority or its doing of its job generally on the
existence or not of certain attitudes amongst its citizenry. Thus, it is unclear how the
presence of such attitudes is supposed to address any state’s general policy of employing
force.
Nonetheless, there is a larger problem, which returns us to the point made earlier
about addressing the specific moral responsibilities of the state and how the state has
certain moral rights in virtue of those responsibilities. Dworkin’s account of political
obligation does not explicitly address the moral point of the state or the law. Based on his
associativist account and his writings more generally, we might reasonably assume that the
state’s primary responsibility is to secure equal concern for the well-being of its members.
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Or, to protect rights. Or, to act with integrity. But, it is not at all obvious how those moral
tasks or goals inform the question of what enabling rights constitute the state’s legitimacy
or why the state needs any such rights in particular. In likening political obligations to
obligations that exist amongst friends or family members, Dworkin effectively declines to
explain why states play fundamentally different roles in our lives. 28 States have distinct
moral jobs, which do not include acting as a friend or family member. They claim distinct
rights, foremost of which are a right to tell people what to do and a right to force them to
do it. The relationship between parents and young children aside, friends and family do
not claim such rights. States also are comprised of and operate through often highly
complex legal systems. Those features of the state need to be explained and legitimized in
their own right. Otherwise, we have not offered an account of political legitimacy but some
other social phenomena that might arise in social groups. Although parallels may be
drawn, friendships, families, and other forms of human association have distinct normative
characters. 29
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I will note one benefit about Dworkin’s argument. Many theorists urge that political
authority and political obligation are problematic because they are not voluntary. But if
Dworkin is correct about certain forms of human relationships, we cannot insist that a lack
of voluntariness is automatically morally problematic. Pointing to analogous obligations
can address certain objections even if doing so is not sufficient as a stand-alone account of
political legitimacy.
29
Although not the same point, my point here overlaps with parts of Rawls’s argument that
the “basic structure” of society is the primary site of principles of justice. Rawls, Political
Liberalism, 257. On Rawls’s view, distinct normative principles must be addressed to the
basic structure of society because it plays a fundamentally distinct role in our social lives
by securing the background conditions for social cooperation. Ibid., 265-69. Another way
to put Rawls’s point is that a theory of justice has to address and be responsive to the special
role that the basic structure plays. My point here is that we need to think about the
legitimacy of the state in a similar way: what special role does the state play? Rawls’s
19

Other prominent views face similar difficulties. Take the principle of fair play as
initially propounded by Rawls as an account of the conditions under which one can have a
moral obligation to obey the law. 30 The basic idea behind the principle of fair play is that
individuals who “accept” the benefits of a fair cooperative scheme have a responsibility to
do their fair share in the scheme. To follow the law is to do one’s fair share. 31 The principle
of fair play has obvious difficulties. The first is that in most states that we are familiar
with, people simply do not choose to accept the benefits that they receive from the state in
any normatively meaningful way. So, it is hard to see how any state would satisfy the
principle of fair play as a broad or narrow matter. The second problem is that it is not clear
why doing one’s fair share requires one to follow the law. It would seem that a duty to do
one’s fair share is just that: a duty to do one’s fair share. That duty can be discharged in
any number of ways besides following the law. 32
A larger problem is the problem noticed earlier. The principle of fair play in no
way addresses the special responsibilities of the state, why it has those responsibilities, and
why those responsibilities give it certain rights. To be sure, Rawls conceives of the state
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as a system of fair social cooperation. Fair social cooperation is its purpose. The principle
of fair play fits with that purpose. Yet, the principle does not identify any benefits,
cooperative or otherwise, that are exclusively provided by the state, benefits that at least in
some way would make the state distinctive and warranting special rights to achieve those
benefits. The state just looks like any other cooperative enterprise, like a baseball team or
a prom committee, enterprises that do not share the state’s rights. Our laws may reflect
many of the political obligations that the principle of fair play would suggest. Yet, nothing
in the account indicates that we could not get rid of states completely and, in their place,
participate in non-state social cooperatives. Thus, to explain the legitimacy of a state, the
principle of fair play is inadequate. 33
Stephen Perry has made similar points under the heading of what he calls, “the
reverse-entailment problem”:
[T]he proposition that a right to rule entails a general duty to obey does not
itself entail, certainly as a matter of logic, that a general duty to obey entails
a right to rule. Moreover, we can easily imagine circumstances in which
there is a general obligation to obey the law, at least in the sense that there
is an obligation to conform one’s conduct with each and every legal
directive, but we nonetheless remain, at best, uncertain as to whether or not
the state has a right to rule. Let me call this the “reverse-entailment”
problem. Its essence is that the existence of legitimate authority logically
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entails an obligation to obey, but an obligation to obey does not logically
entail the existence of legitimate authority. 34
One genesis of the problem is the failure of political theorists to recognize that when the
state has legitimate authority it has a moral power to change the moral situation. The state’s
right to rule, insofar as it has a moral power that it can exercise, instead is fundamentally
dynamic. What one subject to authority has is a political liability rather than a static moral
obligation. 35
The problem, however, is deeper. We can’t address the problem simply by
switching gears and talking about moral liabilities. Return to the example above with your
mother. In that case, you promised your mother that you would always follow the law.
You assumed not just obligations currently in existence but a liability to have your moral
situation altered when the state issues a new legal directive. Hence, even if the state ends
up with an actual ability to change your moral situation, there is no sense in which we have
offered a moral argument that directly addresses whether the state possesses a moral right,
even a moral power, to do so. For any moral right to rule, whether it is a power, claim,
privilege, or immunity, the relevant Hohfeldian relationship must exist between the state
and whoever is subject to its rule. The moral task framework will satisfy that requirement
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because it is focused directly on what rights the state possesses with respect to those subject
to its rule and why. 36

1.2 - The Forward-Entailment Problem, Coercion, and Legitimacy Light
Ultimately, I will argue that states can possess expansive moral authority over their
subjects to alter their moral situations in a variety of ways through the law and to enforce
its demands to secure equal freedom. Such rights enable the state to discharge its moral
responsibility of coordinating our moral rights and responsibilities to each other in a way
that decisively resolves our reasonable moral disagreements about what those rights and
responsibilities should be. Legal rules are necessary to secure a relationship of equality
between persons. That is a relationship in which no person has the unilateral authority to
decide for others how we are to live together and secure freedom. It will be helpful,
however, to consider another scenario that brings us back both to the lingering difficulty
of establishing a general moral obligation to obey the law and the concern about tethering
the state’s right to rule to such an obligation.
Imagine in this example that a modern, complex state, with all of its laws, lives up
to whatever standard is set by your ideal moral or political theory of the legitimate state. 37
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Those who think it is completely impossible to legitimize states presumably would be
unable to engage in this thought experiment. But, it should be doable even for the more
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In such a state, there is a general moral obligation to obey every law. This state is that
good. Now, assume that the state then issues an obligation-imposing law that is in plain
conflict with whatever your ideal moral theory requires. It makes a single mistake, and
there is no longer a general moral obligation to obey the law of that state. How does that
affect its legitimacy? A realistic theory of political legitimacy should say, “not much.”
That is especially so when we compare the state just described with the perfect, but
primitive, single law systems described above. The primitive state that lived up to its
responsibility once could not be more legitimate, or legitimate at all, when put up next to
the nearly perfect state that makes a single mistake. A theory of legitimacy that identified
the perfect primitive state as legitimate and the complex but slightly imperfect state as
illegitimate has gone awry. What that means is that any requirement that the state’s legal
directives morally bind in all cases so as to satisfy the generality requirement will have to
be relaxed.
That conclusion makes sense. If states are so important and have such important
moral jobs, as we should argue, we should not expect their legitimacy to be undermined so
easily. 38 Hobbes and Hume were correct that political institutions are for the most part
artifice, products of human invention. 39 We would not create such enduring enterprises
that are so easily undermined. Of course, legitimacy determinations all depend on how big
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of a mistake the law makes, how often its makes mistakes, and whether there are reasonable
procedures in place to remedy such mistakes. But, mistakes, honest or not, around the
edges ought not undermine the legitimacy of a particular state on any realistic theory of
political legitimacy, even though those mistakes would seemingly undermine a general
obligation to obey the law. That is, states, political officials, and political institutions
should be legitimate in some sense even if the over-demanding expectation of a general
moral obligation to obey the law is not met now or ever. The thought is that legitimate
states are not just possible but are practical. 40
The upshot of that point is that a judgment that an authority is politically legitimate,
that it has a right to rule, should not automatically entail that there is a general moral
obligation to obey the laws of that authority. Call this the “forward-entailment problem.”
The problem is that we can imagine political authorities that are legitimate even where they
do not satisfy the demand of a general moral obligation to obey the law.
Here I want to discuss that problem, how it has led a number of theorists astray, and how
the problem is best addressed.
To start, notice what happens if we think that forward entailment is not a problem.
Many theorists accept forward entailment: that the state has a right to rule entails that it has
the general moral power to impose obligations on those subject to its authority and,
therefore, that there is a general moral obligation to obey the law. As Raz has articulated
the view (and the forward-entailment problem) as follows: “If there is no general obligation
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to obey the law, then the law does not have general authority, for to have authority is to
have a right to rule those who are subject to it. And a right to rule entails a duty to obey.”41
So if we accept forward entailment, we accept that a judgment that a state is politically
legitimate requires an inference that there is a general moral obligation to obey the law of
that state.
Forward entailment has created significant difficulties for defenders of the state. If
we accept forward entailment, we also have to accept that if there is no general moral
obligation to obey the law, then, by modus tollens, the state is not legitimate and has no
right to rule. Exploiting forward entailment has been the basic strategy of anarchist
thinkers over the past four decades. For example, Robert Paul Wolff famously argues that
a moral obligation to obey the law is at odds with the moral requirement that “we
acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy wherever and whenever possible.”42
Wolff uses that requirement to defeat any general moral obligation to obey the law and
therefore any possibility of a politically legitimate state:
If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of
autonomy possible, then there would appear to be no state whose subjects
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have a moral obligation to obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a de
jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous . . . . 43
A. John Simmons also exploits the apparent logical relationship between political
legitimacy and a general moral obligation to obey the law and legitimacy. Simmons’s
argument is straightforward: None of the traditional accounts of political obligation can
explain why any or all citizens are obligated to obey the laws of their state. In light of
those failures, we are forced to “deny[] that there are any governments which are legitimate
(or which are legitimate with respect to a large number of citizens).” 44
Defenders of the state have attempted to rescue the possibility and actually of
political legitimacy by severing the forward-entailment relationship between political
legitimacy and the moral obligation to obey the law. The basic strategy is to articulate a
less robust conception of political legitimacy, one that does not rest on a general moral
power to bind one’s subjects. 45 The strategy of rejecting forward-entailment is a viable

43

Ibid., 19.
A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton University
Press, 1979), 195-96. Simmons thinks that a robust form of consent could ground an
obligation to obey. But, it is unlikely that any and definitely not all citizens consent to such
a thing.
45
Scott Shapiro has described this strategy as “weakening the concept of authority.” Scott
J. Shapiro, “Authority,” in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law,
ed. Jules Coleman and Scott J. Shapiro (Oxford University Press, 2002), 393-94.
Edmundson also seems to understand the matter that way. Edmundson, Three Anarchical
Fallacies, 35-44. One might quibble that this is more a weakening of the concept of
political legitimacy, not political authority. Nonetheless, as will be urged below, the
paradigm understanding of authority is a moral power to change the moral situation. See
Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 1. Some of the watered-down
conceptions of political legitimacy still attribute moral powers to legitimate states, just not
the general moral power to obligate. Thus, it would be fair also to describe them as
conceptions of political authority.
27
44

strategy because the right to rule is not a univocal concept. As I noted earlier, there are a
host of Hohfeldian rights that might constitute the legitimate state’s right to rule.
A common proposal is that the state’s right to rule does not consist in a general
moral power but instead a general moral right to use coercion to enforce the law. Theorists
seem to differ on the precise Hohfeldian nature of such a right, either a privilege-right or a
claim-right. Here, I discuss some of those views with the goal of showing that they are
both conceptually and morally problematic. They may be conceptually problematic to the
extent that such accounts inadvertently invoke moral powers and thereby face most of the
same problems that they seek to avoid. They are also morally problematic insofar as they
commit to the view that the state can force a person to comply with a law, and even punish
them for disobeying such a law, even where the person had no obligation to do so.
As noted, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin argues that under certain conditions there is a
moral obligation to obey the law. Recall that such an obligation is an “associative
obligation” that arises within human associations that satisfy certain conditions. Before
Dworkin presents that account, he explains why the question of the moral obligation to
obey the law is so important for questions about the legitimacy of the state: “no general
policy of upholding the law with steel could be justified if the law were not, in general, a
source of genuine obligations.” 46 Call that Dworkin’s Point. Dworkin’s Point is that the
question of whether the state has a right to use coercion to enforce a law cannot be separated
from the question of whether individuals have a moral obligation to abide by that law. If
an individual has no obligation to follow a law and does no moral wrong in violating that
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law, then the state cannot be permitted to coerce them to do so. The state cannot rightfully
uphold the law with steel unless it has some moral right to demand one’s compliance with
its law. Thus, a general moral obligation to obey the law must be part of the basis for any
general moral right to force compliance with the law.
Dworkin is correct. Building off Kant, my view is that the moral right to equal
freedom makes legitimate political institutions morally necessary. In light of their purpose
of securing equal freedom, those institutions must be enabled with a variety of rights,
including both a broad moral power to alter our moral situation through the public issuance
of laws and a moral right to extract compliance with those laws. Any right to employ
coercion therefore cannot be legitimized separately from the state’s moral power to bind.
As Arthur Ripstein has put the point in presenting the Kantian view, “the state’s claim to
authority is inseparable from the rationale for coercion.” 47
In light of the sustained and mostly successful attacks on the idea that there could
be a general moral obligation to obey the law, a significant contingent of political theorists
have come to reject Dworkin’s Point. According to such theorists, a state’s political
legitimacy consists in its holding a general right to uphold the law with coercion without
its holding a general moral power to create morally binding laws. Christopher Wellman
summarizes one variant of the view as follows:
[P]olitical theorists often suppose political legitimacy and political
obligation to be inseparable insofar as they are logical correlates of one
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another. This is a mistake. The correlative of a state’s right to coerce is not
a citizen’s moral duty to obey: it is a citizen’s lack of right to not be coerced.
Political legitimacy entails only the moral liberty to create legally binding
rules, not the power to create morally binding rules. 48
A moral liberty is just another term for a Hohfeldian moral privilege. Political legitimacy,
on this account, does not entail a moral power to change the moral situation through the
issuance of legal rules. Rather, it simply consists in a moral privilege to enforce valid laws.
The legitimate state can have a right to force you to comply with the law without you
having any moral obligation to do what it demands. The benefit is that such a view does
not entail a general moral obligation to obey the law. The expectation then is that such a
view can avoid the pitfalls attendant to that sort of obligation, along with the modus tollens
attack that undermines the legitimacy of the state.
Versions of this view have been around for some time now. Robert Ladenson was
an early proponent, arguing that the state’s right to rule consists in a moral privilege,
specifically a moral privilege to use force to uphold the law. 49 On his view, the state has
the privilege to uphold the law with force if it has uncontested de facto power to maintain
peace and order. Its possession of that privilege is justified by its ability to maintain general
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peace and order through sanctions. Although the state is privileged to use force to uphold
the law, no one else is so privileged. 50 There are several perceived benefits of such an
account. First, where the state has a general privilege-right to rule it has no duty to anyone
not to enforce the law generally or in specific instances. Even if an individual does not
have an obligation to obey a particular law, the state supposedly does not violate that
individual’s rights when it enforces that law against them. They are not wronged by the
state upholding its laws with force. Second, and more importantly, there is no general
moral obligation to obey the law.

While the state has a privilege to enforce legal

obligations, there is no automatic moral obligation to abide by those legal obligations. That
would only follow from the state’s possession of an equally broad moral power to impose
obligations.
Wellman’s account follows the same basic structure. He conceives of the state’s
right to rule in terms of a privilege to issue legal rules that are coercively enforceable. Like
Ladenson, he offers a substantive moral argument that identifies the moral grounds for that
right. Wellman dubs that argument “samaritanism.” On the samaritan account, the state
benefits individuals by rescuing them from the perils of the state of nature, a circumstance
in which there is no security and no chance for a meaningful life. That rescue is achieved
by issuing and coercively enforcing laws, thereby providing political stability. No other
institution, for example, a private corporation or a free market, could realistically supply
that benefit. What is more, because individuals have a positive right to be rescued from
the state of nature, legal actors (or primordial legal actors) with the de facto power to

50

Ibid., 137-38.
31

perform the rescue have a positive responsibility to secure that benefit for individuals.51
They have a moral duty to exercise the privilege to secure the benefit.
It is notable and commendable that those accounts straightforwardly fit within the
basic moral-task framework I have outlined. Legal actors are enabled with a general
privilege-right to uphold the law with force in virtue of their moral responsibility and de
facto capacity to secure peace and order. In light of that de facto capacity, legal actors have
a general moral permission and privilege to uphold the law with force because they have a
general responsibility to maintain peace and order. The argument is instrumental in
character. The core difference with accounts of the right to rule that entail a general moral
obligation to obey, however, is that a different Hohfeldian element seems to be invoked.
The privilege-centric view is subject to conceptual uncertainty. There are two
reasonable ways to interpret the privilege-centric view just described. On the first,
interpretation, although such views attempt to abstain from Hohfeldian powers, they
unwittingly invoke such powers. On the second interpretation, the state possess a general
privilege to coerce its citizens and individual laws serve simply as fair warnings about
when the state is going to use force. 52 That view, however, paints a non-standard picture
of the law.
The privilege-centric account says that the right to rule is a privilege, not a moral
power. On the first understanding of what is going on, that is not the case. To make that
point clear, let me describe what happens on my own account when the state exercises its
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legitimate moral authority and issues a legal rule or directive, specifically an obligationimposing one. In that case, the state is exercising its moral power by exercising its legal
power to impose legal obligations.

When it does so, its obligation-imposing legal

directives are morally binding and morally enforceable. What does that mean? The
legitimate state’s exercise of its moral power in this case has several intended
consequences. First, the state has imposed a moral obligation in virtue of its legislative
action. But that is not all. Second, the state now has created a claim-right to enforce that
law. What that means is that the state has a right against interference with the enforcement
of that law and that individuals subject to the law now have a correlative obligation not to
interfere with the enforcement of that law. Finally, the state now has a moral privilege to
uphold that law with force, meaning that it does no wrong in enforcing that law. 53 Before
its legal enactment, the state did not have that privilege.
Notice that the account that I have just described also invokes a moral privilege to
enforce the law. The moral privilege to enforce a law stems from the creation of that law
and accompanies the moral obligation to abide by that law. Also notice that the privilegecentric accounts described above do not simply say that the legitimate state has a general
privilege to use coercion to do whatever it desires, or even simply to bring about peace and
order. 54 Rather, any privilege to use coercion comes into existence as the result of a duly
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I am not suggesting that there are not other changes in the moral situation that would be
consistent with this account. For example, we might argue that in virtue of that law, the
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exercised power to create legal rules. What that means is that the right to rule that Wellman
and Ladenson would have described is not simply a moral privilege. Instead, it is a moral
power to create moral privileges through the issuance of legal rules. So, even on the
privilege-centric account, the state is exercising a moral power and changing the moral
situation when it issues a legal directive. When the legitimate state issues a law, it creates
a moral privilege to enforce that law, thereby changing the moral situation. Obviously the
state is creating a moral privilege, not a moral obligation. But, it is a moral privilege that
is derivative of an antecedent moral power to change the moral situation. Therefore, what
Wellman and Ladenson would have described are really exercises of moral powers rather
then simply moral privileges. And the products of those exercises are morally binding
regardless of whether they are obligations or some other Hohfeldian incident.
On the second interpretation, the state possess a general moral privilege the create
laws and to coerce its citizens, a privilege that is justified generally by the need to secure
peace and order. On this account, laws serve merely as fair warnings about how the state
is going to use force. Hart described such a view as the “external point of view” of law; it
is the point of view of the individual who is only concerned to abide by the law to avoid
unpleasant consequences and the point of view of the person who does not believe in the

fairly abstract and therefore difficult to grasp, and that is not an unreasonable interpretation.
Nonetheless, I think Ladenson is best interpreted as describing a moral privilege to enforce
the law. Such a moral privilege is justified in virtue of the state’s ability and need to bring
about peace and order. That interpretation is more plausible because Ladenson claims to
be offering a “conception of law” that engages with views proffered by Hart and Dworkin
about obligation-imposing legal rules. So, he is offering an account of what he takes to be
the conceptual core of legal authority and legal rules.
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moral legitimacy such laws. 55 The difficulty with the privilege-centric view, then, would
be that notwithstanding whether the external point of view could be a plausible
conceptualization of the nature of such laws, it could hardly be a plausible understanding
of anything that looks like political legitimacy. To some extent, political legitimacy has to
be understood from the point of view of someone who believes that the state can actually
be just, and the external point of view does not support that basic picture.
With those more-conceptual issues out of the way, we can think more clearly about
whether such a view would evade any of the criticisms faced by the general moral
obligation to obey the law. One difficulty had to do with the notion that such an obligation
improperly involved being subject to the will of someone or something other than oneself.
The first interpretation still faces that problem. Moral powers, as a conceptual matter,
involve the willful and intentional exercise of a right to change the moral situation. A
moral power to create a privilege runs into that same problem. That difficulty attends to
any exercise of authority by the state over its subjects.
A second difficulty involves the claim that the moral obligation to obey the law
requires individuals to act according to someone else’s judgment of what should be done.
Later in this dissertation, I will say more about whether enabling the state with a moral
power to impose obligations actually demands that individuals give up their own
independent judgment, at least in any way that should be of concern. Nonetheless, any
privilege-centric view does not take us far from that problem. On the privilege-centric
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view, the state achieves its end of securing peace and order by backing up any demands
with threats to impose serious sanctions for non-compliance. People do not like jail or
substantial fines. The state gets people to do what it wants not by giving them a mandatory
moral reason but by giving them a sufficiently weighty self-interest-based practical reason
to follow the law. With the use of either “technique,” 56 however, the individual has no real
option to act in accordance with their own independent judgment of what should be done
because the state has demanded otherwise. So, individuals would still not be permitted to
do what they would otherwise do if they acted according to their own judgment of what
should be done.
The privilege-centric view also faces the same instrumental concerns faced by
views that assert general moral powers. Hume urged that we are bound to obey the law
“because society could not otherwise subsist.” 57 The plain difficulty with that view,
however, is that the subsistence of society does not hang in the balance like that. The law
can tolerate some level of non-compliance without ending up in ruin, so complete or
general compliance is not necessary to that end. 58 Hume’s argument does not adequately
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support a general obligation to obey the law. The privilege-centric approach fairs no better
on that score. Although political stability is a laudable end, and the state might be
legitimized in part based on its ability to secure that end, it is unclear why a general contentindependent privilege to uphold the law in all cases is necessary to secure that end. It
would seem that the state could still achieve that end without the privilege to enforce every
law in every single case.
Recall the price that is paid by replacing the notion that the state’s legitimacy
consists in a general moral power to impose obligations with the notion that the state’s
legitimacy simply amounts to a general moral privilege to uphold the law with force.
Privilege-centric views have to reject Dworkin’s Point that the right to use force has to be
predicated on the moral right to demand compliance or some other basis for asserting that
one has an obligation to obey a particular law. The privilege-centric view does not really
avoid any of the problems faced by the general moral obligation to obey the law and faces
its own problem. So, there is little reason to pay the price of denying Dworkin’s Point.
Before sketching a different deflationary account of the state’s right to rule, I want
to press two points. First, obviously it is important to keep in mind objections to the duty
to obey when crafting one’s own view. But the driving force behind any theory of political

echoes that when he says that, “[t]he main objection is that civilization as a we know it
simply does not hang in the balance every time one of us jaywalks.” Edmundson, Three
Anarchical Fallacies, 28. Neither is it the case that the resolutions of many important
moral tasks, such as maintaining an adequate social minimum, are completely undermined
without full conformity. As Simmons remarks, “Legal systems tolerate quite impressive
levels of noncompliance without performing the tasks in question interestingly less well
(than they would with greater compliance).” Christopher Wellman and John Simmons, Is
There a Duty to Obey the Law? (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 136.
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legitimacy should not be a desire simply to respond to possible objections. We should
always keep in mind that political legitimacy is about the state having a moral purpose.
Any account of its rights should derive from that purpose, not the need to skirt objections.
Second, in offering a competing conception of political legitimacy, we need to do more
than simply craft a conception that looks different on the Hohfeldian surface. We need to
be sure not to face the same exact problems that we sought to avoid.
Seeking to avoid the apparent difficulties with what I have described as forward
entailment, William Edmundson also proposes a different conception of political
legitimacy that emphasizes the coercive enforcement of the law. On his account, the state’s
political legitimacy consists instead in its possessing a general claim-right to one’s
compliance with the direct orders of legal actors (e.g., “Stop the car now!”; “You are
ordered to pay a $5 fine.”), in contrast with one’s compliance with more generalized legal
rules (e.g., “Driver’s must stop at all stop signs.”; “The penalty for putting your garbage
out before 5 p.m. shall be $5.”). The legitimate state also has a general claim-right to noninterference with such orders and the forceful administration of such orders. 59
Edmundson’s reasons for why such a view avoids the difficulties that attend to the general
moral obligation to obey the law are opaque. The primary reason seems to be that “[i]n
general, it is harder to have an assurance of harmlessness when [disobeying] a traffic cop,
rather than a traffic law.” 60 Because of “the relative directness of administrative [orders],”
“a train of consequences” “more firmly attaches to disobedience” of such orders. 61 Similar
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difficulties as those noted above face such a view. That aside, Edmundson’s view faces
difficulties. First, what he has described is not really a claim-right but some sort of moral
power to issue orders that require obedience and non-interference. Thus, any apparent
difficulties with moral powers should be reproduced here. But, second, even if we assume
that harmful consequences can stem from ignoring or violating a direct order, it is unclear
that we should attribute such consequences to the lawbreaker rather than the legal actors
enforcing the order. If there is no obligation to stop at a desert stop sign in the first place,
any harmful consequences that result from fleeing from police enforcing that law are not
the fault of the motorist but rather the police. 62 In fact, the account lays bare the basic point
that Dworkin made: forceful administration of a law that one had no obligation to follow
in the first place seems like a illegitimate abuse of de facto political power. 63 It is a mark
on the character of the state or its agents, not the lawbreaker.
Next, I will outline a modest view of political legitimacy that strikes me as a more
intuitive way to account for the idea that imperfect states can be politically legitimate, a
way that does not demand that all of a state’s laws or actions be legitimized in virtue of the
state itself being legitimate. I will use views presented by Alan Buchanan and Rawls to
articulate the position, and I will suggest that the model I propose is a better way of
understanding their own views.
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1.3 - A Threshold Model of Political Legitimacy
Most people do not do their jobs perfectly. But, if a person does their job well
enough, they have a right to keep their job. For any given job, a person has certain defined
responsibilities, and is provided with certain tools or abilities so as to effectuate those
responsibilities. If they do an adequate enough job satisfying their responsibilities, then
they have a claim to stay in or keep the job. They have a right to continue to use the tools
and abilities provided to them in an effort to satisfy their responsibilities as best they can.
That right is held against any individuals who would strip them of that job or severely
impair them in their ability to do that job. The up-to-par worker would have a rightful
grievance or complaint if they were stripped of their job. Something that rightfully
belonged to them and that they deserved to keep was taken away.
The language of claims and complaints invokes the notion of a Hohfeldian claimright. A claim-right stands in a correlative logical relationship with a duty. 64 If A has a
claim right against B to state of affairs X, then B has a duty to A to ensure state of affairs
X. For example, if Alice’s job is to stock shelves, and she generally does a good job, she
has a claim-right to her job. Others have a correlative duty not to strip her of that job. She
has a right to continue to take on her shelving responsibilities. She would have a claim or
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complaint against anyone who would strip or try to strip her of her job. That is so even
though she admittedly makes mistakes. 65
What does this have to do with a state’s right to rule? As I noted earlier, states also
have jobs. In fact, states perform morally necessary jobs or services, and certain rights
attach to them in virtue of those responsibilities. Throughout this dissertation, I will speak
more extensively about the different species of rights that states can posses in virtue of
their specific moral responsibilities. But suffice to say, a claim-right-to-keep-the job
account of the right to rule is available. In the chapters that follow, I will argue that the
fundamental job of the state is to secure the freedom of individuals to live independently
of each other in ways that are consistent with each and every other individual’s freedom.
The state’s right to use the law for that purpose is crucial. On the threshold account of the
right to rule, insofar as the state, or whatever relevant legal entity, is doing an adequate job
at securing freedom, meaning that it has satisfied a certain threshold for keeping the job
that is specified by its job description, then it has a claim to keep its job.
What I have described is a normatively weak notion. The threshold account is
normatively weak because there is no claim that any particular action of the jobholder is
correct or that the jobholder has a right to perform any particular action. The jobholder is
not beyond reproach. If the shelf stocker created a dangerous condition by leaving cans on
the floor, then one would be able to pick them up and offer criticism. Or, if a store manager
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Another way of expressing the point is that the jobholder deserves to keep the job in
virtue of doing what is an adequate job. For example, we would say that a student who
passes her courses deserves to continue in her major. Or, someone who is a good but not
great parent can still assert that they deserve to be a parent.
41

mistakenly told an employee to sell a product at an obviously incorrect price, then the
manager should be corrected. The same holds for the state.
The fact that it was the rightful jobholder’s job should not cause us to ignore the
jobholder’s mistakes. Instead, there is simply a claim that the person lives up to the
previously defined responsibilities of the job to a sufficient extent. They have a right to
keep the job in virtue of doing an adequate job, notwithstanding that they will do things
incorrectly or irresponsibly at times, though within limits.66 There is a commonsense, and
even reasonable, expectation that they will not be perfect. We can say as much about states,
the law, or political officials. In such cases, we have to be careful about who or what we
are attributing the mistake to. A theory of legitimacy that demanded perfection for any of
them simple to stay in the job would be unrealistic and unreasonable.
The threshold model invokes a kind of moral right, which means that it is a
normatively weak candidate for how we can understand the right to rule, or the legitimacy
of a state. So, the threshold model of legitimacy is distinct from a mere claim that the state
possesses some less-definite positive moral value. In the last few decades, A. John
Simmons probably has done the most to dispel any beliefs in the general obligation to obey
the law or the legitimacy of modern states, while at the same time deflating the moral
significance of those conclusions. According to Simmons, “the traditional notion of
governmental legitimacy . . . is not really at the center of the important problems in political
philosophy.” 67
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distinguish between good and bad governments. Governments can still broadly possess,
or not possess, whatever political virtues we expect them to possess, for example, justice,
fairness, goodness, integrity, and so on.

Those qualities, however, merely serve to

distinguish between governments that deserve our support and those that do not, rather than
between governments that have a moral right to rule and those that do not. 68
Built into Simmons’s point is his well-known distinction between the justification
of the state and the legitimacy of the state. According to Simmons, we provide a
justification of the state “by showing that some realizable type of state is on balance
morally permissible (or ideal) and that it is rationally preferable to all feasible nonstate
alternatives.” 69 Justification on Simmons’s account is comparative in nature. The basic
idea is that life in a state can be morally preferable to some other state of affairs, say life in
a state of nature, or life in a neighboring morally less preferable state. 70 One’s state can
thus be morally justified even if it does not have all or any of the moral rights to rule that
it claims for itself. Simmons admits that states do morally important, perhaps morally
necessary things, but whether they have any moral rights with respect to those subject to
their laws and legal actions is quite a different story.
A justification contrasts with a showing of legitimacy:
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A state’s (or government’s) legitimacy is the complex moral right it
possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to
have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce
the duties. . . . A state’s “legitimacy right” is in part a right held specifically
against the subjects bound by any state-imposed duties, arising from
morally significant relations . . . between state and subject. 71
That is the traditional understanding of the right to rule. As should be clear at this point, it
is not the only conception of legitimacy. The traditional view is standardly associated with
the related idea that individuals living under a legitimate state have a general moral
obligation to obey the law and that the state has a general moral right to uphold all of its
laws with force.
Accounts of legitimacy in the literature often elide the distinction that Simmons
draws. 72

For example, G.A. Cohen contends that legitimacy is “the property that

something has when, to put it roughly, no one has the right to complain about its character,
or, perhaps a little less roughly, when no one has a just grievance against it.” 73 Those
characterizations, however, are too broad. On the one hand, it seems over-inclusive. An
individual might have no right to complain because they cannot do anything to rectify an
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unjust situation or because they may do more harm in attempting to do so. That would not
be legitimacy, and it might not even be a justification. On the other hand, an individual
might have a right to complain and have a just grievance because the state is acting beyond
the scope of any of the legitimate moral rights that it has or is capable of having.
Nonetheless, then the account does not explain what legitimacy is but merely identifies the
types of attitudes or responses that are appropriate to direct toward the state when it acts
outside of the scope of its legitimate right to rule.
What is key to an account being one of political legitimacy is not the particular set
of moral rights described by Simmons. Instead, what makes political legitimacy distinct
from mere justification is that political legitimacy invokes moral rights. The state or a
particular state is not merely justified when it has certain moral enabling rights to rule. At
the most abstract level, a state’s political legitimacy just is a right to rule. But, as we have
seen, accounts of political legitimacy can very dramatically according to what sorts of
moral rights the legitimate state could or should possess.
The threshold model of the right to rule is not a justification of the state but a
normatively weak account of political legitimacy. Notice, first, that it is not comparative
in nature. There is no comparison to a state of affairs in which the person performs her job
perfectly. Nor is there a comparison to a state of affairs in which the person does not
discharge any of the responsibilities of the job at all. Nor is there any comparison to a state
of affairs in which someone else performs the job better. Such comparisons would tell us
whether some state of affairs would be better or worse. But they would not tell us whether
the jobholder has any claim to keep his job or not. The job holder is assessed according to
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a certain threshold standard that determines whether they are performing their
responsibilities adequately or not, and therefore whether they have a right to keep their job
or not. Second, the account provides a moral argument for a specific moral right that
attaches to an individual or entity that is performing a job. Any account of political
legitimacy has to identify the specific right or combination of specific rights that constitute
a state’s right to rule. The threshold model identifies a specific right, a claim-right to
continue in the job.
A claim that a particular state possesses some form of legitimacy serves to
distinguish the legitimate state from a slaveholder or a highway gunman.

A mere

justification of a state cannot do that. Begin with the slaveholder, a benevolent slaveholder.
The benevolent slaveholder is independently wealthy and runs a large farm that provides
fresh produce for free to local families. He uses slaves to get the job done. The slaveholder
rules over his slaves; he tells them what to do and lives off of their labor. This slaveholder
treats his slaves well. The work hours are reasonable and the work is not particularly hard.
The room and board is not just adequate, but downright luxurious. The slaves live in the
finest quarters and eat the finest food. Nonetheless, if a slave disobeys or seeks freedom,
the consequences range from beatings, death, or being sold off to another slaveholder who
is not benevolent.
There is nothing legitimate about the slaveholder. He has no right to rule over those
he deems his property. His commands carry no moral weight. They are “mere demand[s],”
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as Joel Feinberg would say. 74 But his slaves can justify living under his rule. The
slaveholder’s support of local families is of significant moral value. And, the alternatives
to obeying his demands are beatings, death, or becoming the property of an even worse
slaveholder. Yet, it does not matter at all that a slave is better off going along with his say
so or that the enterprise does moral good for local families. We don’t want merely to justify
the state along similar lines because we do not want to place it in the same realm as the
benevolent slaveholder.
A gunman situation can also be used to prove the same point. Hart famously
deployed the case of the highway gunman to show that John Austin’s theory that laws are
merely commands backed by threats mischaracterized legal authority as the gunman
situation writ large. 75 We can make a related point with respect to the moral authority of
the state. The gunman does not have any sort of right to force you to give up your money.
Nor does the gunman have any sort of right generally to continue in the job of being a
gunmen. If faced with a gunman, however, we often have good reason to comply with
their demands. Giving up one’s money is a rational response when the alternative is death.
And, there may be moral reasons to abide by the demand too. Perhaps you have a child to
care for. Perhaps the gunman has informed you that he is going to use the money to pay
for medicine for his ailing wife, and you would just spend it on beer. Despite some
justification, none of those reasons give him the right to your money though. Defending
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the legitimacy rather than the justification of state action serves to insulate the state from
the charge that it is really just the gunman situation writ large.
The comparison between the state and a person with a job is not perfect. There are
a few important differences. In fact, the state’s right to keep its job can be seen as more
robust than that of your average worker. For one, when we speak about the state we may
be referring to a number of things that form part of a complex entity. In the case of the
state or the legal system, we are speaking generally about a complex organization of
persons operating according to a complex set of rules. To use David Copp’s helpful
description, the state is a “system of animated institutions that govern [a] territory and its
residents, and that administer and enforce the legal system and carry out the programs of
government.” 76 To say that the institutions are “animated” is to say that “flesh-and-blood”
people fill and act within the offices and roles that are necessary for governance by a legal
system. 77 Thus, we could sensibly speak about an individual legal official’s right to keep
her job, or a political/legal institution’s right to keep its job, or the legal system’s right to
keep its job, or the state as a whole’s right to keep it’s job. That is not just a technical
point. States and legal systems are not monolithic things that we can only evaluate in
totem. We should not expect massive and complex modern states to possess robust forms
of legitimacy that exist independently of the legitimacy of their parts. That fact sits well
with the threshold model. There is no need to legitimize every single thing a legitimate
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state happens to do. Or, every single thing any individual legal official happens to do. For
any state action, we must always ask whether it reasonably counts as the performance of
the state’s job.
A state’s claim to keep its job is also normatively different from your average case
of a person’s right to keep their job in that the state’s right — actually any one of it’s rights
— is held on behalf of those whom it serves. Normally, your average worker has a claim
to his job because he has certain personal (moral) interests in his job. 78 He deserves it
because he is doing well at it. By contrast, the point of a state is to serve its subjects (or
even people more globally) and to secure equal freedom on their behalf by legitimately
exercising its rights to rule. When it deserves its job, we would also say that the people
whom it serves have a right to the state doing its job and staying in its job. It is in virtue
of the state’s moral responsibility to serve its subjects and to secure equal freedom that is
has a claim to continue in its job so long as it does an adequate job. When a given state
makes a claim to keep its job, it is doing so on behalf of those whom it serves. Its claim is
therefore derivative of the moral rights of those whom it serves. 79
A number of plausible theories of political legitimacy in the literature seem to fit
the basic contours of the modest threshold account I have just described, though perhaps
unwittingly. So I want to pause to discuss a few such theories, describe how they fit into
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the model, and urge that such theories should be construed along those lines. Such accounts
offer a way to fill out the state’s threshold job description and to understand the threshold
model more generally. Alan Buchanan offers an account of political legitimacy that
broadly fits the contours of the modest account of the legitimacy of the state:
The central idea is this: a wielder of political power (the monopolistic
making, application, and enforcement of laws in a territory) is legitimate
(i.e., is morally justified in wielding political power) if and only if it (a)
does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all
those over whom it wields power, (b) provides this protection through
processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect the most basic
human rights, and (c) is not a usurper (i.e., does not come to wield political
power by wrongly deposing a legitimate wielder of political power). 80
Notice that the account centers on a threshold responsibility: protecting basic human rights
and not violating basic human rights in the process of doing so. Insofar as a state credibly
lives up to that responsibility, it has a claim to stay in the job and to continue to use the
means employed in generally doing the job, namely political power and its enabling rights
to rule. That includes issuing legal directives and upholding those directives with force.
There is no requirement that the job be done perfectly, only that it be done credibly, which
is to say that a certain threshold has been met. Even the last criterion, that the wielder of
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Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” 703. Notice that Buchanan conflates
justification and legitimacy here. Moreover, one reading of Buchanan is that he is offering
a view akin to that offered by Wellman and Ladenson. We can ignore those difficulties in
light of the earlier discussions.
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political power is not a usurper, meaning the state did not steal the job from some other
entity that had a claim to the job, fits within the model I have described. You cannot violate
someone else’s right to the job and then seek to stand on the very same ground when your
right is challenged. Notice too how the account fits in the basic moral task framework
discussed earlier. The state has a job, specifically protecting and securing basic human
rights. And, it has a right to make, apply, and enforce law in order to do that job. Moreover,
we can say that such a state is minimally politically legitimate insofar as it is credibly
discharging that moral responsibility to the extent identified by the threshold described in
(a) and (b).
It is important to remain within the moral task framework even when simply
offering a threshold account. That is best exhibited by looking at a theory of legitimacy
that identifies a threshold but does not explicitly present a moral task analysis. Rawls offers
a threshold-based account of legitimacy that does not fit into the moral task framework in
a straightforward way but we can extrapolate to present one consistent with that offered by
Buchanan. Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy states that an “exercise of political
power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in
the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.” 81 The liberal
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Rawls, Political Liberalism, 137. Later, I will explain that despite the modesty of the
liberal principle of legitimacy discussed here, the principle is also unreasonably
overdemanding in that it requires that constitutional principles that all persons would
reasonably endorse. But the moral need for legal rules that can resolve reasonable
disagreement is premised on the idea that not all reasonable persons will endorse the same
principles. So, we need an account that recognizes the need for authority to resolve
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principle of legitimacy is used to determine whether a political regime is legitimate rather
than whether it is fully just. 82 A state must satisfy “constitutional essentials and questions
of basic justice,” which is a threshold requirement. 83 Rawls describes constitutional
essentials along the following lines.

First, constitutional essentials include the

“fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political
process,” including “the powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary,” as well as
“the scope of majority rule.” 84 Second, constitutional essentials include the “equal basic
rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities are to respect.” 85 That list of
basic rights and liberties includes: freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of
association, freedom of speech, the right to security and independence (including freedom
of occupation and freedom of movement), a right to personal property, a right to a social

reasonable disagreement without the expectation that all persons would reasonably endorse
every legislative or constitutional act.
82
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2001), 47. That is clear from the fact that the principle does not require
satisfaction of the second of Rawls’s two famous principles of justice, namely the
difference principle, which requires fair equality of opportunity and social and economic
equality unless inequality in those things would benefit the least advantaged. Interestingly,
one constitutional essential is that “careers [be] open to talents.” Ibid. In Theory of Justice
Rawls rejects careers open to talents as a defensible interpretation of the difference
principle, since it “permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by . . . factors
so arbitrary from a moral point of view.” Rawls, Theory of Justice, 72. That is an example
of why the issue of legitimacy should not be confused with the issue of justice. Rawls’s
charge of moral arbitrariness, however, must be too strong if liberal legitimacy is not also
to be guilty of permitting what is morally arbitrary. Even legitimacy should seemingly be
insulated from moral arbitrariness.
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Rawls, Political Liberalism, 227.
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minimum that provides for basic needs, and the protections of the rule of law. 86 In effect,
the liberal principle of legitimacy identifies the features that a political regime must
minimally possess, because it is its primary responsibility to secure those rights, before it
counts as reasonably just and therefore legitimate. Insofar as it satisfies that principle,
apparently the state has a right to continue to exist and continue doing what it has been
doing, but Rawls is not explicit on the point. 87
Notice what Rawls does not say in describing the liberal principle of legitimacy.
First, there is no explicit account of the moral point or job of the state in Rawls’s brief
discussion.

The implicit idea seems to be that the state has to satisfy or secure

constitutional essentials because it has a responsibility to secure those rights for its citizens.
Insofar as it does that job, then it is legitimate. Second, there is no moral argument for why
the legitimate state, in light of its job and its adequately discharging its responsibilities, has
the moral right to make, apply, and enforce legal rules. That is surprising in light of the
fact that Rawls maintains that the liberal principle of legitimacy is addressed to “two
special features” of political institutions: political institutions are non-voluntary and
“political power is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of sanctions,
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Ibid., 227-29. Although Buchanan refers to the need to protect “the most basic human
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“Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” 705. We could interpret Rawls’s principle as
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Earlier, I noted that for Rawls the more general point of a just state is to secure society
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invoked in Rawls’s discussion of political legitimacy.
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for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws.” 88 Those
obviously are two central issues in discussions of political legitimacy. Yet, the threshold
requirements of the liberal principle of legitimacy address neither of those concerns.
A modest account of political legitimacy does nothing more than identify a
threshold standard that a given state or legal system must credibly meet to continue to have
a right to continue in its job. That seems to be the core idea in Buchanan and Rawls and
the best way to defend such views. A threshold account does not tell us that any particular
exercise of political authority or power is legitimate. It does not lend legitimacy to any
particular exercise of political authority or power. A state’s modest political legitimacy is
consistent with significant failures at securing and protecting fairly basic rights so long as
they do not happen regularly enough and are not particularly egregious. So, a state’s right
to keep its job does not legitimate everything it does. Moreover, the modest account, as a
formal matter, does not say anything about the nature of the particular rights the state might
have beyond its right to continue in the job. More work needs to be done on that for us to
explain why the specific character of the state’s responsibilities require certain specific
Hohfeldian rights to discharge those responsibilities.
States obviously claim the general moral right to create morally binding legal rules
and uphold those rules with force. However, the modest account does not say that the
modestly legitimate state has a general right to create morally binding laws or to enforce
those laws. It just says that it has the right to keep its job, which includes generally
attempting to create moral obligations but perhaps failing.
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Rawls, Political Liberalism, 135-36.
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The modest account also does not justify or legitimize all of a state’s laws or
exercises of force. According to many theorists, states claim that all of their laws are
morally binding. That claim is most commonly associated with the claim that there is a
general moral obligation to obey the law. However, the modest account does not say that
the modestly legitimate state has that moral power. Nor does it identify the conditions
under which a state’s demands are morally binding generally or in specific instances. It
merely identifies the threshold that a state must meet for it to keep its job.
There is a tendency in political philosophy to think of states or legal systems as
monolithic things. If the state is legitimate, then all of the things that it does through its
valid legal processes are legitimate. The threshold model permits us to reject that view.
Put differently, we need not hold on to forward entailment. States, at least modern states,
are not monolithic things like the primitive states discussed earlier. Modern states consist
of numerous branches of government, agencies, and bodies of law, not to mention the
thousands of human legal actors that animate all of those institutions. Each of those
animated parts have their own jurisdiction or own roles in virtue of which they have certain
rights to do certain things, each of which can reasonably be described as exercises of
political authority. Each of those animated parts make decisions on a daily basis. Many
may make responsible decisions. Many may not. There is not one ruler but many. On any
theory of legitimacy, we should be able to assess the legitimacy of any and all of those
parts.
There are perhaps reasons to think of states as indivisible entities. For one, many
political philosophers are in the business of ideal theory. I don’t mean that in the sense that
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their theories are built on idealized assumptions about the circumstances in which we live.
There is obviously a lot of that type of theorizing, and there are legitimate reasons for
engaging in that type of theorizing. Some of that will probably happen in this dissertation.
Instead, I mean to say that political philosophers are often in the business of painting a
broad picture of the ideal that we should strive for. In the case of the state, that would be
the fully just state, one that, as a whole or systematically, always acts and organizes itself
and all of its parts according to whatever our the ideal principles of justice demand. In that
case, it makes sense to speak about the state as a whole as if it is a unitary thing.
More important though, according to a number of theorists, the state itself
understands its authority in that manner. It claims that those subject to its authority are
bound by any and all of its laws equally unless it permits otherwise. Its moral authority is
comprehensive and systematic. As John Finnis puts the point, the law “presents itself as a
seamless web.

Its subjects are not permitted to pick and choose among the law’s

prescriptions and stipulations.” 89 In light of that, the task for political philosophers would
seem to be to offer an account of the legitimacy or justice of a state that lives up to the
state’s image of itself. To be sure, that task is not primarily motivated by a need to preserve
conceptual sincerity. The law does not just claim that all of its laws are morally binding.
It also claims the systematic right to uphold its laws with force. The legitimacy of the
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John Finnis, “Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory,”
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 1 (1984): 120. Elsewhere, Finnis
makes a similar point: “[L]egal thought . . . embodies the postulates that each obligationstipulating law is a member of a system of laws which cannot be weighed or played off one
against the other but which constitute a set coherently applicable to all situations and which
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state’s self-image is therefore not just a matter of conceptual analysis but of justifying the
authority of the law to those who would face its worst consequences. It is an attempt to
address Dworkin’s Point.
The threshold account does not tell us much beyond that there is a threshold job
description beyond which a legal actor or entity gets to continue in its job. Such a right
protects it from revolution and actions that broadly undermine its ability to credibly do its
job. We work with and within such legitimate states rather than attempting to overthrow
them.
In not presupposing the idea that political legitimacy entails a general moral right
to compliance with the law or a general moral right to uphold the law with force, the
threshold model permits “a piecemeal approach to the question of the authority of
governments,” as Raz puts it.90 For Raz that means, first, that the extent of the state’s
authority can be partial and more limited than what the government claims, and, second,
that its authority can vary from individual to individual. 91 My own account rejects that
latter claim insofar as part of the moral necessity of authoritative legal rules is to create
reciprocal, meaning equally applicable to all persons, rights and responsibilities. Raz’s
piecemeal approach thus is at least in tension with the importance and assumption of
equality in liberal political theory. Nonetheless, we should accept that the state’s moral
power to impose obligations and enforce them can be partial and limited by what we
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Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 80.
Ibid.
57

identify as its moral responsibilities or tasks. The threshold model of minimal political
legitimacy fits with that picture.
In the rest of this dissertation, I will broadly lay out what the state’s job is, the
conditions under which it has the moral rights to rule that it claims, and why law is so
important. It is the legitimate exercise of those rights that lends to the state’s legitimacy
on the threshold account. To determine whether a state is credibly doing its job, we need
to be able to assess broad categories of state activity, as well as its individual actions.
Accordingly, we need to be able to identify when the state is actually doing its job.
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CHAPTER 2 - COORDINATING RIGHTS DESPITE DISAGREEMENT
In liberal political theory, rights have an important job to do — protecting the
freedom and independence of the individuals who hold them. This chapter is about the
moral function of enforceable rights and how the law has a necessary practical role to play
in securing those rights. Because rights have a job to do, the law has a job to do. 92
The law is morally valuable and necessary for its dynamic nature, as well as its
static nature. The law is dynamic in that legal officials are empowered to exercise political
authority to alter the moral landscape in a variety of ways over time. 93 They do so, for
example, by imposing obligations and conferring rights on those subject to their authority.
That capacity is important in the face of changed circumstances, recognition that a previous
legal solution is unworkable, or because regular discretion is required or valuable. I will
focus more on the dynamic character of the state’s authority in the next chapter, which
focuses on the importance of political authority for achieving broader public ends, ends
that do not straightforwardly implicate the personal sphere in which we live our lives.
Here, I want to talk about how the law is also valuable and necessary for its static
qualities. The law settles disagreements, often permanently, and in doing so creates and
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Jurisprudence and Politics, 25-60; Shapiro, Legality, 119 (“The[] function [of the
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. achieve goods and realize values that would otherwise be unattainable.”); Joseph Raz,
The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press,
2009), 163-79.
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For similar points, see Hart’s discussion of secondary “rules of change,” The Concept of
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Morality of Freedom, 171.
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secures legitimate entitlements and legitimate expectations in our private interactions with
others. In doing so, the law serves a morally important guidance function and, in turn, a
morally important protective function.
In this chapter, I will focus on the specific problem that reasonable moral
disagreement about the abstract right to equal freedom creates for the possibility of living
amongst others while respecting the freedom of others. The argument is Kantian in
character and runs as follows. 94 First, each person has a fundamental right to equal
freedom. What that means is that each individual has a right to a determinate and secure
normative space in which their person, property, and choices are not subject to the
interference or control of other individuals.

That normative space is articulated by

determinate bundles of Hohfeldian rights.) Second, the right to equal freedom is fraught
with moral indeterminacy, meaning that in a broad range of cases well-meaning reasonable
people aiming to respect the freedom of others will regard reasonable but inconsistent
courses of action as consistent with respecting the abstract rights of others. Indeterminacy
and the resulting disagreement undermines the very point of equal rights, namely that
individuals retain a determinate and secure normative space in which their person,
property, and choices are not subject to the interference or control of other individuals.
Third, what is a morally necessary task for equal freedom is coordination around a
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Kant’s defense of political authority and his account of private rights are found in the
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Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2009). That account is
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reasonable scheme of equal rights. Fourth, public political authority is able and necessary
to complete that moral task, and partly in virtue of that capacity, it is its responsibility to
do so. 95 Therefore, finally, if a public political authority exists that is effective at resolving
that task, then that political authority has the legitimate authority that it claims in
completing that task. That authority is in no way contingent upon the voluntary consent of
those subject to its authority. The view is broadly a moral task account of the legitimacy
of political authority, as described in the previous chapter. 96 The account describes one of
the broad roles of that state in virtue of which it possesses and legitimately exercises its
enabling rights to alter the moral situation and enforce our legal obligations. The basic
point is that one of, if not the, central moral tasks of the law is to specify or constitute a
public system of individual moral rights and duties that define and secure our freedom from
other individuals.
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The Thomist tradition offers a comparable approach articulated in terms of the common
good. John Finnis says of justice that “[b]ecause one’s pursuit of fulfillment would be
unreasonable and self-mutilating if it were indifferent to friendship and to the worth of the
instantiation of human goods in the lives of other people, one needs look to getting order
into one’s relations with one’s fellows, one’s communities. The name for that order, and
for one’s constant concern for it, is justice.” John Finnis, Philosophy of Law: Collected
Essays (Oxford University Press, 2011), 47.
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Green describes such as view as a “task-efficacy” account. Green, “The Duty to
Govern,” 165. The argument in broad form tracks Elizabeth Anscombe’s argument:
“authority arises from the necessity of a task whose performance requires a certain sort and
extent of obedience on the part of those for whom the task is supposed to be done.”
Anscombe, Collected Philosophical Papers, 138. And, then: “If something is necessary,
if it is, for example, a necessary task in human life, then a right arises in those whose task
it is, to have what belongs to the performance of the task.” Ibid., 145. The second
formulation is subtly different in that the individual or entity who performs the task holds
the right to the performance. But we could think that this right is held by someone other
than the task performer. For example, as I will argue here, one’s fellow citizens have the
right against their fellow citizens to a legal system that performs a moral task. Political
obligation therefore is fundamentally owed to our fellow citizens and not the state.
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2.1 - The Philosophical Anarchist’s Challenge
Before explaining how rights protect freedom, it will be helpful to articulate the
primary argument offered to block the inference that the state has a practical role to play
in our lives. Legitimate political authority, many would agree, consists in the right to rule,
where that right is understood at least to consist in a Hohfeldian moral power to impose
obligations and a right to demand conformity with those obligations. 97 The point can
equally be framed in terms of the power to confer rights and the right to demand compliance
with those rights. We can also include a right to use coercion as an element of legitimacy.
The state exercises its moral authority through it legal directives, meaning that a legitimate
political authority’s directives are not just legally binding but morally binding.
The philosophical anarchist, however, urges that there is no moral obligation to
obey the directives of the state, even the reasonably just state, 98 and challenges the
legitimacy of political authority. On the philosophical anarchist account, such obligations,
according to the philosophical anarchist, could only arise after satisfying fairly stringent
standards, such as universal voluntary consent. Although such standards could be satisfied
in principle, as an empirical matter they are unlikely to be satisfied with respect to most
people and most laws. Nonetheless, the philosophical anarchist’s broader point is that if
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one already has duties grounded in justice (or some other moral value) to do what the law
happens to require, then the law has no practical role to play. As Green puts the point, the
“general requirements of justice, and [any] special obligations acquired through consent”
would “pretty much exhaust our political duties.” 99 Non-consenting individuals subject to
the authority of the law would not have a moral obligation to obey the law on the ground
that the law results from legitimate exercises of the state’s legal authority. Thus, the fact
that something is the law does not provide one with any independent moral reason to act
beyond what morality (plus the empirical facts) already require.
As noted in the previous, those who are philosophical anarchists do not disagree
that states or legal systems can be morally justified in a broader sense. As Simmons, who
defends the position, puts the point:
Some illegitimate states may thus be justified by reference to the good that
they do, which is just to say that they merit our support, and thus we have
moral reason to provide it. But saying that some states merit support is not
at all the same as saying that they have a right to direct and coerce us, which
we are bound to honor. 100
Nor must the philosophical anarchist deny that we have non-voluntary duties of justice to
others. According to Simmons,
[e]ven in a relatively disorganized state of nature (as Locke emphasizes), it
is perfectly possibly — even if sometimes difficult — for persons to do their
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duty, obeying the natural law requirement of respect for others’ rights. . . .
But if the duty of justice could be discharged in a nonpolitical social
condition, then it is hard to see how we could reasonably derive from the
duty of justice a duty to obey our countries’ laws. 101
The philosophical anarchist therefore aims only to reject the particular idea that the
directives of the state are reason-giving or obligating in any way over and above what our
determinate natural duties and rights already require. The law, even the just law, is
therefore normatively inert. What matters, according to Simmons, is that we do what we
have all-things-considered most moral reason to do, including respecting and protecting
the rights of others and doing our fair share in pursuing our collective ends. Thus, the
problem for the defender of the idea that the state can legislate moral obligations is to avoid
the claim that there are moral obligations to obey unjust laws but to explain how the law
still has a moral role to play over and above pre-existing natural morality in the case of just
laws.
The philosophical anarchist is mistaken about the extent to which our natural duty
to respect the rights of others is able to serve the role of protecting freedom without
practical help from the law. The law, I argue, has a moral role to play in decisively
identifying or specifying which actions or forbearances count as respecting the right of
others when we interact. The law’s specifications change our moral situation in that they
give us clear and equality-preserving guidance on how to respect the rights of our fellow
citizens. Outside the context of the law, our abstract natural duty to respect the equal
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freedom of others cannot play that role. Because the role of the law is to specify
requirements of equal freedom, any law that could not reasonably count as a specification
of equal freedom need not be binding.
2.2 - Freedom and Rights
The commitment to equal individual freedom or liberty is at the core of liberal
political theory. Here, my point of departure is the basic liberal commitment that each
moral person has an equal right to freedom insofar as that right can coexist with the equal
rights of others. That of course is Kant’s view too. Kant contends that we have a single
innate right to “freedom as independence.” That innate right is the ultimate ground of the
authority of the state and the law. Kant articulates that right as follows: “Freedom
(independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with
the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right
belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity.” 102
Kantian freedom as independence can be abstractly defined in a number of
interrelated ways. First, the right to be independent of the choice of others is the right to
be your own master. Most broadly, it protects one’s capacity for choice. As a consequence
no other person can be permitted to be the master of another, and persons have a right not
to be placed in circumstances in which that would be the case. This protects individuals
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Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:237. The principle is analogous to Rawls’s framing of
his first principle of justice: “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Harvard University Press, 1971), 60. As will become clear later, Rawls’s later
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against having their person or property be subject to or dependent upon the discretionary
choice of another. Second, an individual’s right to independence is a right against wrongful
interference in one’s “purposiveness.” As Arthur Ripstein explains, this means “that you,
rather than any other person, [are] the one who determines which purposes you will pursue.
. . . [I]t is your right that no other person determine what purposes you will pursue, not that
you exercise that capacity successfully.” 103 Accordingly, wronging someone involves
interfering with a person’s capacities or powers rather than undermining the particular ends
that a person happens to have. Third, freedom as independence is a right not to be treated
as a “mere means” by others. In this way, an individual could not rightfully be bound by
a legal duty that required or permitted otherwise. Equally, others have a rightful duty not
to make others a mere means. So, individuals cannot simply be the pawns of other’s
purposes. Finally, the right to freedom as independence protects one’s capacity for choice
against being used or destroyed. 104 For example, just as you, absent my consent, would
not be permitted to cut my arm off, you equally would not be permitted to use my arm to
hold an umbrella over your head. Such constitutes an interference in my capacity to use
my arm in the way I see fit. Similarly, absent consent, one could not use or otherwise
destroy the property of another because such would constitute an interference with one’s
capacity to choose to use one’s property in whatever way one sees fit.
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In practice, what all of that amounts to is that each individual has an equal claim to
an equal, definite, and secure normative space in which their person, property, and choices
are not subject to the interference or control of other individuals. 105 Within that space, one
need not ask the permission of others. Persons have that right in virtue of the fact that they
are free and equal moral persons, namely persons who have the capacity to set and pursue
their own ends, and who have the capacity to recognize and abide the by the rights of
others. 106 At the very least, following T.M. Scanlon, we can agree that “the ability to
influence outcomes and protection from interference or control by others are things people
care about.” 107
Central to the idea that individuals have a right to a certain sphere of control and
choice that is insulated from the discretionary control and choice of others is the idea that
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there determinate limits on how we can treat each other. 108 Broadly, rights are valuable
because they articulate the fixed normative limits within which individuals are protected
in the exercise of their choice and control and through which they can form reasonable
expectations about the choices of others. Most directly, rights secure the freedom of those
who hold them.

To do that, our rights must be “determined (with mathematical

exactitude).” 109
What specific rights one has specify and define the contours of that sphere of
control. 110 To start, the way in which a right secures that sphere depends on the species of
right possessed. It will therefore be helpful to gain a basic understanding of the conceptual
distinctions between different species of rights and identify the manner in which particular
species of rights protect 111 the freedom of the right holder. To do so is in part to explain
the normative significance of rights within liberal political philosophy. 112

108

This cuts across the distinction between positive and negative duties.
Kant, Practical Philosophy, 6:233.
110
Cf. John Oberdiek, “Specifying Rights Out of Necessity,” Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies 28, no. 1 (2008): 128 (“[D]ynamism . . . distinguishes specified rights. A right, on
this picture, can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what
conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another.”).
111
I will generally use the terms “protect” and “secure” to describe the relationship between
one’s rights and one’s freedom. As will become clear, however, that relationship is more
nuanced. We ought not conceive of one’s freedom as something completely distinct from
the rights that one possesses. Our rights not only protect our freedom, they also constitute
our freedom. I discuss this point more in this Chapter and in Chapter Four, which discusses
specificationism more generally.
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These distinctions are also helpful in understanding the variety of accounts on legitimate
political authority that are discussed here.
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As noted in the previous chapter, Hohfeld described the conceptual framework for
characterizing different species of rights, with each species having a distinct logical form.
The basic framework of legal relations is captured in Hohfeld’s table of “jural correlatives”:
Right:

Claim Right

Correlative to:

Duty

Privilege
No

Power

Immunity

Liability

Disability113

Claim

Right

The columns designate jural correlates, namely pairs of “incidents” that logically entail one
another. For example, that Ann has a claim-right against Bob, logically entails that Bob
has a duty to Ann. Moving diagonally between the columns, we have pairs of jural
opposites, pairs in which the negation of one incident logically entails the other. For
example, that Ann has no duty to wash Bob’s car entails that Ann has a privilege not to
wash Bob’s car. I will flesh out the relationships more in the course of explaining how
each species of right secures freedom.
The way in which a right secures the freedom of the right holder depends on the
particular Hohfeldian right possessed. A basic starting point for and the core of the idea
that individuals have rights is the idea that there are determinate limits on how individuals
can treat each other. The idea of a limit is the core of a claim-right. Every claim-right is
logically correlated with a duty. So, insofar as an individual has a claim-right, someone or
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some entity has a duty to that individual. Other individuals are limited to complying with
their duties and therefore lack discretion to do what the limit proscribes.
Two examples will suffice to explicate the idea of a claim-right, the two examples
chosen from each side of the traditional distinction between positive and negative rights or
duties. A negative right is a claim-right that imposes a negative duty on another individual
not to act in a certain way. Such a right calls for a forbearance. For example, if Abe has a
claim-right against Barb that she not intentionally touch him absent his consent, then Barb
has a duty to Abe not to touch him in that manner absent his consent. By contrast, a positive
right entails an affirmative obligation on another to do something for or to provide
something to the right holder. If Abe has a claim-right against Barb to a watch in Barb’s
possession, then Barb has a duty to ensure that Abe gets the watch. Nonetheless, in both
cases, a logical relationship holds between the claim-right holder and the duty holder. As
Judith Jarvis Thomson puts the point, a claim-right is something “a person has against a
person [or entity].” 114 One cannot have “a claim out into the blue.” 115 Rather, a claimright is held against some other person or entity.
Claim-rights protect the freedom of the right holder by imposing obligations on
others. Claim-rights against specified forms of interference most clearly exemplify that
point. Rights against certain forms of interference in one’s person protect one’s ability to
do as one chooses with one’s own body. Similarly, a right against interference in one’s
property protects an individual’s right to do as one chooses with one’s property.
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Insofar as powers, privileges, and immunities are types of rights, it is not the case,
as Thomson puts it, that “[e]very right is a right to something.” 116 Claim-rights are rights
to something, namely a correlative duty, but that is not true of other rights. Under the
Hohfeldian scheme, a privilege-right is not a right to something; it is a right that consists
in the right holder not having something, namely a duty. The Hohfeldian correlate of a
privilege is a “no right.” What that means is that having a privilege to do something entails
that someone else does not have a claim-right that the privilege holder not do that
something. For example, if Abe has a privilege to swim in the lake with respect to Barb,
Abe does not owe Barb a duty not to swim in the lake. Often when we speak loosely of an
individual having a privilege, we mean to say that the individual has that privilege with
respect to everyone. For example, if Abe has a privilege to swim in the lake, then he does
not owe a duty to anyone not to swim in the lake. 117
A privilege-right protects the freedom of an individual insofar as having a privilege
entails that one does not have an obligation that limits one’s conduct. A privilege by itself
does not protect an individual from interference from others; that job is left to claimrights. 118 Rather, a privilege merely entails that one is not bound in some way and is
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therefore free from an obligation. The privilege holder therefore lacks certain specifiable
limits.
A power-right gives the right holder a moral capacity intentionally to alter the moral
situation of oneself or another, for example, by altering the duties or rights of another or
oneself. We recognize a number of circumstances in which having such capacities
constitute part of the power-right holder’s freedom. These include the moral power to bind
oneself by making promises and entering into contracts, the power to consent to things that
would otherwise be wrong absent one’s consent, and even the power to seek redress of
wrongs done against one’s person or property, among other things. 119 Such powers are
essentially expressions of each individual’s power to make choices about their person and
property in the course of pursuing one’s conception of the good, including entering into
certain sorts of relationships with other people. As Raz explains, moral powers are
constitutive of how “[w]e are all to a considerable degree the authors of our moral
world.” 120
Finally, a Hohfeldian immunity-right makes the right holder free from having their
moral situation changed. An individual’s immunity-right entails that someone else lacks a
power-right with respect to that individual. That individual therefore is not subject to the
moral control of another insofar as they have immunity from such control. For example,
individuals in liberal societies possess immunities against public and private demands that
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they participate in a particular religion. So, any attempt to impose an obligation to praise
the Pope would be ultra vires. No obligation would be imposed and the attempt to do so
would be normatively fruitless. Immunity against the decisions of others protects one’s
freedom in that one is not subject to the moral control of another. In different terms, insofar
as one has an immunity, one does not have a master and is not subject to another’s
authority.
Rights in common political discourse are most often not atomistic in the way
described. That is because when we speak loosely about rights, we are speaking about
collections of Hohfeldian rights. Take for example our right to bodily integrity. Such a
right arguably includes 1) certain claim-rights against interference in one’s person (e.g.,
non-consensual touching); 2) certain immunities from being subject to the choices of others
(e.g., the decision of another to sell your body); 3) certain privileges to use your body in
the way you choose (e.g., your privilege to waive at your neighbor or not); and 4) certain
power-rights to alter your own moral situation (e.g., consenting to let another hold your
hand).
The moral order that Kant describes is an order in which individuals are universally
and equally secure in a normative space in which: 1) they can determine the course of their
actions and property through their own choice in a way that is free from interference from
others within limits (claim-right), 2) in a way that is not subject to the discretion of others
within limits (immunity-right), 3) in a way in which they do not wrong others with their
actions within limits (privilege-right), and such that (4) they can alter their own rights
against and responsibilities to others within limits (power-right). Beyond that, however,
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the Kantian right to equal freedom alone does not tell us much about the specific content
of the rights that we have in our person or property. Rather, it tells us that we have an equal
right to have rights and that they have to be determinate and systematic to do their job.
That all serves to make the more general point that rights secure the freedom of
rights-holders in a variety of ways. Below I explicate that point further in discussing how
a system of equal rights secures freedom and how the law plays an important role in the
life and vitality of our rights.
2.3 - Moral Indeterminacy and the Defects of the State of Nature
Rights that articulate the space within which individuals can live independent of
the choices of others must be effectively coordinated in an public, univocal, and
determinate way to do their job. To understand that point, it will be helpful to look at life
absent those features.
At its core the state of nature in liberal political theory is a state of reasonable
disagreement spawned by moral indeterminacy in our rights to person and property rather
than a morally permitted war of all against all for private gain. Only against such a baseline
can we make sense of a mutual requirement and goal of ensuring the equal freedom of
others notwithstanding indeterminacy. 121 That baseline establishes the standpoint from
which we should assess the question of how laws can morally bind. Most agree that the
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law plays an important coercive function in that the law authorizes and uses force to
provide assurance and security for our rights, particularly against those who choose not to
respect the rights of others. But to justify the legitimacy of the practical role that the state
claims to play is also to justify that role to the reasonable citizen, one who aims not to do
arbitrary violence against others but one who aims in good faith to respect the rights of
others and to equally stand up for his own rights. 122
According to the philosophical anarchist, the reasonable citizen does not need the
state’s political authority to provide him with guidance about what he must do to satisfy
his obligations not to violate the freedom of others. On such a view, the state is permitted
to use force to protect individuals against those who will or who do violence to the rights
of others. But, in that respect, the philosophical anarchist believes the state is no different
than any other individual who is authorized to use force to protect their own rights or the
rights of others. Therefore, we need to understand why life without political authority is
not as the philosophical anarchist claims.
Arthur Ripstein, interpreting Kant, maintains that the state of nature suffers from
three defects. Those defects are moral in nature and make the state morally necessary to
secure our right to freedom as independence. First, acquired rights to property, which are
a necessary extension of freedom, are not possible in a state of nature. Second, acquired
rights cannot be secure outside of the assurance-providing coercive institutions of the state.
And, third and finally, in a state of nature our rights are indeterminate and subject to
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disagreement, as “objective standards cannot be established in a state of nature.” 123 For
those reasons, rights to property can only be provisional in a state of nature. Ripstein sees
those defects as interconnected but distinct. I am going to suggest that the primary defect
in the state of nature is indeterminacy in our rights and that the discrete problem of
acquisition would disappear in the absence of indeterminacy. But, for now, I will rehearse
Ripstein’s three defects.
According to Ripstein, it must be possible to obtain property rights in objects,
including land, because objects must be able to “serve as means for setting and pursuing
purposes.” 124 A secure capacity to set and pursue one’s own purposes within determinate
limits just is one’s freedom. It is that more general right that is constituted by our rights in
our person and property. The original acquisition of property, however, raises a problem
“because it does not simply change the world,” rather “it places others under new
obligations” as a result of the unilateral choice of the person acquiring the property. 125
What that amounts to is one person subjecting other persons to his own private will for his
own private purposes. That is the problem of unilateral choice or private authority.
Freedom is inconsistent with being subject to the private will of another person. That is
because each individual has an immunity that protects them against being subject to the
private will of another.
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The problem of private authority is raised because a private individual is
unilaterally interpreting his own rights and the rights of others. In doing so, he is
unilaterally using another person’s person and property for his own private purposes.
The problem is not raised, however, “if I move from one place to another, [such that] I
occupy space which is not available for your occupation while I am there.” 126 According
to Ripstein, that “change does not place you under a new obligation, but simply applies
[my right to my person] to a different circumstance.” 127
A legal system with publicly defined rules for acquiring property resolves the
problem in two ways. First, our right of acquisition of property must be reconciled with
the rights of others.

I cannot acquire property rights that result in unfair property

distributions or acquire rights that systematically undermine the rights of others. A
systematic solution is required. And, one must be able to tell where their property right
begins and ends. Second, and more importantly, the exercise of a power to acquire property
must be an exercise of a public power that is equally conferred to all. So, a private
individual cannot exercise the power of acquisition in a manner that serves only his own
private purposes. Acquisition in accordance with public authority, an authority that has a
public responsibility to all to ensure that all could be reasonable in abiding by the common
scheme, is the exercise of a public power with a public purpose.
The second defect is the lack of assurance or security for equal rights. According
to Ripstein, “without public enforcement, people lack the assurance that others will refrain
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from interfering with their property and, as a result, have no obligation to refrain from
interfering with the property of others.” 128 The point is not just that coercion is necessary
to protect one’s rights. Rather, if assurance is absent, then the problem of private authority
arises again: “If you refrain from taking what is mine, without assurance that I will refrain
from taking what is yours, then you are permitting me to treat what is yours, and so an
aspect of your capacity to set and pursue purposes, as subject to my purposes.” 129 Your
freedom is thus subject to my will because the security of your rights depends on whether
or not it happens to be my private purpose not to take what I am claiming is mine. The
solution to that problem is a coercive state that provides security and assurance that one’s
rights will be protected just like everyone else’s.
Before moving on to the third defect, I want to briefly discuss the notion of coercion
involved in securing our rights. For Kant, coercion is not primarily understood in terms of
punishment, which is how many would perhaps understand that term. Instead, coercion is
understood as a morally permitted constraint on the freedom of another to secure freedom,
or, as Kant puts it, a “hindering of a hinderance to freedom.” 130 Such hinderances are
necessary to secure one’s rights. As a practical matter, there are three basic categories of
such hinderances. The first is preventive. Public and private actors are permitted to
intervene and hinder the freedom of another to prevent that person from violating the rights
of others. For example, one would be permitted to restrain an individual who is attempting
to punch another person. The second is remedial. Public and private actors are permitted
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to remedy continuing and past hinderances. For example, if a person is trespassing on
one’s property, they can be physically removed from the property. Or, if someone steals
property, they can be forced to return the property or pay for it. The third category would
cover what we traditionally refer to as punishment. These are hinderances attached to
criminal offenses. Such hinderances serve both the purpose of deterring (or simply
confining) those who are not otherwise deterred by law or its remedial character, and the
purpose of punishing by imposing proportional retribution on those who commit wrongs.
Each of those categories describes a manner in which rights are enforced or upheld. 131
Returning to the moral defects in the state of nature, the third defect is that in the
state of nature our rights are not determinate. That is also the basic point that I am
emphasizing in this chapter. As Ripstein puts the point, “general rules are not sufficient to
classify particulars falling under them.” 132

More specifically, a general rule that

individuals are to respect to the rights of others is not sufficient to guide their actions in
particular cases because each person can disagree in good faith about what that requires.
It is partially but not fully determinate. The argument differs from the Lockean argument
that the state is necessary simply to settle rights disputes that tend to result in rancor and
violence. Of course, the state will do that too. But, even if there were no actual disputes,
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the state would still be necessary to settle the content of our rights. The point is that “rights
are necessarily subject to dispute, not that they are always disputed. The application of
concepts to particulars is always potentially indeterminate, and so requires judgment, as a
result of which the classification of particulars is always, at least in principle,
indeterminate.” 133 The view is also not the skeptical view that “the basic terms of social
life have no answers but somehow require them, so that institutions must step in to answer
them.” 134

There are certain precepts of freedom that are not subject to reasonable

disagreement, such that there is no role for the law to play in resolving a reasonable
disagreement.
Broadly the point is that ,
concepts of right do not always generate a single answer, but because they
demarcate aspects of a system of reciprocal limits on choice, their
application to particulars must be given a single answer in every case. . . .
[N]either the normative concepts nor the relevant facts nor any combination
of them guarantees agreement. Again, different people may . . . agree in a
wide range of cases. Any such agreement is, from the standpoint of right,
mere coincidence, and so rights are by their very nature subject to
dispute. 135
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In the case of acquisition of property, for example, there is always going to be
“indeterminacy, with respect to quality as well as quantity, of the external object that can
be acquired.” 136 Notwithstanding a determination not to violate the rights of others, in the
state of nature, the best that individuals can do is what they have a right to do, namely,
“what seems right and good” in the situation. Not to do that would be to subject their own
decisions about what is right to the private authority of other individuals with whom they
are interacting. Again, that is the problem of private authority.
Political authority resolves that problem by making our rights systematically
determinate in a univocal way that secures the freedom of all. In the state, no longer are
one’s rights dependent on what others subjectively deem to be right and good in the
situation but are now dependent on determinate public standards.
The broad theme running throughout the previous discussion is that the three
defects amount to the problem of private authority. Private authority is contrary to freedom
as independence because what freedom consists in is being able to choose the course of
one’s life independent of the private purposes of other individuals. That problem is a real
problem that needs to be cured by the state.
Moreover, although assurance is a defect in its own right where we cannot assume
that others will abide by the law, the first defect turns primarily on the third defect, namely
moral indeterminacy.
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reasonable expectation that any one individual’s acquisition of property can be made
consistent with the equal property rights of others absent a univocal specification of our
rights. And, second, such acquisition in a state of nature involves one individual imposing
obligations on others in their own private manner and according to their own private
interpretation of what right requires. Those problems, however, go away if we assume for
the moment, as the philosophical anarchist does, that there is a true account of equal natural
rights that governs our property rights, including the mechanisms by which we acquire
property. Assume that something like the Lockean account of property acquisition is
correct, that we have a right to appropriate property though the use of our labor insofar as
“there is enough, and as good left in common for others.” 137 The Lockean who acquires a
particular piece of property, say land, alters the moral situation of others insofar as those
persons now have certain duties not to violate the Lockean’s property rights by trespassing
on that land.
If that is indeed the case, no problem of private authority arises, as the Lockean’s
property was acquired by exercising the same and singular right and capacity to labor that
each other free human being is endowed with. That capacity can be exercised for whatever
purpose any individual chooses, just like an individual in the modern state can exercise a
legal power to acquire property for whatever purpose she chooses. What is more, if the
Lockean account is true, the Lockean can raise a private authority objection of his own to
the Kantian: by disregarding the Lockean rights of others and placing state-imposed
normative conditions on property rights, the Kantian is attempting to alter the moral
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situation of those who have acquired bona fide property rights through the use of their
labor. So, the Kantian needs the indeterminacy argument to find a defect in acquisition.
The Kantian can make that argument. The problem of private authority arises
because the Lockean account of property acquisition is woefully indeterminate with respect
to the mechanism of acquisition and the character of the right acquired. First, there are just
no clear answers as to what constitutes enough and as good left: Is that measured by the
area of the property? The agricultural quality of the property? The market value of the
property? And, so on. What is more, even if that could be determined, it is unclear how
the necessary coordination between each acquisition is supposed to happen. Second, is
there a minimal amount of labor that must be used to acquire property, and must that labor
continue for the property right to continue. Third, when one labors on a particular piece of
property there will be “indeterminacy, with respect to quality as well as quantity, of the
external object that can be acquired.” 138 Nozick raises that point in discussing Locke’s
labor-mixing theory of property acquisition, questioning whether “[b]uilding a fence
around a territory presumably would make one the owner of only the fence (and the land
immediately underneath it),” or all of the property within its bounds. 139 Finally, even if
one acquires a property right to a particular piece of property, that does not settle the
question of the content of the right acquired. Is the right absolute, or are their exceptions?
Are their limits on what can be done with the property? Is there a time limit on the right?
And so on.
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It is only because of that indeterminacy that the problem of private authority is
generated. That is because in unilaterally interpreting what the nature of one’s property
rights are, one imposes one’s own view of what the moral situation ought to be on other
individuals. Such a right would confer unequal authority on that individual, authority that
could not be shared by all. Because of indeterminacy, others also have different reasonable
views about what our property rights consist in. As an equally free moral person, each
person has no reason to defer to another private individual’s judgment about what property
rights they have.
2.4 - Necessary Features of Rights
In light of the previous discussion, I want to focus on how indeterminacy
undermines the ability of rights to articulate equal spheres of independence. We have
already seen that indeterminacy in the state of nature results in the problem of private
authority. Here I want to explore that idea more broadly and explain what is needed for
rights to articulate a domain within which individuals can lead independent lives.
Rights that articulate the space within which individuals can live independent of
the choices of others require several important features that cannot be satisfied outside of
the state. First, rights must be systematically coordinated between persons and across time.
Largely that means that our rights must be coordinated in a univocal and settled way such
that they are mutually consistent and universal. For an given right, all persons must know,
or be easily able to know, the legal content of the right such that it makes sense to say that
there is in fact a specified legal rule in existence that governs conduct. Call that the
coordination requirement. Second, our rights must be action guiding in a decisive and
84

determinate way in broad cases. There must be definite courses of action that count as
respecting rights.

Call that the decisive-reason requirement.

Third, rights must be

publically knowable. Call that the publicity requirement. Fourth, the state must be broadly
effective in satisfying those requirements. Call that the effectiveness condition. Those
requirements are interconnected and mutually reinforcing, but it is helpful to separate them
out.
The basic idea behind the coordination requirement is that the mandate of a system
of equal rights presents a kind of coordination problem in light of the fact of moral
indeterminacy. What that means is that there is a moral need for all members of a
community to act or “coordinate” according to a single scheme of rights that is internally
consistent and egalitarian. This obviously is not a coordination problem in the traditional
sense in which individuals need to choose a course of action and the outcome is jointly
determined by the actions of all of the agents. 140 Rather, the point is that groups of
individuals who interact must have a settled rule that specifies the content of a right, which
they will conform their actions to and upon which they can assert their claims against
others. People are not coordinating their behavior simply by acting in accordance with
what everyone else is doing; instead, they are coordinating around a legal rule that they
regard as legitimate. 141 The first and foremost reason for that is egalitarian in nature.
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Insofar as we are all equal moral persons, we have the same basic rights that articulate our
freedom. That equality must be coordinated between people despite indeterminacy (or
inequality) between the various interpretations of our rights. But, finally, rights are
valuable because they protect one’s ability to form and follow plans around one’s
conception of the good. One cannot plan one’s life if what one is entitled to varies broadly
depending upon whom one is interacting with and how they interpret one’s rights. 142
Accordingly, the problem of unilateral authority represents a failure to coordinate
our interpretations about what rights each of us have. Outside of the state, each person has
a right to do what seems right and good to him. What that means is that the security of
one’s claims is arbitrarily dependent upon whom one happens to interact with and whether
their conception of one’s rights happens to coincide with one’s own. That is a problem
both because one is then subject to the private authority of another and because that
authority could not be shared equally. Of course we can enter into private agreements with
others, but then what rights we have is subject both to the bargaining power of others and
their own private purposes in deciding who to enter into agreements with. Moreover, even
if that were acceptable, we would constantly be forced to haggle with others about the
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terms of our interactions, which is hardly desirable from the perspective of freedom. By
contrast, if our rights are coordinated in a univocal and equal manner, those problems are
resolved.
The second requirement is that our rights must be action guiding in a decisive and
determinate way in broad cases. Rights must provide clear guidance as to what counts as
respecting the right, what is protected by the right, and/or how the right is to be utilized (in
the case of a power-right). Rights have the capacity to be action guiding in several ways.
First, rights guide the actions of those who possess them in that a right possessor can form
reasonable expectations about what he is and is not permitted to do and what others are and
are not permitted to do. That is important with respect to one’s ability to plan the course
of one’s life. Second, rights can guide the actions of those who are looking to avoid
violating the rights of others insofar as rights specifically define what counts as respecting
the rights of others. Finally, with power-rights, one most know specifically how to exercise
a moral power successfully insofar they are permitted to do.
We can first explain the idea with respect to claim-rights.

A claim-right is

correlative with an obligation. Obligations are commonly regarded as special types of
reasons for action, namely reasons for action that are “presumptively decisive,” namely
“reasons which, although they are capable in principle of being outweighed or overridden,
nevertheless present themselves as considerations upon which I must act.” 143

The

decisiveness of such reasons for action is part and parcel of the “trumping” quality of
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rights. 144 But, the decisiveness of such reasons requires that those reasons precisely
identify how one is to proceed to satisfy the obligation. And, insofar as a right-holder
expects others to abide by their obligations, the right-holder must have a precise
expectation as to how others are going to act, insofar as the right-holder has a reasonable
expectation that others will respect his rights.

Rights must be “determined (with

mathematical exactitude).” 145
Because of indeterminacy, however, freedom-based considerations cannot
decisively settle which courses of action are consistent with the freedom of others.
Indeterminacy does not just create reasonable disagreements between people; it also creates
reasonable disagreement within people about which course of action to take. For example,
I may believe that I would be reasonable to think that I have freedom-based right to use a
grill in my backyard despite the fact that the smell of barbeque will waft across my
neighbor’s yard, as she can close her windows. Such an intrusion, I might reason, does not
unduly burden my neighbor. On the other hand, I might reasonably think that the smell
from my barbeque violates my neighbor’s freedom-based right to enjoy her property as she
sees fit. Nonetheless, I would not be unreasonable in having either of those views.
Therefore, I do not have a decisive reason to choose one course of action over the other
and am left without a clear way to respect my neighbor’s freedom. 146
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If I choose to grill, my neighbor is similarly situated and does not know if she has a
right to complain about my grilling or if it is her responsibility to close her windows or
wear a mask to block the smell when I am grilling.
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Comparable points can be made with respect to moral powers. Not only must a
possessor of a moral power have clear guidance on how to exercise the power, others must
have a clear understanding of the circumstances under which moral powers are effectively
exercised. For example, one seeking to exercise the power of contract must be able to
ascertain the circumstances under which an attempt to exercise the power to bind oneself
or another in an agreement will be effective and enforceable. And, those putatively subject
to someone else’s power must know under what circumstances their moral situation will
be altered so that they can plan accordingly.
The publicity requirement is connected with the previous two requirements in a
fairly straightforward way. If there are to be equal rights that are action guiding, they must
be publicly discernible. For rights to coordinate action in a univocal and decisive manner,
and create and secure reasonable expectations, the fact of a right must be epistemically
accessible in a fairly robust way. Rights could not serve their practical role if they were
not capable of being readily known. They would not be able to guide action and therefore
not be able to coordinate our actions in a way that is consistent with all having equal and
secure rights. An unknowable right cannot be acted upon. It is also important that
individuals be able to see that others are respecting each other’s rights. They could only
do so if they can assess others’ actions against a public standard. 147
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This is also important for the effectiveness of the system, or the “stability” of the system,
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Finally, a state that is tasked with satisfying those requirements must be broadly
effective at doing so. Roughly, that is just to say that the above constraints must actually
be satisfied by the state. A law that is not broadly followed or enforced is not serving its
purpose. The state possesses effectiveness insofar as it not only has the capacity to
decisively coordinate behavior in a public way, but effectively does so. That point is
emphasized and at the core of John Finnis’s account of legitimate political authority.
According to Finnis, “the sheer fact that virtually everyone will acquiesce in somebody’s
say-so is the presumptively necessary and defeasibly sufficient condition for the normative
judgment that that person has (i.e. is justified in exercising) authority in that
community.” 148 Of course we need not go as far as to say that effectiveness is a sufficient
condition, but it is definitely a necessary condition.
The importance of assurance in Kant’s view is largely explained by the importance
of the state’s effectiveness at getting people to follow its directives. That the state needs
to rely on force to uphold the effectiveness of a system of equal rights is tangential to the
basic point that the state needs to uphold the effectiveness of a system of equal rights. If
we were all fully motived to abide by the state’s articulation of our rights, there would be
no need employ force to maintain the effectiveness of our rights. Assurance is assurance
that others will abide by rights, not that they will abide by those rights because those rights
are backed by force. 149
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Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 250.
Kant conceives of a right as involving a moral title to coerce. Kant, Practical
Philosophy, 6:232. However, title to use force in defense of rights does not imply that
force will be necessary to secure rights, just that it always be an option.
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Here I have argued that life outside the state is problematic from the perspective of
freedom. Reciprocal rights of freedom must be effectively coordinated in a public,
univocal, and determinate way to do their job. Insofar as the state has effectively done that,
it possesses the legitimate authority it claims to have with respect to our rights. In the next
two chapters I will say more about why the positive law is specially suited for that task,
first focusing on the importance of law for achieving broader collective goals and then
focusing on how specification of our rights and responsibilities works.
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CHAPTER 3 - DYNAMIC AUTHORITY, COLLECTIVE ENDS, AND FAIRNESS
In the previous chapter, I argued that that the law has a necessary practical role to
play in ensuring the freedom of those subject to it. Specifically, I argued that all individuals
have a right to a determinate and secure normative space in which their person, property,
and choices are not subject to the interference or control of others. Because of moral
indeterminacy in the right to independence, the law is morally necessary to publicly settle
how we are to interact with others in such a way that we do not violate their independence.
Reciprocal rights of freedom must be effectively coordinated in a public, univocal, and
determinate way to do their job. Insofar as the law effectively settles how we are to avoid
using and interfering with the person and property of others, we have moral obligations to
obey those laws.

The legal rights and responsibilities that govern the face-to-face

interactions between persons and property determine and secure our independence.
Here, I want to focus on how we use law to achieve and specify our broader
collective ends. This topic is normally discussed under the heading of public goods, 150
where our concern is not with individuals using or injuring the personal means, one’s
person or property, that uniquely belong to any discrete individual. Instead, our concern is
with individuals who do not participate in the relevant way in the state’s discharging of its
public responsibilities. Our public responsibilities are collective for two reasons. First,
they are derivative responsibilities that each of us have in virtue of being part of a state-
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linked collective that has certain responsibilities. Second, they are collective in that they
are discharged on behalf of and usually for the sake of the equal freedom of all members
of the collective. This obviously raises the issue of what collective responsibilities we
actually have. Put differently, what ends are states permitted to pursue through its
authority? How do such ends relate to freedom? How do such responsibilities implicate
what individual citizens are responsible for doing? This raises issues connected with taxes
and compelled civil service. Contemporary theorists usually explain the responsibilities of
individual members of the collective by reference to the principle of fairness. Here, I will
seek to understand that principle in terms of the moral responsibility of the state to secure
equal freedom in a fair way.
I will begin by sketching how securing and maintaining equal freedom in the face
of changing circumstances requires that political authority in part be dynamic. Following,
I explain how political authority has a coordinative role to play in discharging our
collective responsibilities. Next, I will discuss and criticize variants of the view that
fairness requires individuals to obey laws that effectively execute our collective
responsibilities. I will end by articulating a better way of understanding how fairness is
involved in legitimizing our collective obligations.
3.1 - Securing Equal Freedom through Dynamic Authority
Securing equal freedom is a big undertaking that requires fair, coordinated
collective action in the face of reasonable disagreement amongst a diverse populace about
the nature of our collective responsibilities and how they are to be discharged. Individuals
generally do their part in two ways: they pay, or they participate. Those activities need to
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be coordinated in some fashion. Here I will discuss in broad terms the nature of our
collective responsibilities or problems, and how the state’s capacity to coordinate behavior
is necessary to specify and discharge those responsibilities.
Any public projects that are the legitimate responsibility of the state must be
reasonably understood to secure and maintain equal freedom. Put differently, the state’s
legitimate power is limited to securing and maintaining equal freedom.

Otherwise,

participation in public projects could not be mandatory and coercively enforceable. As
Ripstein puts the point, “[t]he only powers a state may exercise are ones that fall under
various aspects of its duty to create, maintain, and improve a rightful condition.” 151
There are perhaps three interrelated categories of public projects that roughly 152 fit
that bill: securing rights, securing institutions, and securing relations of independence
through distributive justice. I described the first project in the previous chapter. We require
effective political institutions to specify and secure our rights in our person and property,
and to enforce agreements between us. The second project concerns adequately securing
the organs or instruments of government so that they can effectively discharge their
responsibilities to secure equal freedom. Put differently, the state has a responsibility to
maintain itself and maintain the means reasonably necessary to do its job. We need
effectively funded and staffed legislative, executive, and judicial bodies; public buildings
to house those entities; entities that protect those institutions, including the military, law
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Ripstein, Force and Freedom, 223. This is a more general way of capturing Kant’s
point that legitimate force must be a “hindering of a hindrance to freedom.” Kant, Practical
Philosophy, 526.
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To be sure, there may be other ways of dividing up categories of public projects.
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enforcement, and fire department; and other administrative agencies that deal with the
economy, public health, education, and so on to ensure that there are people able to take
on those responsibilities effectively. I do not mean to provide a comprehensive list, as the
nature and extent of any necessary government bodies is in many respects subject to
reasonable disagreement. The basic point is that insofar as any of those government bodies
are needed to secure our right to equal freedom, we need to collectively secure the ability
of those bodies to do their jobs effectively. We either need to pay or participate. 153
Ripstein identifies public roads and thoroughfares as a paradigm case of a
mandatory public end. The example is a good place to start. The necessity of roads can
be seen as derivative of the necessity of the first two projects I just identified. First, public
roads are necessary because without them private property rights in land would not be
consistent with equal freedom. If all land were privately owned, then individuals would
ultimately get trapped on their own land or that of others. The only way to move around,
pursue your own ends, and associate with whom you desire would be to seek permission
from one’s neighbors. But that creates a situation in which your freedom is dependent on
the choices of others. 154

Second, a similar problem arises in light of the state’s

responsibility to secure equal freedom, for example, by deploying law enforcement to
prevent an attack. Law enforcement would not be able to do its job of preventing an attack
if it was not able to get to the victim without trespassing on land or seeking permission
from owners of land adjacent to where the victim is located. The idea, then, is that public
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roads are a precondition without which private rights in land or public responsibilities to
protect would not be possible.
The third project deals with the state’s role in distributing resources for the purpose
of ensuring that individuals do not fall into impermissible relationships of dependence and
domination. Even if the state secures those rights that are covered by the private law, we
might still be concerned about how inevitable natural and social processes and
happenstance can place people in circumstances that are inconsistent with equal freedom.
Recall that freedom as independence requires not only that individuals be free from
interference by others by that they not be subject to relationships that are inconsistent with
their equal status as independent persons not subject to will of others. For example, that
sort of rationale can be used to account for the state’s responsibility to combat poverty.
The person who falls into poverty is effectively subject to the choice of those who are
fortunate to have more. Although such individuals have a duty of charity, that duty on the
Kantian account is an imperfect duty, meaning that individuals have latitude or discretion
in how and when they discharge the duty. The result is that the impoverished person finds
himself in a relationship in which his capacity to set and pursue his own ends independently
of others is subject to the discretionary charity of others. To resolve the problem, there
needs to be public provision of resources to secure those who might fall into poverty. 155
The basic rationale for poverty relief can be brought back to the rationale for public
roads. Recall that roads are necessary to prevent situations in which individuals are
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landlocked and cannot pursue their own ends without asking leave of their neighbor. The
situation is analogous to a case in which a person falls into a deep pit and cannot leave the
pit without assistance. 156 In effect, the person is landlocked in a hole, and he is completely
at the whim of possible rescuers who may or may not choose to rescue him, which is
inconsistent with his freedom. Mandatory public rescue is therefore necessary to cure the
dependence, just like mandatory public roads are necessary to cure the dependence when
someone is landlocked. Poverty relief can be analogized to mandatory public rescue. The
person who falls on hard times is like the person who falls in the hole: he is dependent on
the charity of others. He therefore has a right to be rescued with some sort of social safety
net.
The previous discussion was simply a sketch of how we should think about the
relationship between public responsibilities and equal freedom. Surely, we will have
reasonable disagreements about how to address the moral problems discussed. In any case,
the point is that for any proposed public responsibility we need to seek out justifications
that are grounded in the right to freedom as independence.
How can those collective responsibilities be discharged? The answer provided by
the moral task account defended here is that only effective political authorities enabled
with certain moral rights, most prominently moral powers to change the moral situation,
for example by imposing obligations, can discharge those responsibilities. The above
responsibilities are collective in nature. That is so primarily because of the scale and
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complexity of those projects, which require the expenditure of significant amounts of time,
manpower, and money. But they are also collective because we regard them as a shared
responsibility that must be discharged fairly. I will have more to say about that latter point
below.
In the previous chapter, I focused on the moral importance of the static character of
legal rules. When it comes to the rights and responsibilities that govern interactions
between private persons, the law is morally necessary to settle reasonable disagreement
between competing but reasonable interpretations of our right and responsibilities.
Otherwise, our person and property would not be secure even from morally motivated
individuals.
Not only is the law meant to settle such disagreement for the time being, it is meant
to settle it for good. That is especially important when it come to the laws governing our
person and property. Individuals require a stable sphere of dominion in which they can
make choices about their person and property, often over a lifetime, based on the legitimate
expectations set by the law. The laws governing those rights could not serve their purpose
of securing equal freedom if they changed much over time. This is one of the principles
inherent in the principle of the rule of law. 157
Notwithstanding, equal freedom must also be secured over time in the face of
constant changes in our physical, social, economic, and technological circumstances,
changes that have the capacity to undermine equal freedom. In addition, reasonable
disagreements that were once settled often reemerge. Recall that one aspect of political
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legitimacy is the moral power to change the moral situation. That power is dynamic in the
sense that it is a prospective capacity to alter how the current contours of the moral
landscape. 158 Insofar as that capacity can be used to alter the moral situation, for example
by imposing enforceable moral obligations, it is also a capacity that can be used to guide
and secure changes in the coordinated behavior of those who are subject the state’s
authority. 159
That a state with the dynamic capacity to alter the moral situation is morally
necessary should be evident from our earlier discussion of the need to intervene to protect
individuals from falling into relationships of dependence through time and the need to
secure institutions and rights over time. In the face of such changes, political authority
with the capacity to alter our coordinated behavior is necessary. Political institutions
themselves are also subject to degradation over time and require regular supervision and
revision. This is as true in mundane cases, such as allocating resources to fix infrastructure,
as it is in the more exceptional cases of allocating resources to military defense in the face
of real security threats. The broad point is that not only must we secure a rightful condition,

158

This discussion is informed by Perry’s analysis of political authority in terms of the
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to use Kant’s terminology, we need to sustain it over time in the face of natural and social
forces that would slowly or dramatically undermine that condition.
This discussion is limited in a number of ways. First, it is not meant to be an
exhaustive discussion of the range of cases in which moral change is necessary and
reasonable. The discussion is just meant to show that our legal circumstances are not fixed
by a system of rights and responsibilities that falls from the sky and is set for time
immemorial. Law is purposive and dynamic, and there are reasons having to do with equal
freedom to defend the need for law with that character. Second, although the authority to
change the moral situation is necessary, like any aspect of authority, it can be abused.
Obviously, we expect authority to be exercised consistent with the rule of law.
Notwithstanding a need for change, we expect that laws will still generally be reasonably
stable over time. That is both because law could not secure legitimate expectations if it
were to change constantly and because it could not coordinate our behavior if it were to
constantly change course. Although an exhaustive discussion of the relationship between
moral powers and rule of law principles is beyond the scope of this discussion, I highlight
the problem to show the limits of the discussion before pressing on to the next section.
3.2 - Coordination and Positive Law
Political authority is in large part legitimized by the moral necessity of resolving
large-scale coordination problems between persons through public laws that give easily
discernible guidance. Not only is coordination necessary for rights, it is necessary to get
large-scale projects done. Because the above responsibilities are collective in nature, they
necessarily require coordination between the broad range of persons who share in that
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responsibility. 160 How is that possible? The inability to coordinate our behavior without
law is not due simply to the frailties of the human condition, including limitations in the
reason, foresight, knowledge, or motivation of any given individual or association.
Although, those are legitimate concerns. Rather, even our most ideal well-motivated
citizens will reasonably disagree about what the right course of action should or must be to
discharge our collective responsibility to secure equal freedom.
Disagreement comes at two points. First, we may disagree about what it means to
secure equal freedom where that is understood as a certain state of affairs over time that
satisfies one’s conception of equal freedom. Second, we may reasonably disagree about
the means (including the timeline) according to which that state of affairs is to be secured.
Reason cannot be our only guide in many cases. And, even in cases where perhaps there
is an obvious better option, coordinating around a less-ideal option may be better than not
doing so. Absent a unitary legal authority to direct action, we would not be able to realize
our collective ends.
Political authority is able to coordinate our actions because instead of being guided
simply by our own conception of right, we are to be guided predominantly by the law. The
law is able to serve that purpose in part because of its positive nature. To determine what
equal freedom requires, and hence what course of action is required, we simply look to
what the law says. To determine that, we need only look to social facts about what legal
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officials, or bodies of legal officials, have done and said. 161 As Waldron expresses the
point, “law must be such that its content and validity can be determined without
reproducing the disagreements about rights and justice that it is law’s function to
supersede.” 162
More is required for the law to play its coordinative role beyond its positivity. The
law must be reasonably communicated to all those whom it seeks to coordinate. And, its
demands must be reasonably easy to understand. The law must also be effective both in
the sense that people generally abide by it but also in the sense that it is enforced and seen
to be enforced where individuals fail to abide. If individuals have no assurance that others
are following the law’s dictates, then they will see themselves as being duped into serving
the ends of others rather than coordinating with others for the purpose of sharing
responsibility in securing equal freedom.
Additionally, the moral need for political authority to achieve large-scale collective
ends is not just instrumental in nature. Rather, it matters that those ends are achieved
through the rule of law. Placing authority in legal rules and offices with public mandates
addresses the problem of private authority, in which we are subject to the private purposes
of others. In that way, law has intrinsic and necessary value apart from being a means to
securing a collective end. It puts each of us in a relationship of equality with our fellow
citizens.
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The law’s authority has limits. Its purpose is to resolve reasonable disagreement
about equal freedom, not to impose demands that no reasonable person would accept as
consistent with equal freedom. Where there is no possibility of reasonable disagreement,
then the state’s authority to specify our rights and responsibilities ends. For example, we
would be hard pressed to account for the permissibility of using public dollars to fund
sports arenas or religious celebrations. The moral task of equal freedom therefore also sets
limits on the uses of political power. For any possible public purpose, we need to identify
how it can be justified in terms of secure a system of equal freedom.
This point can be easily missed in discussions of political authority because of the
assumption that in legitimizing authority, we are demanding that individuals completely
surrender their judgment about what is right and what is not. 163 However, the point of law
is to coordinate our actions, not exclude thinking about how action should be coordinated.
The background assumption of this dissertation is that others are actively reasoning about
what course of action is right, but they will inevitably reasonably disagree. There is nothing
unreasonable or concerning from the perspective of equal freedom about that. Individuals
only become unreasonable in the event that they insist on acting according to their own
personal judgments about what freedom requires once the law settles the matter. It is at
that point that they unilateral impose their will on others and unilaterally undermine fair
solutions to securing equal freedom. They hinder freedom rather than simply thinking or
reasoning about doing so.
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3.3 - The Principle of Fairness and Political Authority
It is perhaps not that controversial that much of the law’s moral value comes from
its ability to coordinate human activity to achieve valuable ends. 164 A number of theorists
have therefore questioned whether we can draw the inference that laws rationally related
to such ends will bind all of those subject to the law. Recall my earlier discussion in
Chapter One of Hume’s defense of political obligation. Hume urged that we are bound to
obey the law “because society could not otherwise subsist.” 165 The plain difficulty with
that view, however, is that the law can tolerate some level of non-compliance without
society falling into ruin. 166 The same can be said about almost any of the public tasks that
are reasonably the responsibility of the state. 167 Thus, one might ask how the general moral
necessity of legal solutions to collective problems implies the moral necessity of any
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strictly consequential account of our duty to obey the state’s commands can be plausible.”
Ibid., 33.
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individual person complying with the law. Theorists have sought to resolve that problem
with an appeal to the notion of fairness. Fairness brings into the fold those actors and
actions that are not necessary to bring about whatever end needs to be achieved because
those individuals whose compliance is not marginally necessary would violate a duty of
fairness if they failed to comply.
Rawls was an early proponent of the principle of fairness, so our discussion must
begin there. Rawls argued that under the following conditions, an individual will have an
obligation to obey the law: First, there is a just scheme of social cooperation that yields
benefits. Second, the individual can benefit from the scheme even if he does not do his
part. Finally, the individual voluntarily accepts and intends to continue to accept the
benefits of the just scheme. 168 If those conditions are met, then the individual has an
obligation to cooperate and do his fair part, which in the case of the state amounts to his
obligation to follow the law.
There are a number of difficulties with the view, which I will address by looking at
the steps in reverse order. The first major difficulty is the step from the duty to do one’s
fair part to the duty to follow the law. We might accept for the sake of argument that if
one accepts benefits from a just social scheme of cooperation, then one has a duty to do
one’s fair share in producing that benefit. For example, say that I live in a town with an
ordinance that requires payment of a $5 tax that is used to pay for the daily services of a
river-cleanup technician. All of my fellow citizens pay the tax. I refuse, despite the fact
that I accept and enjoy the benefits of the clean river. It is where I fish for my dinner.
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Although I refuse to pay the tax, I clean the river on the day that the town does not hire the
technician. There is no difference in the cleanliness of the river because I clean the river
on that day, just like I do every other day when the town hires me as the technician. The
difficulty is that if one can do one’s fair share in a way that the law has not specified, then
one has not violated one’s duty to do one’s fair share even though one has violated the law.
Accordingly, the failure to do one’s fair share without additional premises cannot account
for why one’s failure to follow the law violates the principle of fairness.
The second problem is with the inference from receiving benefits from a just
scheme of cooperation to a duty to do one’s fair share in producing the benefits. Say that
364 of my co-workers agree to create a cooperative coffee scheme whereby everyone is
assigned a day to contribute a bag of Primo coffee. 169 I did not participate in the agreement,
nor was I somehow made aware of it prior to taking the job, but pursuant to the agreement
my name is put on a list with all of my other co-workers designating the date on which
each of us is responsible for buying one giant bag of Primo coffee for the pot. As a result
of the scheme, there are 365 cups of coffee available each morning, and a hot cup of coffee
is placed on my desk each day. I drink it each day because I like coffee, and I don’t want
to, and should not have to, walk down the hall to pour the cup out in the kitchen sink.
According to the principle of fairness, when it comes to my day, I am supposed to
contribute a bag of Primo coffee. 170 Yet, there is no apparent reason why I can be required,
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part to the duty to obey the rule. Even if I believe that I have a duty to do my fair part in
the coffee scheme, there may be another way to do that. For example, instead of buying a
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let alone forced, into such a thing. The Primo coffee scheme is just a case of other people
foisting their own private purposes on me, which is a violation of my rights.
The next difficulties arise because the conditions that are supposed to trigger the
duty of fair play are rarely, and therefore not generally, present. Moreover, in part because
of that, those conditions in no way seem relevant to the question of whether one has a moral
obligation to obey a law. First, the applicability of the law to an individual is not
conditional on their voluntary acceptance. Laws, unless explicitly stating so, do not
condition their applicability on the voluntary acts of those subject to them. 171 There is a
good reason for that. We saw this earlier in Chapter Two. Conditioning the applicability
of the law on the voluntary actions of those subject to it permits individuals to unilateral
impose there own will on their fellow citizens. Second, the applicability of a law is also
not contingent up whether an individual benefitted from that law. There may be a broad
sense in which we expect citizens generally to benefit from the law, not in the sense that
they are better off than some comparative state of affairs or that they receive discrete
discernible benefits, but in the sense that they can exercise their freedom to personally
pursue whatever benefits they want so long as they abide by the rights of others. That just

bag of Primo as required, I might by a bag of Sub-Primo but spend thirty minutes cleaning
the deposits out of the coffee machine, which needs to be done to make good tasting coffee
even though no one else recognizes that fact. Nonetheless, a lot depends on how we
describe the benefit that is produced by the scheme. If the benefit is that all drink Primo
coffee each day, perhaps because Primo has special nutrients, one’s substitution is not
doing one’s fair share. If the benefit is that all drink good-tasting coffee each day, then one
has offered an adequate substitution.
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The nature of the acceptance necessary to ground the obligation of fair play is also
subject to dispute. Simmons, for example, defends a more robust conception of the
acceptance necessary for any duty of fairness. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 20.
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means the state is generally doing its job. However, whether a particular law is legitimate
and binding, fully or partially, on a person does not turn on whether they actually received
some benefit from it. For example, part of my tax dollars may be spent to fund a battered
women’s shelter. Being a man, I do not receive any obvious personal benefits from that.
Yet, surely the state’s funding of that program can be understood to be securing the equal
freedom of the women who need that shelter, and the state can demand some of my tax
dollars on that basis. I can be called upon to share in the responsibility of securing the
equal freedom of those women.
Several observations should be made at this point. First, I have not argued that the
principle of fairness, perhaps with some adjustments, is not applicable in contexts outside
of the law. For example, Simmons’s has articulated a version of the principle of fairness
with reasonably robust requirements that, if met in the context of our everyday voluntary
associations with others, would seems to ground a moral obligation to do one’s fair
share. 172 Second, despite that, it seems obvious that notions of fairness would somehow
be relevant and important in any discussion about what the state can demand of individuals
when it comes to the broader public responsibilities that make coordination necessary.
Accordingly, and finally, the implication is that the state is sui generous in that it is not
simply your average association amongst teammates or co-workers. Any fairness account
should presume that fact. This, as I remarked earlier, is the problem with conceiving of
the state simply as a system of social cooperation. Instead, the state is singular in the
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mandatory role it plays and the mandatory responsibilities that it discharges with respect
to securing equal freedom.
With those lessons in mind, a number of theorists have sought to combine the
principle of fairness with moral task theories of the state. For example, David Estlund
argues that we have a collective duty to solve humanitarian problems, which translates into
a duty that individuals have to do their “fair share” to solve such problems. 173 And,
Wellman argues that only states have the effective capacity to benefit us by rescuing us
from the state of nature. Therefore, states have a samaritan duty to benefit us by securing
peace and protecting rights. The principle of fairness then comes in to account for why we
all are subject to the law in furtherance of those ends even though any one of us would not
be marginally necessary to achieve the goal. 174
I will discuss Estlund’s use of the principle of fairness some in Chapter Five
because it fits with his account of the authority of democratic institutions. Because
Wellman offers a more developed and nuanced account of the issues of fairness relevant
in this chapter, I will focus on his view. Wellman summarizes his view as follows:
The samaritan model of political legitimacy explains that a state has a right
to force even those who do not consent because this force is necessary to
rescue this person and others. Adding samaritan duties and fairness to this,
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we can now explain that each person has an obligation to obey the law as
her fair share of this samaritan task. By invoking fairness in this fashion,
we may freely admit that no one would slip into peril if a single individual
disobeyed the law. Instead, we point out that it would be unfair to shirk
one’s share of the samaritan chore.

Securing political stability is a

communal responsibility that falls upon all of us; it is wrong to leave all the
work to others. 175
I will not say much about Wellman’s view of the specific task that he identifies for the
state. There are surely questions about what exactly it means to say that the state’s
responsibility is to rescue us from the state of nature and secure political stability. We
could interpret that responsibility more or less narrowly. It is difficult to understand how
many of what we reasonably take to be the state’s responsibilities could be understood as
derivative of the state’s responsibility to rescue us from the state of nature. What is
important, nonetheless, is that the account reasonably fits within the basic moral task
framework. That is crucial because it addresses any difficulties that would arise in applying
the principle of fairness to demand fair contributions to benefits that are not mandatory or
moral in nature (such as daily coffee).
Wellman uses fairness to capture, and subject to the state’s authority, those actors
and actions that are not strictly necessary to bring about whatever end needs to be achieved.
The basic idea is that if others are required to expend effort to resolve an important task,
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then everyone else, as a matter of fairness, must do so too. I will challenge that idea in part
later on, but for now it is not particularly controversial to accept that view.
The view still faces a substantial difficulty, one that was discussed above. The
problem is with the inference from the duty to do one’s fair share to the duty to “obey the
law as [one’s] fair share” of the collective end. 176 Even if we assume that individuals have
a duty to do their fair share, it would seem that in most everyday cases there are any number
of ways in which individuals might discharge their fair-share responsibility, ways that do
not involve compliance with the law. 177 For example, if some of my tax dollars would be
spent on a poverty relief program, why can I not forgo paying those dollars to the
government and instead direct them to a different poverty relief program that does as good
or an even better job relieving poverty? The picture that emerges from that difficulty is
one in which the law is a guide for how to do one’s fair share, but it is not a mandatory
guide. There is the possibility that individuals can do their fair share in a manner that is
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not mediated by political authorities. 178 Obviously, whether someone in fact lives up to
that responsibility would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis, and adjudicatory
bodies would be necessary to adjudicate disputes about that. However, insofar as we accept
the idea that individuals can do their fair share independent of the law, we cannot draw the
inference that compliance with the law is necessary as a matter of fairness.
Wellman attempts to solve this problem. His answer is that discretion in how to do
one’s fair share is “a good of which one may not take more than one’s fair share.” 179 In
requiring that all individuals obey the law, we are fairly distributing the good of discretion.
The individual who disobeys but still does what is her fair share in support of important
moral task is taking more of her fair share of discretion.
Although interesting, this strategy is not successful. There are two problems. The
first problem is that requiring a fair distribution of discretion does not entail full obedience
with the law unless there is already full obedience with the law. Hart offered an early
version of the principle of fairness, what he called “mutuality of restrictions,” that helps to
explicate the idea. Hart argued that “when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise
according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these
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restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission.” 180 It fairly captures the
idea that Wellman is invoking here. If everyone else restricts their liberty, i.e. their
discretion, in furtherance of the collective task, then they have a right to the same
“submission.”

So, if everyone else obeys the law in furtherance of the state’s

responsibilities, then I must submit in the same way and obey the law.
A difficulty arises, however, if we do not assume that everyone obeys the law,
which is not an unreasonable assumption in light of human experience. As an empirical
matter, compliance is only ever partial: people break the law. What that means is that so
long as the state’s moral responsibilities are sufficiently discharged, a fair distribution of
submission and discretion will not require full compliance from all persons but only partial
compliance from all persons. Whether there is a fair distribution is determined by reference
to how people in a given state are actually behaving. 181
The second difficulty is that discretion is not always a good and, in fact, is not a
good in this context. Having an obligation obviously impacts whether one has discretion
with respect to a certain action. If a person has a decisive moral obligation to do X, then
she has no discretion not to do X. If she has no decisive moral obligation to do X, then she
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has discretion to do X. The question of discretion is thus conceptually related to the
question of whether there is an underlying moral obligation. It is therefore true that if
everyone has the same obligation with respect to X, then everyone has the same discretion
with respect to X. But, if an individual has a moral obligation to do X, then having the
discretion to do otherwise is not a moral good. Their exercise of discretion would amount
to violating their moral obligation. It would be odd to aim to fairly distribute permissions
to violate moral obligations.
More generally, the issue of whether a law is politically legitimate seems to have
little to do with how much discretion individuals are given in how they discharge their fairshare responsibilities.

For example, say that a Pennsylvania law requires that all

Pennsylvanians contribute to the state-run poverty program. Assume also that New Jersey
has a similar requirement, but New Jersey requires contribution either to the New Jerseyrun poverty program or a private option run by a company in Princeton. Assuming that
such programs function adequately, I see no reason to think that New Jersey is any more
legitimate, or even politically preferable, simply because it permits more discretion. Nor
do we think that Pennsylvania citizens are being treated unfairly when compared to New
Jersey citizens. Obviously, citizen’s within each state might reasonably disagree about
which program the state should employ, which is why each state must pick an alternative
to resolve the disagreement and coordinate everyone’s behavior. But, either option could
be legitimate.
Those problems represent a broader difficulty with the distributive argument: it gets
the order of explanation wrong. Although perhaps a fair distribution of discretion is a
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consequence of full compliance with the duty to obey the law, securing a fair distribution
of discretion does not explain why individuals have a duty to obey the law.
3.4 - Securing Equal Freedom Fairly
The prior discussion of the principle of fairness and the distributive argument
compels a different way of thinking about the relationship between fairness and the
obligation to obey the law. In the views described above, fairness was to be determined by
focusing on the acts or discretion to act of individuals. Those arguments took two forms:
Individuals have an obligation to do their fair share. Or, each individual is to have the same
amount of discretion. Our focus should be elsewhere. Instead, we should focus on the law
itself and whether the law secures freedom in a fair manner.
Earlier I noted that the primary ways in which individuals participate in collective
projects is by paying or participating. Here, I want to use that distinction to make a point
about how thinking about political legitimacy in terms of a moral power allows us to think
about whether the principle of fairness really requires everyone do the same exact thing or
have the same amount of discretion. Say that there is a legitimate national security threat,
and a special operations team of 200 soldiers is required to supplement the existing 200
soldier volunteer force. Now, as a general matter, the law requires taxes to fund the military
and more money may need to be raised to support the additional special operations force.
But, if you are a soldier, your taxes are discounted some because of your military service.
How is the state to raise 200 additional soldiers? Well, it could ask for 200 more
volunteers. But let’s say that instead it will choose to draft 200 additional soldiers by
lottery.
115

The solution specifies a fair system of shared responsibility. No citizen has been
treated unfairly in the example. Yet, they fall into three unequal categories: payers,
volunteers, and draftees.

What should be evident is that the example does not

straightforwardly fit the principle of fairness as it was discussed earlier. Between the three
categories, citizens are not contributing in the same manner.

Nor is there obvious

distributive equality in the amount of discretion afforded each citizen. At present, the
volunteers have very little discretion. They are living the military life and constantly
subject to the say of their commanders. But, the volunteers chose the life, so at least they
had more discretion than the draftees who had no choice. The draftees will have little
discretion soon enough but before the draft they have more discretion than the volunteers.
The payers, well they have a lot of discretion in contrast with the soldiers. But the payers
also lack discretion in that they have to pay more in taxes. Perhaps they need to work
longer hours to buy things they have wanted to buy. Plus, they had no ability to choose to
join up. The only way to get into the additional special force unit was to be selected in the
lottery.
There are three lessons here. First, fairness does not require everyone to do the
same thing or to have the same amount of discretion. You can end up a volunteer, a draftee,
or a payer. Second, there is no obvious way in which we would measure the discretion of
each category of citizen with the goal of treating them equally. For example, as between a
payer and a volunteer, in one sense, payer has more discretion because a member of the
military will end up with way less discretion. But, in another sense, they each have the
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same discretion insofar as each was given the discretion to limit their discretion or not.182
Finally, what we are primarily concerned with is coordinating everyone’s behavior in a fair
way such that the job of securing the nation is completed. Insofar the law specifies a
reasonable approach to that job, it has resolved any reasonable disagreements that might
exist about whether the same actions must be required of all or whether discretion must be
distributed equally if possible. Undoubtedly, there may be cases where equal action is the
choice that resolves a reasonable disagreement, but it is not a requirement.
Articulating the principle of fairness as a principle used to assess the law directly
offers an additional advantage over the standard accounts. We can now respond to an
important criticism of fairness-based accounts of political obligation. Jules Coleman offers
the following argument against the principle of fairness as an account of the obligation to
obey the law:
[L]ooking at duties of fair play to help us understand how the law can be a
source of content-independent moral reasons is like looking for love in all
the wrong places. . . . If there is a duty of fair play to comply with law it is
not grounded in law, but is instead contingent upon the compliance of others
with law. It is not a duty to obey the law whose ground is the law, but a
duty we owe others not to take advantage of their compliance with law. 183
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The account that I just described avoids this criticism. Because the principle of fairness
applies to how the law chooses to coordinate our behavior rather than our behavior directly,
it is not the case that any duty is explained by a need not to take advantage of the
compliance of others. Instead, the bindingness of any duty that results from fair legal
coordination is grounded in the fact that the law is coordinating our behavior in a fair
manner. Therefore, the law is, at least in part, the ground because the law resolves any
reasonable disagreement about what fairness requires. Another way of putting this is that
the principle of fairness is a principle that applies to institutions. 184
That is not to say that there is not a related background duty that applies to
individuals. Citizens have a moral responsibility to participate in fair legal solutions (to
the extent they are called) to secure equal freedom. The state in part determines the
character of that shared responsibility through the law. In addition, it is only because we
each have a shared responsibility that the state can call on us at all. In that sense, there is
a correspondence between moral reasons that apply to the state and those that apply to
individuals.

Perry echoes this criticism as showing that the principle of fairness violates the directiveas-ground condition Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 23.
184
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CHAPTER 4 - LEGAL SPECIFICATIONISM GENERALLY
I have argued that moral indeterminacy without enforceable political institutions
undermines the possibility of equal freedom. A legal system is necessary to provide a
univocal specification of what our rights and responsibilities consist in. The primary
reason for that is so that individuals can pursue their our own good in a way that is
consistent with the pursuit of the good by others. But, what does it mean to specify our
abstract right to equal freedom? And, why must specification be performed by the state
rather that simply by each individual? This chapter addresses those issues.
It will be helpful to begin with a commonplace example to understand the
relationship between an abstract requirement and a specification of that requirement. Law
schools demand that prospective students demonstrate proficiency in critical reasoning and
critical writing prior to admittance. Nonetheless, most law school-bound students will tell
you that what is required is demonstrated proficiency on the LSAT, the Law School
Admission Test. Thus, law school applicants are required to demonstrate proficiency
through a particular test that is created and administered by a particular company, namely
the Law School Admission Council (LSAC). That is the demand that law schools make
on applicants and applicants must comply if they have a hope of admittance. Only the
LSAT counts.
Say that a trash man, Lenny, gets ahold of an actual version of the upcoming LSAT,
with answer key and all, after one is accidentally tossed in the trash. Convinced that the
LSAC is a corrupt enterprise that should not have so much influence, but acknowledging
that his law school-bound kid, Junior, has to demonstrate proficiency to gain admission,
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Lenny brings the test home to administer to his kid free of charge. Mainly for spite, he
changes the name to the “LAST” (Lenny’s Anarchically Standardized Test).

He

administers the exam to his kid in the same way that it would be administered by the LSAC
and scores the exam according to the answer key. Has the kid demonstrated proficiency in
critical reasoning and critical writing? You bet! He only missed two questions! Junior is
a smart cookie. Yet, despite demonstrating proficiency on the LAST, Junior is not admitted
into any of the law schools to which he applied. In fact, all of the law schools refuse to
read his application because he never took the LSAT.
In this case, demonstrating proficiency in critical reasoning and critical writing is
the abstract demand. Demonstrating proficiency on the LSAT is a specification of that
demand. Insofar as prospective law students intend to comply with the abstract demand,
they must do whatever counts as complying with that demand, namely doing well on the
LSAT administered by LSAC. That is because only demonstrating proficiency on the
LSAT counts as satisfying the more abstract demand as far as law schools are concerned.
Proficiency on no other exams or in other academic exercises will count as demonstrating
proficiency for purposes of law school admissions. With that example in mind, I will now
provide a more general theoretical framework for how to understand specification of
abstract requirements.
4.1 - A Framework
Philosophers writing about political authority have described the practical effect of
exercises of authority in a variety of ways: “the law modifies the way morality applies to
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people” (Raz) 185; our political duties are “mediated” and thus “filled out” by the law (Stilz
interpreting Kant) 186; the law has a role in “constituting” and making “determinate” our
rights and responsibilities (Ripstein interpreting Kant) 187; or the law provides
“determinations” 188 of principles (Murphy, Finnis, and Aquinas). 189 I will describe all of
these practical effects under the heading of specificationism, which is the view that the
state, through the law, has a responsibility and a right to specify the abstract right to equal
freedom.
Henry Richardson offers an account of how specification works for individuals
deliberating about their own moral ends and how they are to act in light of those ends. It
will therefore be helpful to begin with Richardson’s account and build from there.
Richardson’s account most directly concerns our reasons for action and thus is easily used
to build an account of specifications of political obligations, but we can equally use it to
cover the variety of Hohfeldian rights discussed earlier.
Richardson aims to present an account of deliberation about ends that is rational
and action guiding in real-life cases, notwithstanding conflict and incommensurability
between many of our important goals. So, while I have described specification as an
interpersonal problem, Richardson presents it as an intrapersonal problem. How is an
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individual to act in the face of competing commitments, such as personal success and close
family ties?

Richardson characterizes specification as a deliberative process that

supplements both intuitive balancing of values or reasons, and deduction from general
practical principles. Specification, on his account, is important not just for acting but so
that one can systematize their practical commitments into a reasonably coherent scheme in
which one is able to act according to principle.
Specification of norms, according to Richardson, involves “setting out substantive
qualifications that add information about the scope of applicability of the norm or the
nature of the act enjoined or the end aimed at.” 190 A specification does that by “describing
what the action or end is or where, when, why, how, by what means, by whom, or to whom
the action is to be done or the end is to be pursued.” 191 More broadly, a specification “will
involve spelling out the ways or circumstances in which it is to be pursued.” 192 So,
returning to our example of law-school admissions, the norm that specifically requires that
proficiency be demonstrated on the LSAT administered by LSAC adds information about
the specific nature of the act and circumstances required to demonstrate proficiency more
generally.
Richardson is primarily concerned with norms or ends that are non-absolute in
character, norms that display a “kind of looseness” that Kant described in his account of
imperfect duties using the idea of “latitude.” 193 Some norms describe more general policies
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or goals that can be satisfied in any number of ways. For example, Kant argued that we
have an imperfect duty to ourselves to develop our talents. Nonetheless, that duty does not
tell one which talents to develop or the manner in which they are to be developed.
Similarly, we have an imperfect duty to promote the happiness of others. But that duty
does not tell one whose happiness to promote, when, how much, or in what manner. Of
course, here we are not concerned with ethics but political right, an account of what
individuals can be required and forced to do by the state. Below, I will return to why
Richardson focuses on non-absolute norms or ends, and note a problem.
Take the following example, from Richardson, of an abstract, non-absolute norm
or end that is in need of specification: “Within reason, do what is necessary to improve my
chances of getting into medical school.” 194 How is a budding medical student to go about
satisfying that norm in a reasonable manner? He has a number of commitments to family
and friends. He also must look out for his own welfare. And, he wants the options of
specializing and getting a good job. One specification of the above norm would be,
“Generally speaking, while I am at school, do whatever morally acceptable acts are
necessary to assuring myself a reasonable chance of getting into a premier East Coast
medical school.” 195

Notice that the latter norm incorporates relevant substantive

information into the norm such that the budding medical student has reasonably clear
guidance on what to do in the face of a broad range of choices. First, the abstract norm is
specified to require certain actions only when one is at school.
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That limits the

circumstances in which the end is to be pursued. When at home, he can close the books.
Second, the norm now only permits choices that are morally acceptable. So, for instance,
the student would not be permitted to study instead of abiding by his promise to spend the
afternoon with his sister. Third, the norm narrows the range of necessary actions to those
that reasonably improve one’s chances of not just getting into an East Coast medical school
but a premiere East Coast medical school. Hence, despite consistently scoring above
average on his practice exams compared to students who got into average medical schools,
the student cannot leave the library to go watch television; he must press on until he masters
those practice exams and scores above average for premiere East Coast schools. In the
end, “[f]ulfilling the more specific end is a way of fulfilling the more abstract one,” but not
the only way. 196
There are two consequences to specifying the norm.

First, once a norm is

sufficiently specified, prospectively, it should be “sufficiently obvious” which actions will
count at satisfying the norm. 197 Specification therefore serves a purpose in guiding action
in a range of cases that pose real ethical problems. Second, retrospectively, once a norm
is sufficiently specified it becomes sufficiently clear which actions “count” as satisfying
the norm or not. Thus, others and oneself will be able to determine if one has satisfied the
abstract norm by looking to see if one has satisfied the additional criteria set out in the
norm that specifies the manner in which the abstract norm is to be satisfied.
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Richardson offers the following helpful definition of the specification relationship
between two norms. Norm p is a specification of norm q if and only if:
(A) every possible instance of . . . p would count as an instance of . . . q (in
other words, any act that satisfies p . . . also satisfies q . . .);
(B) p qualifies q substantively . . . by adding clauses describing what the
action or end is or where, when, why, how, by what means, by whom,
or to whom the action is to be done or the end is to be pursued; and
(C) none of these added clauses in p is substantively irrelevant to q. 198
(A) imparts the notion that one can satisfy the more abstract norm by satisfying the
specified version of the norm. The idea is that the set of actions that satisfy p is contained
within the set of actions that satisfy q. (B) imparts the notion that more specific information
is incorporated into the norm. Obviously, more or less specific information can be added
to the norm. How much information is enough has much to do with what is the purpose of
specification. For present purposes, it should be the case that enough information is added
to offer practical guidance in real decision scenarios. (C) is included for completeness but
merely follows from (B) insofar as irrelevant information could not substantively qualify
q. For example, incorporating irrelevant conjuncts into the norm would be ruled out.
Now, Richardson says that if a norm is “logically absolute in that it is to be pursued
in all circumstances, then specification could add nothing that is already implicit in it.”199
It is for that reason that he focuses on norms qualified by “generally,” norms that therefore
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permit some sort of latitude. That claim would seem to rule out the argument for
specification that I have offered here. For one, it is expected that one must always respect
the equal freedom of others. And, one must also always do their fair share in securing
equal freedom for others. Those are logically absolute norms insofar as they must be
followed in all instances, and it is the job of the state to secure compliance to the fullest
extent possible.
Richardson nonetheless overstates the point. To begin, take the following example
that he offers to make the point that logically absolute norms cannot be specified: “For
example, if we began with ‘always do whatever is required for personal success,’ then
‘always dress in the way required for personal success’ would be redundant.” 200 The idea
is that the latter norm is not a specification of the former more general norm because the
latter norm directly follows from the former. It is a simple entailment. The latter norm
therefore adds nothing to the former norm. The same would be the case if we reframed the
example in terms of respecting the rights of others. For example, from, “always act in a
way that does not violate the rights of others,” one can infer, “always drive in a way that
does not violate the rights of others.” From the example, Richardson infers that logically
absolute norms cannot be specified. It is “the nonabsolute character of our norms [that]
ensure[s] that judgment has a role in deliberation,” according to Richardson. 201
Another way to articulate the problem is in terms of the view of practical authority
that Raz calls the “no difference thesis.” 202 The no difference thesis says that an “exercise
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of authority should make no difference to what its subjects ought to do.” 203 Instead,
practical authority, including political authority, does change reasons and what subjects
ought do. It would not be practical authority otherwise. Similarly, if the contents of all
legitimate legal norms were simply entailed by natural political morality, there would be
no sense in which such norms made a practical difference.

They would not be

specifications.
Although it is true that norms that are entailed by logically absolute norms cannot
be specifications, it is not true that logically absolute norms cannot be specified. Even
logically absolute norms can be specified insofar as there is any indeterminacy in the norm,
meaning that there are a number of viable qualified norms satisfaction of which would also
satisfy the indeterminate norm.

Return to the mandate of personal success.

Even

Richardson’s example can be specified insofar as “personal success” is indeterminate.
There are innumerable standards by which personal success can be measured.

For

example: Does personal success demand prestige, money, a doctorate, or fame? Does
dressing for personal success require functional clothing or clothing designed to foster a
certain image? What one does to satisfy the abstract norm ultimately depends on how one
defines personal success.

Consequently, that the norm is logically absolute is not

dispositive. What matters is that there are number of ways to satisfy the norm and that
adding more information will identify which course of action to take.
The point is not of mere technical importance. As I explained earlier, practical
authority, authority that is able to alter the moral landscape, can only be legitimized if there

203

Ibid., 48-50.
127

is a moral need for that authority.

If all logically absolute moral norms provided

sufficiently clear moral guidance in all circumstances, there would be no role for practical
authority to play aside from the need for coercive enforcement. The law could make no
practical difference, and the law could no more than merely recite our pre-existing logically
absolute rights and responsibilities and what follows from them. Even logically absolute
norms, like the norm mandating satisfaction of the right to equal freedom, require
specification, such that there is a practical role that the law can play.
We are now in a good position to offer a general definition of the specification
relationship between two norms, building off Richardson’s account. Moral norm B is a
specification of abstract moral norm A if and only if:
(1) Every action or state of affairs that satisfies the specified moral norm B
could reasonably count as satisfying the abstract moral norm A;
(2) Specified moral norm B is not logically entailed by moral norm A; and
(3) Specified moral norm B adds relevant substantive information (content)
about the who, what, where, when, why, and how for satisfying the
abstract moral norm A. 204
Here I have largely followed Richardson’s exposition with some minor changes in
language and the inclusion of (2) to capture the point made in the above discussion. (2)
makes clear that a practical difference in made by the specification. So we could even
revise (2) to state:
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(2’) Moral norm B makes a practical difference in the moral landscape.
In the case of norms that require action, for example an obligation-imposing norm, the
specification of that norm makes a practical difference with respect to what an individual
must do. The broad norm language is still useful. It encompasses both norms that describe
obligations and norms that describe rights. A norm can describe any Hohfeldian incident.
As I have argued so far, the law is required to specify our abstract equal right to
freedom as independence. Although still interpreted in abstract terms, the abstract right
can be interpreted to obligate individuals to respect to rights of others and to obligate
individuals to do their share in securing the background conditions necessary for equal
freedom. The state can force individuals to comply with those obligations by forcing them
to comply with the law, law that provides specifications of those obligations. As I have
explained, we reasonably disagree about what more specific norms, actions, and states of
affairs constitute satisfaction of the abstract rights to equal freedom and the abstract
responsibilities that flow from it, which is why political authority is morally necessary to
specify our rights and responsibilities in the first place.
In light of the language I have been employing to discuss the need and importance
of political authority, (1) can also be reformulated in a way that employs less philosophical
jargon:
(1’) Specified moral norm B is a reasonable interpretation of abstract moral
norm A.
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The core idea is that we have competing but reasonable interpretations about what freedom
requires. Nonetheless, freedom requires the law to coordinate our interpretations so that
we can live among each other in a way that is consistent with the freedom of each other.
4.2 - Sources of Indeterminacy
At this point, it will be helpful to address some of the sources of indeterminacy in
our shared and undisputed moral commitment to freedom. Moral indeterminacy is the
primary defect in the statute of nature that the state’s practical authority is supposed to cure.
Beyond agreement on the abstract value of freedom, there is likely broad agreement on a
broad range of examples of violations of freedom. We presumably agree that the core cases
of wanton intentional homicide and intentional theft count as rights violations.
Nevertheless, there is still broad room for reasonable disagreement.
There are numerous sources of moral indeterminacy. 205

The first source of

indeterminacy in the abstract concept of freedom itself. First, the concepts of freedom and
its cognate political values, including justice and fairness, are quite abstract. Although we
might all agree that all moral persons have a right to freedom it is unlikely that we all share
the same conception of freedom and therefore will reasonably disagree about the scheme
of rights that is necessary to realize freedom. 206 Our abstract concepts contain a range of
core conceptions about which we reasonably disagree. 207
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Second, our moral concepts contain vagueness and therefore admit of borderline
cases. 208 Take the concept of battery, defined broadly as any “harmful or offensive contact
with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause the [victim] to suffer such contact . .
. .” 209 A paradigm instance would be a violent beating with one’s fist. A borderline case
would be a slight nudge to move another out of the way in a crowded bar. Terms obviously
can be more or less vague.

Nonetheless, agreement about core cases still leaves

disagreement about borderline cases.
Third, oftentimes, while in theory there might be a right answer upon which all
would agree, the choice requires a difficult and complex “overall assessment” and yet a
decision must be made. 210 In some cases with this structure, it is more important that a
decision between reasonable interpretations be made than that the most reasonable option
prevails. 211

entitlement to a flute between three children. Child A claims entitlement to the flute on
the ground that she is the only one who knows how to play the flute and that therefore
giving it to her would maximize happiness. Child B claims entitlement to the flute on the
ground that he is the poorest and that therefore giving it to him will further egalitarian
equality. Finally, child C claims entitlement to the flute on the ground that she made the
flute and that individuals who expend the time and energy to make something are entitled
to the fruits of their labor.207 Sen’s basic point is that the abstract concept of justice alone
cannot resolve the matter. The concept of freedom suffers from the same difficulties.
Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 12-15.
208
Roy Sorensen, “Vagueness,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward
N. Zalta, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/vagueness/.
209
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Thus, some resources can be devoted to continuing to make the overall assessment such
that a new and better decision could be made down the road.
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Fourth, while we might all agree that freedom-based considerations must be
brought to bear on political decisions, we might reasonably disagree about the relative
weight or ordering of the competing freedom-based considerations. 212 Our disagreements
result from diversity in our backgrounds, natural makeup, and our judgments about what
other things are important. 213 Such diversity is inevitable, especially in liberal societies.
Two examples will suffice to demonstrate the point. Rules governing the rules of the road,
including speed limits, balance freedom-based considerations about freedom of movement
with freedom-based considerations about security in one’s person.

Similarly, rules

governing the workplace, for example, rules governing workplace safety, balance freedombased considerations about freedom of contract with considerations about personal safety.
Nonetheless, our plural and incompatible commitments cannot all be satisfied at the same
time. Thus, there has to be a “moral loss” and there is reasonable disagreement over where
the losses are to lie. 214
Finally, in some cases, an arbitrary choice needs to be made among equally morally
acceptable options. There are multiple options and any option will do. The choice between
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options is arbitrary. That is the broad description of the well-worn case of choosing which
side of the road cars must drive on. Our moral commitment to freedom, does not supply
the answer. The required decision, then, is indeterminate.
It is important to note that those with whom we reasonably disagree are not
regarded as being understandably mistaken in their interpretations and therefore merely
excused for holding to the unreasonable beliefs that they do. We can imagine the person
who was cultivated as a vehement racist who believes that the enslavement of some races
is permissible and laudable. In such cases, there is an explanation for why they hold the
unreasonable beliefs that they do, but there is not a rational explanation, or justification,
for their wrong beliefs. No reasonable political theory could support the view. Perhaps
they are merely excused. But, their excused viewpoint could not count as a plausible
interpretation of what freedom demands and therefore could not bind. In light of the
diversity of reasonable viewpoints that are explained by the factors described above,
individuals are justified in what they take to be the requirements of equal freedom when
they reasonably disagree. Some interpretations of what counts as respecting the freedom
of others will be clearly mistaken. 215 Those interpretations are not candidates for binding
law.
The indeterminacy in abstract right has the capacity to generate three types of
reasonable disagreement.

First, we might have a disagreement between different

conceptions of freedom. For example, a sufficientist about distributive justice would

215
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disagree with an egalitarian who requires broader equality wealth. Second, we might agree
on a conception of freedom, for example that inherent in Rawls’s justice as fairness, but
reasonably disagree about the institutions and rules that should realize that conception of
justice. So, we might disagree about whether the law should realize a property-owning
democracy or market socialism. 216 Finally, even with institutions and rules in place, we
might reasonably disagree about the application of those institutions and rules to particular
facts. Such disagreements require some form of adjudication. 217
4.3 - Some Examples and a Clarification
As I noted, specified norms can describe any of the Hohfeldian incidents. That is
important because all Hohfeldian rights can secure freedom. For example, moral powers
are subject to specification. There are reasonable disagreements about how a given moral
power must be exercised to be successful and there are reasonable disagreements as to the
limits on our moral powers. Contract law exemplifies this point. If one aims to sell their
land to another individual, we can reasonably disagree about the conditions that must be
met for them to successfully exercise their power to do so. Perhaps the land-sale agreement
must be in writing. Maybe a certain number or kind (e.g., a notary) of witness is required.
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Perhaps there is a review period in which the contract can be cancelled. Such decisions
create certain consequences for parties to agreements and to the public more generally.
But, freedom is served by coming up with a decisive and univocal specification of how
moral powers can be exercised, regardless of the ultimate decision between reasonable
views. The same goes for possible limits placed on our power to contract. For example,
there is reasonable disagreement over whether individuals can contract to work in certain
work conditions, say to work more than a certain number of hours a week. Such details
must be hashed out politically.
Cases involving rights against harms that result from certain categories of risks also
exemplify the point. Currently, the law imposes strict liability for harms that result from
certain activities that are categorized as abnormally dangerous, for example, blasting.
Thus, a blaster who causes a foreseeable harm to another’s person or property as a result
of blasting violates the right of the victim regardless of whether the blaster was negligent
and regardless of the broader social value of blasting. Whether that should be the case is a
political question that is subject to reasonable disagreement. It would not be unreasonable
to advocate a fault-based policy rather than a strict liability policy.
I want to discuss a final example involving necessity exceptions in trespass cases.
The example also affords an opportunity to discuss a related view that has been described
under the heading of “specification” and to explain how the other view differs. According
to John Oberdiek, the “specified conception of rights” is the view, that “[a]lthough [rights]
have a determinate and predictable content in a wide variety of contexts, . . . their content
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nonetheless depends entirely upon context.” 218 Oberdiek’s view is that we can only
identify “the content of a right in light of and indeed in response to what is justifiable to do
under the circumstances.” 219 Thus, a moral right will be “specified so as not to conflict . .
. with justifiable behaviour.” 220 That view contrasts with a view he describes as the
“general conception” of rights, which is the view that rights are not circumstance
dependent. The general conception of rights countenances cases in which individuals can
justifiably infringe the rights of others.
Accordingly, in defending the specified conception, Oberdiek’s concern is also to
reconceptualize and unify intuitions about those cases in which individuals seem to be
permitted and even justified in infringing or violating the rights of others. In particular, he
focuses on Joel Feinberg’s well-known Cabin Case, a case that raises the issue of whether
there is a necessity exception to the right against trespasses on one’s property.
In the Cabin Case, a mountain hiker must decide whether to break into another
person’s cabin or remain outdoors in the face of a deadly snowstorm. According to
Oberdiek, “[t]here is widespread consensus that the hiker would be justified in breaking
into the cabin under such circumstances.” 221 Nonetheless, the view of “proponents of the
general conception of property rights is that the hiker would be justified in breaking into
the cabin out of necessity even though the cabin owner has a right that the hiker should not
do so.” 222 Oberdiek’s take is that the cabin owner’s right is specified to permit exceptions
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for cases of dire necessity. The hiker’s justified intrusion does not conflict with the cabin
owner’s right because the intrusion falls within an exception. The overall picture is that
“[a] right . . . can stand against different behaviour in different circumstances, so that what
conflicts with a right in one context may not conflict with it in another.” 223 So, if it were a
beautiful day outside and thus no necessity, the intrusion would not be permitted.
That idea meshes well with the basic idea of specificationism articulated here. One
goal of specificationism is to reconcile decisively the competing freedom-based claims that
individuals could potentially make against each other in what look like conflicts of rights
cases. Specified rights, which will often mark out exceptions in our rights to person and
property, exhibit a complexity that cannot be captured by sole reference to our abstract
rights to freedom, person, or property. I therefore agree that exceptions can be built into
the content of our rights.
But we should part ways with Oberdiek in several respects. First, what the hiker is
permitted to do and how the content of the cabin owner’s property right is to be specified
seems to me to be subject to reasonable disagreement. It is not the case that our rights
“have a determinate and predictable content.” 224 Note that there are a number of ways in
which rights might be structured in the Cabin Case. To describe a few, first, there is the
position that the cabin owner’s right should be unqualified and that there are no exceptions
for necessity. The hiker violates the cabin owner’s right if he trespasses. It was his
responsibility to prepare better for the hike. Second, there is the position that the cabin
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owner’s right is unqualified if the cabin owner is present but there is an exception for the
hiker if no one is home. Such a scheme obviously emphasizes interests that attach more to
the cabin owner’s person than his property, such as his interests in safety and privacy.
Third, there is the position that the hiker is permitted to enter the property and use it for his
safety but that he must compensate the cabin owner. Insofar as he compensates the owner,
he does not violate the cabin owner’s right. On that view, the cabin owner should expect
that hikers will need to use the cabin in extreme cases and he should plan accordingly.
Finally, there is Oberdiek’s view that the hiker is justified in entering the cabin to save
himself regardless of the cabin owner’s consent, that the cabin owner has no right that the
hiker not do so, and that compensation is not owed. On my view, the law ultimately settles
the question of which scheme structures our interactions, as we can reasonably disagree
about the options.
That the nature of the scheme that should be in place is subject to reasonable
disagreement brings me to the second difference. Oberdiek contends that only specified
rights are “fully moralized,” and that generalized rights are not, insofar as the content of a
specified right is conditioned on the question of what individuals are justifiably permitted
to do in the circumstances. I agree with Oberdiek that one cannot be both permitted to do
something and prohibited from doing something. On my view, however, what one is
permitted to do in the circumstances is determined by what the law selects from the range
of reasonable views about how rights ought to specified in given circumstances. 225 Law
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could specify or select a “generalized” property right that would prohibit the hiker from
utilizing the cabin despite the circumstances. In which case, the hiker would not be
permitted to trespass despite the circumstances. On that view, it was his responsibility to
plan for foreseeable emergencies.

We therefore cannot determine what behavior is

permitted independent of a determination of how our rights are specified in the
circumstances.
4.3 - The Necessity of Political Authority and Consent Theory
I now want to discuss a challenge to the argument that the moral necessity of
authoritative political specifications entails the conclusion that the state in fact has the
exclusive moral right to specify our rights and responsibilities through the law. Return to
the challenge from consent theory discussed in Chapter Two. Consent theorists do not
necessarily deny the moral importance of the state or the possibility of legitimate political
authority. Instead, they believe that some form of consent is necessary for political
authority. Accordingly, the consent theorist might agree that specifications are morally
necessary components of our moral lives yet reject the notion that the state retains any
authority in virtue of that. Mark Murphy is a consent theorist who offers such a view.
Murphy appreciates the moral importance of specifications.

Nonetheless, he

defends a version of consent theory that relies on consent in the “acceptance sense.” 226 On
Murphy’s view, binding consent need not require the performance of a speech act or an
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attitude of approval. 227

By contrast, one can consent to be bound by the state’s

specifications merely by accepting those specifications into one’s practical reasoning as
the principles upon which one will act. 228
That version of consent theory, Murphy maintains, is “consistent with the central
thesis of natural law political philosophy — that the law’s authority derives from the
common good of the political community.” 229 The core principle of that view is the
requirement that “each person is bound to do his or her share for the common good.”230
The common good is a “comprehensive state of affairs in which each person’s good is fully
realized.” 231 Nonetheless, the common good principle exhibits “normative openness,”
meaning that the principle, like the abstract right to equal freedom, underdetermines how
we ought to act rationally in order to satisfy the principle. 232 Murphy explains that
normative openness “makes room” for the law to serve an important and necessary
practical purpose with respect to the common good, as the law can “provid[e] a partial
[specification] of what one is to do in fulfilling the common good principle.” 233 A
specification on Murphy’s account is either “a realizable approximation of an unrealizable
ideal” or “a more precise specification of a vague objective.” 234

227

Ibid.
Ibid.
229
Ibid.
230
Ibid., 86.
231
Ibid., 114.
232
Ibid., 59, 88.
233
Ibid., 88.
234
Ibid. I should point out that Murphy uses the Thomistic language of “determinations”
to describe the same phenomena that I describe here.
140
228

Nothing in Murphy’s account of specification is prima facie inconsistent with the
view defended here. However, although Murphy recognizes that there is a morally
necessary role that the law can play, he does not believe that fact is enough to conclude
that the law has the exclusive moral authority to specify the common good principle:
[T]he fact that authority is needed, and that the law is the best candidate to
serve this role, does not actually make the law authoritative. It does not
show that citizens are acting wrongly by failing to act in accordance with
the law’s dictates. At most, it shows that if citizens fail to do their part to
make the institution authoritative — perhaps by consenting to it, or
something of that sort — then they are acting unreasonably. . . . There still
exists a gap that is not crossed: that it would be a good thing for the law to
be authoritative does not mean that the law is in fact authoritative. 235
At first glance, Murphy’s argument looks like Simmons’s rejection of the justificationlegitimacy inference. It will be remembered that Simmons argues that one cannot reason
directly from the fact that a state is (or states are) on balance beneficial or generally justified
to the conclusion that a state is legitimate, meaning that it has the kinds of moral rights that
it claims to have. 236 Notwithstanding, Murphy’s argument is slightly different and more
akin to Stephen Darwall’s challenge against Raz. Darwall charges that even if someone
might have good or decisive reason to abide by the demands of another, for example,
because he would do better in complying with the reasons that apply to him, no inference
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can be drawn that the latter has moral authority over the former.
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In a similar vein,

Murphy rejects the inference from the moral value or moral need of moral authority to the
actual existence of that authority. 238 Merely because something would be of great moral
value does not make it so.
That political authority would be morally valuable instead is a sufficient reason to
consent to be bound by the state’s specifications. Murphy believes that individuals have
good reason to consent to be bound by the law’s specifications in light of the law’s
coordinative and epistemic capacities, and that perhaps they would be unreasonable for not
doing so. 239 But, that one would act unreasonably in not abiding by the law’s demands
does not entail that one would act wrongfully in not doing so.
Why accept and act according to specifications at all rather than on a case-by-case
or willy-nilly basis? Murphy argues that we run afoul of the common good principle not
just by “performing an act that is ruled out by the content of the principle” but also by
acting in an “unprincipled way.” 240 We might understand that as a basic requirement that
one act with integrity. 241 The reason to stick with a given specification “does not . . . result
from the character of the requirement specified but from the rational unseemliness of
changing one’s mind without adequate reason for doing so.” 242 Accepting and utilizing
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the law’s specifications, in the end, is merely one way in which individuals can act with
integrity and according to principle with respect to the common good, while at the same
time discharging their obligation to do their fair share. It is not the only way however.
Insofar as individuals act on their own private specifications of the common good principle
and do so consistently, they do not run afoul of the common good principle or the
requirement that they act in a principled manner. “[S]o long as one accepts a certain
determination of [some principle], one ought to act on it.” 243 That is so regardless of
whether the specification is the law’s or one’s own.
We should agree with Murphy that specifications are normatively important in our
practical lives and that specifications provide a vehicle by which we can live principled
lives. That seems to be the gist of Richardson’s account as well. Nonetheless, we must
grapple with Murphy’s argument that although specifications are morally important and
the state is capable of resolving important moral problems, we have not shown that the
state must be the exclusive specifier of our political rights and responsibilities rather than
private individuals. To respond to Murphy’s consent-based challenge, it will be helpful to
remember the task that the law’s authority addresses. The point of legal authority is to
secure equal freedom and resolve the problems of the state of nature. Insofar as Murphy’s
natural law view cannot address those moral problems, the view presented here is on better
footing.
As was argued earlier, legal specifications are necessary to resolve the difficulties
that indeterminacy creates for equal freedom. The first is the problem of unilateral
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authority. Insofar as there is indeterminacy and each individual has an equal right to
interpret the boundaries of the rights of others, we each becomes subject to the private
authority of other individuals. The second problem is that indeterminacy prevents us from
forming legitimate expectations that our capacity to make choices within a particular
domain of freedom will be respected and be free from interference. Those problems are
solved insofar as the state has the authority to decisively and public coordinate our rights
and we have assurance that others will abide by those rights. The same can be said with
respect to those responsibilities individuals have in light of our collective responsibility to
secure equal freedom in a fair way. By ignoring the law and acting according to one’s own
specifications one is imposing one’s will on others. Murphy’s consent theory, like any
other consent theory, leaves one’s right to a system of equal freedom subject to the private
authority of individuals. It therefore recreates the very problem that political authority is
to resolve.
Beyond recreating the problem of private authority and not addressing the tasks that
freedom requires, there is a broader problem with Murphy’s reliance on the idea of personal
integrity as a basis for consenting to be bound by the state’s specifications. The law is
fundamentally concerned with our interactions with others and securing freedom. In that
way, the law is interpersonal. By contrast, integrity is an intrapersonal virtue. At best,
integrity is a matter of personal responsibility, not the state’s responsibility. Individuals
themselves must ensure that they lead a life of integrity. At worst, perhaps there is no
moral requirement that an individual lead a life of personal integrity. So long as individuals
respect the legitimate claims of others, integrity is a matter of personal choice.
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Although the law and others are perhaps prohibited from undermining one’s ability
to live a life of integrity, they could not make one accountable for not living such a life and
surely could not force one to live such a life. Suffice to say, integrity is just a reason of the
wrong kind when it comes to justifying the state’s authority and the fact that it backs that
authority with the right to extract compliance with its demands. If integrity is a moral
upshot of a commitment to follow the law, then perhaps that is a good thing. 244 However,
personal integrity is not an appropriate ground of political authority. More importantly,
however, integrity is not a proper basis for acting in a way that violates or undermines the
equal freedom of others.
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CHAPTER 5 - EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY
Democracy serves the values of freedom, justice, equality, fairness, respect,
publicity, participation, education, truth, and so on. 245 That democracy serves those values
is to say that democracy can be morally justified in certain ways. But as we have seen, that
the state, specific kinds of political institutions, or specific laws are morally valuable in
certain ways does not directly speak to the question of whether and how they are politically
legitimate. More needs to be said. A theory of political legitimacy, as I have explained,
accounts for the state’s right to rule — its right to bind its citizens through law, its right to
uphold the law with force, and minimally its right to continue in the job of exercising those
rights. Here, I have argued that the state’s task is best understood in terms of securing
equal freedom. Accordingly, we need to locate a theory of democracy within that theory
of political legitimacy.
A majority of the theorizing about democracy is concerned with moral ideals and
democratic values more generally.

That is, theorists are responsive primarily to

justificatory questions about the moral values that democracy serves: What makes
democracy valuable? Or, how can our democracy be better? Or, what would make our
democracy more responsive to some specific moral value, say equality or education.
Obviously, those are important questions that will be fruitful in discussions about the
political legitimacy of democracies. Yet, here we want to address questions about political
legitimacy, questions that would include: Must a state be democratic for it to be politically
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legitimate? Can laws that do not issue from democratic procedures be legitimate? How
does democracy affect legitimacy? Here, I want to focus on how democracy figures in
questions about the political legitimacy of political institutions, the human beings that
occupy roles within those institutions, and the laws that demand our compliance.
6.1 - Four Models of Democracy
I want to begin by outlining four models for how we might conceptualize and
understand the political legitimacy of democratic decision making: the Aggregative Model,
the Self-Rule Model, the Deliberative Model, and the Arbitration Model. My goal is to
note any internal difficulties within these models and to highlight any manner in which
they can be fit within the equal-freedom moral-task framework that I have discussed to this
point.
It should be said that for a number of reasons, these models are somewhat artificial.
First, no view in the literature necessarily, explicitly or implicitly, defends any particular
model exclusively. Theorists instead tend to defend hybrid views that include element of
a number of models. Not one of these models is on its face mutually exclusive from the
other, but each captures core elements of the major views present in the literature. Second,
with each model, I do not aim to capture the elements of every view that reasonably could
fit within that model. For example, theorists working within the deliberative democracy
tradition disagree about how much agreement on fundamental moral principles is necessary
for democratic decisions to be legitimate or ideal in some way. But we need not focus
extensively on that fact. The goal simply is to assess some of the more common ideas and
to articulate what each model identifies as the core moral purpose of democratic
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institutions. Finally, as any theory of democratic legitimacy will rely heavily on the value
of equality, which has been central to this point, it will be useful to see how equality fits
within each model.
Before going further, we need to begin with a working understanding of what it
means to say that a political entity or process is democratic. For now, it will be helpful to
begin with the folk understanding of democracy. First, in a democracy, citizens have an
equal right to participate, partly though not exclusively through voting, in the political
decision making process, and disagreements within that process are resolved through some
principle of majority rule. Second, political offices are open to all in the sense that any
person has an equal right to occupy any political office insofar as they are capable of
adequately performing the tasks of that office. 246 Finally, debate is free and open in the
sense that no one is restricted from voicing their opinion on the basis of who they are or
what their view is. Later, I will suggest that democracy can and should be conceived more
in terms of the broader notion of political equality. The result is that the folk understanding
of democracy is but one institutional specification of democracy, and majority rule is not
as sacrosanct a rule of decision as it is often made out to be. Nonetheless, it will be helpful
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This basically restates what Rawls would describe as a political institutionalization of
“careers open to talents.” Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 72. Rawls thinks that careers open
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to begin from a point of common understanding, and each of the four models below attempt
to present the moral foundation for our common understanding.
The Aggregative Model is common among social choice theorists. It also probably
captures how ordinary citizens would explain the legitimacy of democratic decision
making. According to social choice theorists, democratic decision making effectively
maximizes preference satisfaction while giving equal consideration to each individual’s
preferences.

We might understand the latter point to express a broader democratic

commitment to equality. Whatever democracy requires, it requires that people be treated
equally in some obvious sense. 247 The Aggregative Model does that by ignoring individual
differences and treating each person’s preferences like anyone else’s preferences. In a
democracy, persons reveal their preferences with their votes, and each vote is counted
equally. Satisfying the preferences of more people is an important moral goal, and majority
rule is an effective way to satisfy the political preferences of more people.
There are of course well-known internal theoretical problems with the Aggregative
Model, which I will leave to the side. 248 Here, I want to focus on how the Aggregative
Model is problematic for moral reasons from the perspective of political legitimacy and
equal freedom. 249 The core difficulty is that the legitimacy of a political decision has little
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E.g., Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard
University Press, 2000), 184 (“[G]overnment must act . . . with equal concern for the life
of each member.”).
248
For a discussion of these issues, see William Riker, “Social Choice Theory and
Constitutional Democracy,” in Philosophy & Democracy, ed. Thomas Christiano (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 161-94.
249
Theorists have rejected this model for other reasons that I will not address. For example,
Joshua Cohen argues the Aggregative Model may fail to protect religious liberty. Joshua
Cohen, “Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy,” in Philosophy &
149

to do with the maximization of preference satisfaction. 250 This problem can be presented
from two different directions. First, that a political decision satisfies any person, a majority
of persons, or even all persons’ preference(s) is not sufficient to make a political decision
legitimate, where that is understood to mean that it is morally binding and coercively
enforceable. It is simply a reason of the wrong kind when the issue is forcing people to do
things. 251 Individuals cannot be forced to abide by their own preferences. In the previous
chapters, I sketched a view of the reasons of the right kind that account for the legitimacy
of political authority, namely that political decision making is necessary to specify and
secure equal freedom.
With that in mind, we can also challenge the Aggregative Model from a second
direction. One might propose that although maximizing preference satisfaction is not a
sufficient condition, it is necessary to make a political decision legitimate. The idea would
be that a political authority could only be legitimate in discharging its moral responsibilities
if it treats each person’s preferences equally and maximizes satisfaction of such
preferences. Democratic decision making, one could argue, is a necessary means to that

Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 20. And, Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson charge that the Aggregative Model affirms and reinforces unjust power
distributions in society and does not take deliberation seriously. Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),
16.
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Building off the work of P.F. Strawson, Darwall makes the related point that
“[d]esirability is a reason of the wrong kind” to ground our moral practices of holding
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150

end. The problem is that it is not the responsibility of the state, or the political community
more generally, to satisfy anyone or more people’s personal preferences. Responsibility
for that lies with individuals who are to take responsibility for their own personal pursuits.
Beyond that, if one’s preferences do not align with a political decision, individuals must
alter their preferences or at least not demand that others act to satisfy those preferences. 252
The upshot is that the Aggregative Model does not fit within the basic picture of the state
that has emerged thus far: the state has a moral responsibility to secure equal freedom, and
creating an enforcing the law discharges that responsibility.
The Aggregative Model fairs no better if we jettison preference-satisfaction in favor of
another “currency” that is to be maximized. 253

One might suggest that instead of

maximizing preferences, democracy maximizes satisfaction of the legitimate claims of
equal persons. 254 Because each person has an equal claim to determine how society is
ordered, each person gets an equal vote by which they communicate that claim. The notion
of a claim invokes the notion of a right. We can think of democratic procedures as
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aggregating and maximizing satisfaction of equal rights or claims. Yet, by invoking rights,
the Aggregative Model fairs no better. 255
For simplicity, focus on a disagreement between an individual dissenting against a
majority decision (Dissenter) and an individual who is a member of the majority (Majority
Member). Majority Member claims a right to Dissenter’s conformity with his view, which
also happens to be the majority view. Consider the situation from the perspective of
Dissenter. Dissenter thinks that Majority Member is either wrong or equally right. If
Majority Member is wrong, then Dissenter does not have an obligation to go along with
what Majority Member demands. But, if Majority Member is equally right, then we have
something akin to a conflict of rights between Dissenter and Majority Member. Let’s look
at the conflict case. How can Majority Member bolster her claim against Dissenter? On
the Aggregative Model, she points out that a majority of people have the same claim against
Dissenter, and a larger number of rights in some sense outweighs Dissenter’s right.
Nonetheless, on the standard view about how rights operate, Majority Member
cannot bolster her claim in that way. That is one of the upshots of John Taurek’s famous
argument that the numbers do not count in conflict of rights cases. Because of the generally
accepted liberal commitment to the separateness of persons, an individual’s legitimate
claim against another is in no way augmented by the fact that others, no matter how
numerous, have the same sort of claim against that individual. 256 Similarly, the legitimacy
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of an individual’s claim against another is in no way diminished by the fact that there are
a fewer number of others who share his claim. Each individual considered as a separate
person has their own equal claim against any individual with whom they disagree. If we
are to understand democratic processes as providing a justifiable resolution of the
competing legitimate claims of Dissenter and Majority Member, that there are more
claimants on Majority Member’s side is not normatively relevant to their dispute. In effect,
Dissenter says to Majority Member: “I will speak with each member of the majority
separately. But for now, this is between you and I, and I have as much of a claim as you.”
Therefore, the Aggregative Model, as an account of the political legitimacy of democratic
decision making, faces substantial obstacles. I will not discuss it further.
Next, consider the Self-Rule Model of democracy. The Self-Rule Model invokes
the prominent idea that democracy is rule by the people. The basic idea is that those who
participate in democratic institutions are somehow (individually and/or collectively)
binding themselves through democratic law, by contrast with a system of government in
which the government decides for us and binds us. As Scott Hershovitz puts the point,
“[t]he idea behind this view of democracy is that we are binding ourselves through acts of
legislation. . . . [I]n democracies, people decide together what they shall be bound to do.”257
He goes on to maintain that “denying people the opportunity to participate in the process
of government closes off opportunities to organize one’s life autonomously.”258
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Nevertheless, it is unclear how the rhetoric of the Self-Rule Model can be squared with the
political reality of reasonable disagreement and the very purpose of political authority,
which is to resolve those disagreements. One way to understand the view is as a voluntarist
account according to which individuals who participate in democratic processes
autonomously choose, freely will, and/or consent to the binding outcomes of those
processes. Or something along those lines. 259 There are significant difficulties with that
picture. For one, as Thomas Christiano correctly points out, the model seems “to require
that the basic rule of decision making be consensus or unanimity. . . . Only when all agree
to a decision are they freely adopting the decision.” 260 Such a requirement undercuts the
basic framework supporting the need for political authority in the first place. 261 Moreover,
it is inconsistent with the commonplace rule of decision in democracies, namely majority
rule. Second, even if there was unanimity, there is still only an attenuated sense in which
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any outcome could be said to be the product of any individual member’s exercise of
autonomy or choice. In all but very narrow circumstances, any individual’s input (e.g.
vote) in the collective decision making process is not causally decisive with respect to
bringing about their preferred outcome; they are dependent on a contingent majority of
others voting for the same outcome. Such is hardly a paradigm instance of self-rule.
Some Self-Rule Model theorists are aware of such difficulties. As Hershovitz
notes, following Raz, conceiving of the model along voluntarist lines is “one of the least
persuasive arguments for democracy.” 262 He, nonetheless, urges that we can accept the
Self-Rule Model because there is “value [for] people participating in decisions that have
an important impact on their lives.” 263
I imagine that most would not doubt that participating in democratic politics can
have some sort of valuable impact on one’s life. Any philosophical theory of democracy
would presumably accept that. For example, such participation is a way of educating
oneself and honing one’s deliberative capacities. That claim is a component part of the
Deliberative Model, which I will discuss next. In any case, it is not clear how one draws
an inference from the more general moral values associated with democratic participation
to autonomous rule through democratic legislation. We might specify the Self-Rule Model,
or rule by the people, in an alternative non-voluntarist way, but then we lose the
argumentative force of the rhetoric normally associated with that model. Accordingly, the
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Self-Rule Model cannot be reconciled with the basic purpose of political authority or the
character of democracy as commonly understood.
Next, consider the Deliberative Model of democratic legitimacy.

On the

Deliberative Model, democratic procedures are legitimate and produce legitimate laws
because such are the product of wide-scale deliberation between persons who equally
participate in open and public debate about how to order our common world. Proposals
are publicly disputed and argued over. Reasons are exchanged. Individuals learn from the
process and often revise their views. Finally, a public decision is made, and the reasons
for that decision are provided.
As an initial observation, the emphasis on the value of deliberation places the
Deliberative Model in proximity to the value of intentionality condition for theories of
authoritative decision making. 264 The moral order is not left to be the outcome of brute
forces, market forces, or social forces more generally. Instead, it is placed in the hands of
a deliberative body of legal officials, or citizens more generally, with the capacity to reason
about how society is to be intentionally ordered. The expectation is that in doing so,
decisions will more often be sufficiently responsive to the requirements of equal freedom
that not.
Theorists who work within the Deliberative Model differ widely on how to
understand the internal requirements of that model, the types of value that the model is
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responsive to, the role of majority decision making, and how the model accounts for the
legitimacy of democratic political decision making. I will not include an exhaustive
presentation of those differences, except the following. Some deliberative democrats
demand that any legal decision be justifiable according to reasons that all subject to it
would reasonably accept. But, that sort of commitment brings us back to principles
underpinning the Self-Rule Model.

Instead of unanimous endorsement of the legal

outcomes of democratic processes, the unanimity version of the Deliberative Model
requires unanimous endorsement of the reasons that justify the legal outcomes. By
contrast, other deliberative democrats, in my view correctly, maintain that such a
requirement is too stringent. We reasonably disagree about what equal freedom demands,
so we cannot expect such consensus on the reasons justifying any law. Moreover, some
will just be mistaken about what reasons appropriately support the law. We should not
require shared reasons in that case.

In fact, that political authority and democratic

principles of decision, specifically majority rule, do not require full consensus weighs
against such a consensus requirement at any level. Although a theory of deliberation can
play a role in a theory of democratic legitimacy, it must be premised on reasonable
disagreement and the importance of deliberation in light of disagreement.
I want to note two final difficulties with the Deliberative Model. First, a number
of deliberative theorists simply build into their model of deliberation that individuals will
comply with the outcome of the deliberative process. For example, Joshua Cohen asserts
that “in an ideal procedure of political deliberation . . . [participants] are prepared to
cooperate in accordance with the results of such discussion, treating those results as
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authoritative.” 265 The difficulty then is to understand how the Deliberative Model itself
would explain anything about the legitimacy of the outcome that is not already simply
assumed. In assessing the legitimacy of an outcome, we are seeking to account for its
authoritativeness even for the person who is not prepared to treat it as authoritative.
Second, it should be noted that the Deliberative Model on its face does not single out
democracy as a requirement for political legitimacy. Say that a dictator rules over a great
land as his family always has. Benevolent and professorial, the dictator always collects a
significant amount of data on the public’s views on justice and public policy. Sampling is
done. The dictator holds town halls at which he listens to the competing views and asks
tough questions. Citizens attempt to convince him of their views but often change their
views in response to his questions. The dictator respects the views of his citizens. But at
the end of the day, the dictator is the decider. His publicly informed decisions become the
rule. In that case there is extensive deliberation amongst the citizenry about what the law
should be, people are treated equally in the deliberation, and a decision is made as a result.
It is unclear what role the democratic principle of majority rule plays in the Deliberative
Model, such that the dictatorial regime would be excluded as an option. Robust public
deliberation in which all citizens participate equally can be had within a variety of
institutional formats. At this point, we should not jettison the Deliberative Model. Aspects
of that model can fit within the moral task account of democracy that I will offer below.
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Finally, consider the Arbitration Model of democratic decision making. 266 On this
model, democratic procedures offer a mechanism to settle disputes between competing
parties about how we are to order our common world. Democratic processes do that in a
way that treats each party equally. The key idea here is that there are reasonable disputes,
and those disputes need to be settled in a way that is consistent with treating each person
equally. Democratic procedures are legitimate, binding, and enforceable because they
effectively adjudicate those disputes consistent with equality.
Note that the comparison with standard cases of arbitration is not exact. In a
standard arbitration, parties to a disagreement agree or consent in advance of the
disagreement to come before a neutral arbiter, plead their case, and have the arbiter decide.
Before resolving the dispute, the arbiter also attempts to persuade the parties to come to
some form of agreement or compromise, as the process is only meant to resolve disputes
that cannot be resolved otherwise. Most aspects of modern-day democratic procedures do
no operate that way though. Instead, there are competing sides with no neutral arbiter. The
sides may enter into agreements or compromises, but only in limited cases. There is also
no pre-disagreement agreement to be bound by democratic law. Arbitration is therefore
mandatory. And, a final decision is made through majority vote rather than through a
neutral arbiter who makes a reasoned decision after considering each side’s position.
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The Arbitration Model, however, provides an important insight into the moral
purpose of authoritative democratic procedures and law more generally. The core purpose
of arbitration is to resolve disputes in a way that treats each party to the dispute equally.
Insofar as democratic procedures resolve disputes and do so by giving each person an equal
vote, democratic procedures serve that purpose. Thus, the Arbitration Model captures a
key part of the purpose of authoritative democratic political procedures.
The difficulty, however, is that the Arbitration Model also does not exclusively
support democratic procedures.

The Arbitration Model would support any political

procedure or institution that resolved disputes in a manner that treated disputants equally.
For example, return to the dictator example above. The professorial dictator is a paradigm
case of mandatory arbitration and fits the Arbitration Model. That is not to say that the
Arbitration Model does not have a role to play in any account of the political legitimacy of
democratic procedures. Surely it does: it effectively captures the basic point of political
authority as described to this point. The point is just that democracy as it is commonly
understood is not the exclusive option under the Arbitration Model. Put differently,
effective democratic institutions are but one reasonable specification of the more general
moral principle that reasonable disputes about equal freedom have to be authoritatively
resolved in a way that treats each person as an equal. Additional theoretical architecture is
thus needed to account for democracy.
6.2 - Unilateral Authority and the Political Equality Constraint
At this point I want to introduce an alternative account of the legitimacy of
democratic political institutions. This account makes sense of the role that political
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equality plays in questions of legitimacy, while unifying the core elements of the
Arbitration Model and the Deliberative Model. This account understands democracy as an
institutional answer to the problem of unilateral authority and fits within the broader moral
task account.
All of this talk about democracy might seem suspect in light of the discussions in
the previous chapters. Earlier, I argued that the state and law are morally necessary to
secure relations of equal freedom among citizens. I offered an account of why and when
individuals living within reasonably just states can have fairly robust moral obligations to
abide by the law. Those obligations arise from the coordinative capacities of the state in
the face of reasonable disagreement. When there is a law in place that effectively resolves
what would otherwise be a reasonable disagreement, not complying with that law amounts
to one subjecting others to their own private view about what justice as equal freedom
requires. In doing so, one is unilaterally dictating the terms of one’s interactions with
others according to one’s own private judgment. Thus, one is violating the right of another
to one’s conformity with laws that specify the standard for relations of equality between
citizens.

Our actions are governed by public specifications of our rights and

responsibilities rather than our own private view of such rights and responsibilities. Only
by acting according to the law, where the law provides an effective and reasonable
interpretation, can one avoid unilaterally subjecting another to one’s own will. It is the
state’s responsibility to deploy the law to secure those relations amongst persons, and the
law is morally binding insofar as it does that.
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On its face, that suggests that morally binding law can exist without democracy. If
there is a moral task for a state to do, and it does that task credibly and effectively, what
else is there to say? Put differently, democracy concerns the process by which laws are
created. If the outcome of a process, democratic or otherwise, functions as needed, why
does it matter how it came about? To answer that question, we must first draw a distinction
between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of legitimacy. Philip Pettit teases out a
similar distinction along the following lines:
Given that a state is necessary for justice, there is an issue about how it
ought to relate to its citizens, as distinct from the issue of how the citizens
ought to relate to one another. And that, as I conceive of it, is the issue of
legitimacy. Where the issue of social justice is a matter of the horizontal
relations of citizens to one another, political legitimacy is a matter of their
vertical relations to the state that rules over them. 267
We should not agree that justice is distinct from legitimacy in the manner that Pettit
describes. According to the view that I have described, politically legitimate laws are those
that effectively specify the requirements of justice, conceived as equal freedom, between
persons. Thus, legitimacy of the law has as much to do with the horizontal relations
between persons subject to authority as the vertical legitimacy of the state has to do with
the extent to which it effectively structures just relations between equal persons. We need

267

Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 135-36. Dworkin draws a comparable but different
distinction between the vertical and horizontal “dimensions” of political power. Dworkin,
Sovereign Virtue, 190-91.
162

not think that when we are talking about the justice of a law we are talking about something
distinct from its legitimacy and visa versa. 268 How the state relates to its citizens is surely
an issue of justice.
The distinction between the horizontal relation between citizens subject to a law in
contrast with their vertical relation with a de facto authority is instructive. The purpose of
the state is to create and enforce laws that constitute certain horizontal relationships
between subjects who are equally required to follow the law. Each person is equally bound
by the law, and by following the law, we interact with one another through the law on
horizontally equal terms. Doing so resolves the problems associated with the state of
nature, the primary problem being situations in which individuals are subject to the private
authority of others because of moral indeterminacy and disagreement. That problem
concerns a morally problematic horizontal relationship that one might have with others in
the absence of public legal standards to govern our behavior. The horizontal, then, serves
to distinguish cases where the rule of law exists between subjects and those where it does
not. By following the law, one is not horizontally subjecting their fellow citizens to their
own private will. The law governs how we interact with others and articulates our
enforceable rights and responsibilities with respect to each other. Non-democratic political
institutions and actors can equally secure the rule of law.
We can also evaluate the vertical relationship between subject citizens, and the
political actors or processes that have authority over them. Of that relationship, we can ask
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whether and in what ways it is legitimate from the perspective of equal freedom. This
inquiry will seek to draw a distinction between societies where an unelected dictator or
ruling class rules citizens, and those societies where political authority is adequately
democratic in character. For example, is the vertical relationship that a citizen has with an
unelected dictator different from the vertical relationship that a citizen has with an elected
leader in a democracy?
Another way to understand the vertical/horizontal distinction is in terms of the
process/outcome distinction. A common, and I think correct, point in the democracy
literature is that in some manner the process by which a law comes into existence is morally
relevant aside from the independent merits of the law that is produced. 269 Thus, there are
two dimensions by which we can assess the legitimacy of a law: the process by which it
came about and the substantive merits of the law. The former is the vertical dimension of
legitimacy, which concerns the process by which the right to rule is exercised. Is legislation
the product of a single professorial dictator, or a democratic process? With respect to the
horizontal, insofar as we think of laws as structuring certain moral relationships between
persons, then a moral assessment of the outcome of exercises of authority is a moral
assessment of the moral relationships that the law constitutes between persons. Is the law
a reasonable specification of the right to equal freedom or something beyond the scope of
the state? That is the horizontal dimension noted above.
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Call the following the Political Equality Constraint (PEC). The PEC demands that
each individual in a society has an equal right to decision-making authority as each other
individual in society. That is a constraint on the vertical, or process, dimension of
legitimacy, as well as the horizontal relationships between citizens. On the common
understanding of democracy, that constraint is satisfied in two ways. First, political offices
with decision-making authority are open to all. What that means is that if one has the basic
capabilities to do the job, then there is no constraint on them occupying the position, except
that it might already be occupied or that the open process for choosing between capable
candidates did not choose them. Second, insofar as any individuals have certain rights to
participate, all have the same rights. The obvious consequence is that all reasonably
capable citizens have an equal right to vote where elections are held. But, they are also to
have equal access to the public deliberative process, including equal rights to speech and
equal rights to communicate with those who have decision-making authority.
The PEC is derivative of three interrelated ideas that I discussed earlier in Chapters
One through Four. The first is the prohibition against unilateral authority. Recall that one
aspect of being independent is not being subject to the private will of another. What that
means is that no individual is permitted unilaterally to determine the choices of others.
Those with unilateral authority are able to impose their own private purposes on others.270
But the reverse is not the case. In order not to run afoul of the prohibition on unilateral
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authority, rights to decision-making authority must be equal. The second is the rule of law.
Part of the idea of the rule of law is that laws are to be general, meaning that their
application and scope does not depend on the proper identity of any particular individual.
So, Abe cannot posses the right to rule in virtue of the fact that he belongs to a particular
family. Instead, if anyone is to have a right to rule, everyone must have as much of a right
as anyone else. Third, the constraint is a direct implication of the liberal commitment that
all sufficiently capacitated persons are to be regarded as both free and equal, such that no
individual could have a claim to political power that is any different from any other
individual. A free and equal moral person has equal standing to make demands about how
equal freedom is to be secured and what it means.
The PEC is described as a constraint because it places a limit on what would
otherwise be a sufficient argument for the legitimacy of exercises of political authority,
namely that such exercises are morally necessary to secure equal freedom and effectively
do so. The moral necessity of political authority aside, the PEC governs both how political
authority is to be distributed and the manner in which it is to be exercised. The latter point
is that political authority can only be exercised through a process that at a fundamental
level gives each individual an equal right to decision-making power. The upshot is that no
potential political leader can make a claim to a position of authority on the ground that she
has a right to assume that position that no one else possesses. The PEC therefore rules out
theories that would permit claims to decision-making authority on the basis of family name,
race, gender, or social class, among other things.
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How does the PEC contrast or fit with the models of democracy described above?
Recall that the Arbitration Model effectively captures the basic moral purpose or task of
political authority as I have described it here. There are reasonable disagreements between
citizens, and authority must be exercised to resolve those disagreements effectively so that
we can live on reciprocal terms. The PEC can be understood as a constraint on how
mandatory arbitration over law making should operate. Reasonable disagreements over
what the law should be are to be resolved by a process that gives no one anymore authority
than anyone else.
What about the Deliberative Model? The Deliberative Model captures an important
aspect of why authority is valuable in the first place. It allows human beings to deliberate
and reflect on how to order our lives rather than leaving that order to chance or social
forces. That is of primary instrumental importance because it allows us to aim at laws that
adequately respond to the requirements of equal freedom, laws that are within the domain
of the reasonable. 271 The right to participate in deliberations can also be understood to
flow from the PEC. If any right to decision-making authority must be equal, surely any
right to participate in deliberations as to what decisions should be made must also be equal.
Thus, not only is the PEC consistent with the Deliberative Model, the equal right to
participate follows from the PEC. Finally, because participating in the process by speaking
one’s mind and contributing to the deliberation, within limits, does not violate the freedom
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of others under any reasonable political theory, the right to speak one’s mind will be
secured on any account of democratic authority, including one that invokes the PEC.
The PEC, along with the vertical/horizontal distinction, can also be deployed to
account for two reasonable views that are in tension with each other. First, a dictatorship,
even a professorial one, in some sense lacks legitimacy, in contrast with a democracy. The
PEC accounts for that because the dictator’s claim to rule violates the PEC and a democracy
does not. Second, in light of the more general argument that the law’s purpose is to secure
equal freedom between persons by specifying our rights and responsibilities, we should be
able to account for why individuals can have obligations to obey the law notwithstanding
that they happen to live in non-democratic states. Clearly, non-democratic states can
actually do the job of creating laws that specifies the requirements of equal freedom.
Insofar as the law does that, it is legitimate. But such an institutional arrangement would
seem to violate the PEC.
It is important to note that the issue of the bindingness of non-democratic law is not
just about distinguishing between dictatorships and democracies. That is because the issue
arises even within democracies. Two instances are worthy of note. First, constitutional
law, which identifies the basic structure of government, its powers, and its limits, is hardly
democratic. Instead, such law secures the background structure in which democratic
decisions can be made and enforced. Such law is not susceptible to change through normal
democratic processes. Second, many of the laws that bind generations today were created
during previous generations. In that sense, future generations are bound by legal decisions
made by past generations participating in legal decision making without the participation

168

of future generations. Consequently, we cannot so easily deny the possibility that nondemocratic law can still be binding.
To resolve that issue, return to the above distinction between the vertical and
horizontal dimensions of legitimacy. The PEC is a constraint on each of those dimensions.
Whether a state is democratic rather than a dictatorship is a vertical legitimacy issue. The
PEC is only satisfied vertically if rights to political authority are held equally between those
who are ruled and the state actors who rule. Democracy is therefore necessary for vertical
legitimacy. But, democracy is not necessary for horizontal legitimacy. Instead, whether
the rule of law is satisfied between those individuals is the relevant issue. The PEC is
satisfied horizontally insofar as all of those subject to the state’s rule have equal authority.
In the case of a dictatorship, the PEC is satisfied horizontally because all subjects have the
same authority—none. And, they are all subject to a set of laws that govern them equally.
Imagine a law that governs the terms of interaction between neighbors, Joe and
Smo. Imagine that law is a noise ordinance that limits playing music that can be heard
across property lines past 8:00 p.m. Everyone recognizes that to be the law, generally
abides by it, legal officials effectively enforce it, and it is a reasonable candidate for such
a law. Such a law can equally emanate from a democratic process as it can unilaterally
from a dictator. Now, say that it was imposed by a dictator and say that neighbor Joe
violates the law. On the view presented here, Joe has violated Smo’s right to Joe’s
compliance with the law. In violating the law, Joe has unilaterally imposed his own will
on Smo. When Smo asks for a justification, imagine that Joe says he refuses to abide by
that law because it emanated from a non-democratic process that he was precluded from
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participating in. Smo, nonetheless, has a legitimate grievance. His response can and
should be that the law effectively set the terms of interaction between him and Joe such
that he has a right to Joe’s compliance. The fact that the vertical character of the law is not
democratic is not Smo’s problem. Joe’s beef is not with Smo or the law; it is with the
dictator.
The point of the example is to show that the horizontal legitimacy of the law can
float independently of its vertical legitimacy. Legitimacy is not just about doing what the
dictator tells you to do; it is also about doing what the law tells you to do. Horizontal
legitimacy in this case is about whether a law effectively resolves moral disagreement and
coordinates actions and expectations. Compliance with the law is fundamentally owed to
our fellow citizens, not those who possess political authority. If the law effectively sets
the terms of our interaction with others, they have a right to our compliance with the law.
The law effectively resolves a moral disagreement that does or could exist between us. It
does so in a way that binds us all equally and therefore satisfies the PEC between us.
The question then is how to understand the legitimacy, or lack thereof, in the
vertical relationship that exists between the dictator and his citizens. This is where things
get complicated and likely become heavily circumstance dependent. In some states,
democracy is not possible in light of circumstances that exist in such states. For example,
in some places, insisting on democracy would just result in turning government over to a
majority coalition of religious zealots who seek to impose their religious views on everyone
else. In such a case, we might remember the threshold model described earlier. A dictator
in such a situation might insist that he has a right to stay in the job because he is credibly
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doing the job of securing equal freedom. That right and any attendant enabling rights
belong to him in virtue of his moral responsibility to secure equal freedom. He is the only
one who can effectively do that. He might admit that his rule violates the PEC but explain
that democratic institutions are not plausible in light of the circumstances. One way to
understand what the dictator is saying is that his responsibility to secure horizontal
legitimacy takes priority over his responsibility to secure vertical legitimacy. 272
In summary, what I have described is a moral task account with a constraint,
specifically the PEC. This model, I have argued, adequately captures how we think about
the moral importance or necessity of democratic authority in contrast with non-democratic
authority. Moreover, the PEC account described imports aspects of the Arbitration and
Deliberative Models. Now I want to turn to several views that work within those two
models that are explicitly moral task accounts but that rely on alternative components other
than the PEC to account for the authority of democratic law.

6.3 - Moral Tasks and Equal Respect
I noted earlier that the literature on the authority of law often lacks much discussion
of the relationship between democratic institutions and legitimate authority. In recent
years, that has changed, as a number of democracy theorists have defended theories of
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legislature). Christiano, The Constitution of Equality, 240-41.
171

democratic authority that fit within the moral task framework that I have been defending
throughout this dissertation. Here I want to discuss such views with goal of explicating the
overall moral-task account and the PEC. The goal is to explain why a moral task theory
that attaches the PEC is superior to theories that append some other moral principle to
account for the authority of democracy. I also want to begin to lay the groundwork for the
claim in the final section of this chapter that democracy as we currently know it is just one
of a number of plausible specifications of authoritative political institutions that satisfy the
PEC.
A number of theorists have sought to explain the authority of democracy by
reference to a principle of equal respect amongst citizens.

Broadly, there are two

components to such views. First, democratic institutions themselves express respect for
individuals as equals in giving each individual an equal say. Second, when individuals
abide by democratic laws they express respect for their fellow citizens. And, in not abiding
by democratic laws, law breakers express disrespect for their fellow citizens.
Thomas Christiano is broadly correct to maintain that “[t]he reasonably just state is
engaged in a morally necessary activity in the sense that someone who fails to comply with
the reasonably just state’s publically promulgated rules is normally violating a duty of
justice to his fellow citizens.” 273 We should not treat that statement as an inference from
the reasonable justice of a state to the reasonable justice of any of its laws. Rather, the
reasonably just legal specifications of the state will be morally binding. According to
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Christiano, however, the authority of democracy has an alternative basis that relies on the
value of equal respect.
Christiano argues that “the principle of public equality grounds the authority of
democracy.” 274 According to the principle of public equality, “[e]ach human being has a
fundamental and natural duty to treat other human beings as equals . . . . But this duty is
only fully realized among persons when each person attempts to treat others publically as
equals.” 275 As part of that duty, “each person has a duty to each other citizen to afford
them a right to an equal say and to respect that equal say.” 276 The first part of that latter
requirement comes close to stating the PEC: each citizen has a right to an equal say. The
second part states the principle of equal respect for the judgment of others. It seems
uncontroversial that the PEC would follow from the former premises.

If political

institutions are public, then denying any individuals an equal say would be to publically
treat them as unequals or not to respect them as equals. At the very least, that means that
in a society where there are not equal rights of participation and equal voting, political
institutions and/or those in power in that society would be violating a right that individuals
have to an equal say. Put differently, they would be violating the PEC. However, it is not
obvious the extent to which that duty falls directly on individual citizens. If we both live
under a despot, it is not clear how either of us could discharge a duty to the other to afford
them a right to an equal say. Neither of us have any say, and there is unlikely to be anything
either of us could do to otherwise change matters. What one can do, however, is not impose
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their will on their fellow citizens. In that limited sense they can sense, they can secure the
equal say of their fellow citizens. By contrast, within a democracy, a duty not to interfere
with the democratic process, including voting procedures, would follow easily from the
right to an equal say. If I took your ballot out of a ballot box, then that would be a direct
violation of your right to an equal say.
I want to focus, however, on what seem to be the connected duties to “treat others
publically as equals” and “to respect th[e] equal say” of others. According to Christiano,
those duties explain why we have a moral obligation to comply with democraticallyproduced laws. Christiano explains those duties along the following lines:
The basic idea then is that one owes it to others, by virtue of the principle
of equality and the fundamental interests of each in having her judgment
about justice accorded respect, to comply with the decision of the majority
about how to establish justice. 277
He explains that citizens who do not comply with democratic laws “affirm[] a superior
right to that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be
arranged.” 278 In doing so, “[o]ne is putting one’s judgment ahead of others’ and in the light
of the facts about judgment and the interests in respect for judgment, one is in effect
expressing the superiority of one’s interests over others.” 279
Here I want to address two broad problems with such a view. The first is with the
notion of a duty of respect. The second has to do with resting the authority of democracy
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on a basis other than the moral responsibility or task of the state. Resting a duty to obey
the law on the duty to respect one’s fellow citizens is problematic. That is because the duty
of respect, like any attitude-centric duty, is inherently indeterminate. There are enumerable
ways in which we can show respect for others. Here are several (not all) possibilities for
how to interpret a duty of respect, not all of which would demand compliance with the law.
First, a requirement of respect could be a requirement only that one has a certain type of
attitude toward the object of respect. Such a duty does not require an individual to act in a
particular manner; it simply requires them to have a certain type of mental state,
specifically an attitude of respect. We might imagine a person faced with a legal decision
emanating from a democratic procedures saying, “I respect the decision, the effort that
went into it, and all of my fellow citizens, but I am going to do what I think is right for all,
including myself.” In which case, the person has the requisite mental attitude, and perhaps
that he express that attitude in some way, but the requirement that he have that attitude
does not give him reason one way or the other to follow the law.
There is a second, moderate possibility. The moderate duty of respect would
require that one at least regard the object of respect as having some sort of practical
relevance, as carrying some sort of deliberative weight, in one’s deliberations about what
to do in the face of democratic decision. This is commonly how we understand the
normative import of requests between individuals in morally valuable relationships, for
example, a friendship. Take a person making a request of their friend. In the normal case,
a friend, as a matter of respect for his friend, is obligated to give some consideration to his
friend’s request to do something, perhaps even substantially weighty consideration. But
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respect does not require that the friend ultimately act on the request to the exclusion of all
other considerations. Nor is it the case that the friend automatically does anything wrong
by not going along with what his friend requests. The request (even if communicated more
like an order) does not automatically obligate. Along such lines, requiring respect for
democratically created law could mean that one is required to consider a democratically
generated law as carrying (significant) weight in one’s deliberations. So we can imagine a
person saying, “I see your point about the fact that this law was the majority decision of
my fellow citizens, and that fact weighed heavily in my deliberations, but ultimately other
moral considerations compel me to do otherwise.” There likely will be cases in which that
consideration tips the balance in favor of following the law. But that will not be true in all
cases. All that is required is that the citizen takes the law into consideration in deciding
what to do. 280
Finally, we could interpret the duty of respect to require that a person abide by
democratic law. Only if one follows the law does one show adequate respect. This last
idea brings us to the claim that democratic procedures have the capacity to generate moral
obligations. It is that version of respect that respect-based theories must satisfy if equal
respect is supposed to ground a duty to comply with democratic laws. The difficulty is that
if there are other existing avenues for respecting one’s fellows as equals, then it is not
obvious on what basis we would require this interpretation of the duty of respect. Exactly,
why does the citizen need to show that much respect? Without more argument the duty of
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respect is indeterminate with respect to the different ways in which the duty can be
discharged.
Before discussing one final difficulty with respect-based views, it will be helpful to
look at another view that focuses on equal respect. In Law and Disagreement, Jeremy
Waldron aims to present “a philosophy of law that pays something more than lip-service
to the ideal of self-government; a philosophy of law which indeed puts that ideal to work .
. . in its account of the nature of law, the basis of legitimacy, the task of interpretation, and
the respective responsibilities of legislatures, citizens, and courts.” 281 Notwithstanding that
goal, the view that Waldron goes on to present is perhaps more important for its attempt to
apply the lessons of philosophy of law, especially lessons about the nature of legal
authority, in the other direction, to thinking about the moral authority of democratic
decision making. Under the heading of what, borrowing from Rawls and Hume, 282 he calls,
“the circumstances of politics,” Waldron develops a number of points discussed in earlier
chapters about the need for law in the face of reasonable disagreement: “[T]he felt need
among members of a certain group for a common framework, decision, or course of action
on some matter, even in the face of disagreement about what that framework, decision, or
action should be, are the circumstances of politics.” 283 As I argued earlier, that need is not
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just felt; it is a real moral need to secure equal freedom. Democratic authority, according
to Waldron, is justified in some manner by the fact that we live in the circumstances of
politics, and there is a necessary moral task to complete.
Now, one might criticize the authority of democratic decision making in a manner
comparable to how one might criticize the authority of law: That a law is a valid law or
that a law garnered a majority of the votes are just social facts that seem to be arbitrary
from the moral point of view. How can a social fact defeat one’s considered judgment
about, or the independent moral merits of, the required course of action? Earlier I urged
that the fact of reasonable moral disagreement admonishes confidence in one’s ability to
determine the singular moral merit of any given action. Waldron shares that view and
defends democratic law making, specifically majoritarian voting procedures, against the
charge of arbitrariness by highlighting their ability to resolve moral disagreement in the
circumstances of politics:
Society needs a mechanical procedure precisely because recourse to a
substantive procedure would reproduce, not resolve, the decision-problem
in front of us. What seems like the majoritarian obsession with statistics is
. . . the tribute that politics plays to the reality that social problems and
opportunities confront us in our millions, not in the twos and threes with
which moral philosophers are comfortable.

And what seems like its

impersonality is really a commitment to equality—a determination that
when we need to settle on a single course of action and we disagree about
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what to do, there is no reasonable basis for our decision-procedures to
accord greater weight to one side than to the other in the disagreement. 284
There are two points to unpack here. The first deals with the positivity of democratic
procedures, the second with the value of equality. First, democratic procedures are morally
important because they channel moral disagreements through a process that results in a
decisive majoritarian decision that does not reproduce the disagreements that it functioned
to resolve. Waldron is emphasizing the moral importance of the legal positivity of
majoritarian democratic procedures.

Democratic processes cannot resolve moral

disagreement about the substantive merits of a candidate course of action if after the
democratic process takes its course, individuals simply could continue to act according to
their own ex ante assessment of the substantive merits of a course of action. Resolution is
achieved because we can ascertain the required course of action simply by tallying votes.
It should be recalled that democratic procedures and democratically produced laws are not
uniquely positive. As I explained earlier, all laws, by virtue of the fact that their validity
is determined by social facts, have the capacity to resolve reasonable disagreement because
the existence and content of a law is not determined by one’s reasoned moral assessment.
Waldron’s second point is that democratic majoritarian procedures also apparently
express a commitment to equality. At this point, it is not clear exactly how majoritarian
procedures are unique in that respect. If there is no reasonable basis to accord greater
weight to one side of a debate rather than the other, then it is unclear why the side that
carries a majority of votes should prevail. I will return to that point in the final section. In
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any case, at this point Waldron’s point about equality is consistent with the PEC described
earlier. We can say that no matter what positive “mechanical” process is used to come to
final decisions, no side within a reasonable debate within a democracy has any more than
an equal right to decision-making power.
Nonetheless, Waldron goes on to develop his moral task account partially in terms
of the moral importance of equal respect. He sums up the view as follows:
[A]n account of majority decision cannot itself explain the authority of
legislation (in [a] constraining sense).

That explanation must come

primarily from our sense of the moral urgency and importance of the
problems we must address—the things that ought to be done and must be
done by us together, in our millions, if they are to be done at all. . . . The
appeal of majority decision is that it not only solves the difficulty [the
circumstances of politics] generate, but it does so in a respectful spirit.
Thus, its constraining authority consists of the fact that it allows us to
address in these circumstances those problems that are deemed important
and compelling. The two, then—constraint and respectfulness—combine
to make a particular demand on each citizen . . . that he should not insist
unreasonably on what appears to him to be the right solution to the urgent
problems we face, if the result of such insistence is likely to be that the
problems we face do not get any sort of solution at all. 285
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The view presented can broadly be described as an attempt to explain why laws that
issue from democratic legislatures and/or majoritarian decision making are morally
binding. It attempts to explain the moral authority of democratic legal procedures.
There are two components to Waldron’s argument. The first has to do with the ability of
democratic processes to resolve “important and compelling” moral problems. The second
has to do with the virtue of “respectfulness.”
Despite being on the right track in a number of respects, the view faces difficulties.
First look at how Waldron presents the moral-task component of his argument. He says
that no citizen should “insist unreasonably on what appears to him to be the right solution
to the urgent problems we face, if the result of such insistence is likely to be that the
problems we face do not get any sort of solution at all.” 286 Obviously, it would be
unreasonable—even evil and against one’s duty—for any individual citizen to insist on not
complying with the law if the immediate and foreseeable result of that failure to comply
would be a failure of a collective solution to an urgent moral problem. In such a
circumstance, the citizen has a moral obligation to go along and not to insist on what he
regards as the morally required course. The problem is that the individual citizen is rarely,
if ever, in a circumstance where his individual compliance is marginally necessary to
discharge any of our collective responsibilities. Recall an earlier discussion about Hume’s
instrumental defense of the general moral obligation to obey the law: “If the reason be
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asked of that obedience, which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer,
because society could not otherwise subsist . . . .”287 But, contra Hume, society never hangs
in the balance like that and nor do most moral tasks that require collective action. It would
be a highly unusual, even tragic, circumstance for the solution to an urgent and necessary
moral problem, one that normally stems from the collective needs of millions of people, to
hang on the compliance of any particular individual. In fact, it is the nature of collective
action problems generally that they do not have that sort of structure, which is why such
problems call out to be addressed in ways other than an appeal to the individual importance
of the actions of any particular individual. 288 Any moral task argument that rests on the
instrumental necessity of any particular citizen’s conformity to law faces the same problem
that Hume faces.

This is especially problematic for Waldron because, by his own

admission, what is paramount to explain the authoritativeness of majoritarian procedures
is not that they are democratic but that they resolve urgent moral tasks. In Chapter Three
I urged that the need to discharge our collective responsibilities in a fair manner can address
the concern about inconsequential non-compliance.
Waldron does not say anything about equal distributions of responsibility, but he
places heavy emphasis on the value of equal respect in democratic procedure. Perhaps
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respect can bridge the gap in the argument. There are two objects of respect on Waldron’s
account. First, the achievement of the democratic process in resolving necessary moral
tasks collectively is an object of respect. 289 And second, the process respects the persons
who are afforded an equal vote in the democratic process because they have an equal right
to participate and their divergent views are not silenced. 290 The upshot seems to be that
by respecting the democratic process, one is satisfying a duty to respect one’s fellow
citizens. At this point, we are where we left off earlier. The difficulty is that a duty of
respect is inherently indeterminate, as there is no straightforward inference from a duty to
respect to a duty to obey the law.
I want to note a broader problem with respect-based views of political obligation.
Even if the duty of equal respect could adequately explain why individuals have a moral
obligation to follow democratically produced laws, the duty of respect cannot explain why
democratically produced laws are coercively enforceable. Following Kant, I earlier argued
that force is only permitted to secure equal freedom. However, duties of respect do not
implicate the freedom of others. If I disrespect you, for example by insulting you, I have
in no way hindered your freedom. Although individuals should respect others, they cannot
be forced to do so or punished for failing to do so. The duty of respect therefore cannot
account for the coercive nature of political institutions, democratic or otherwise. For that
additional reason, the duty of respect fails.
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None of this is to say that duties of respect are not violated when individuals do not
abide by the law in democratic society. If democratic laws secure equal freedom, then we
have obligations to follow those laws. If we break those laws, then we violate our
obligations and the rights of others. Disobeying such laws expresses disrespect, but that is
because lawbreakers are violating the moral rights of others. The problem is with deriving
duties to obey from duties to respect. On respect-based views, the obligation to obey the
law is in some way derivative of the duty of respect. Such views put the cart before the
horse.
6.4 - Moral Tasks, Epistemic Value, and Normative Consent
For some, the authority of democracy is to be grounded in its special instrumental
and epistemic capacity to bring about just outcomes. That may or may not be true as an
empirical matter but instrumental concerns are completely relevant in the moral task
framework. But we should not get carried away. A primary example is David Estlund’s
“epistemic proceduralist account of democratic authority.” 291 Estlund argues that the need
to resolve certain urgent moral tasks in ways that are epistemically respectable, fair, and
entitled to consent can ground the authority of democracy and the obligation to obey. 292
He argues that democratic states “serve urgent collective tasks with institutions that can be
publicly seen to have some decent tendency (better than or at least nearly as good as any
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other and also better than random) to produce good or correct decisions.” 293 There are
“great humanitarian problems” that must be addressed, and the duty to obey laws issuing
from the democratic process is a species of duty “to contribute to the solution of great
humanitarian problems.” 294 Although those urgent collective tasks can generally be
resolved without all citizens participating, each citizen nonetheless has a duty of fairness
to participate.
Democratic processes are important to political legitimacy insofar as such
processes are epistemically respectable and such processes do not draw “invidious
comparisons” between possible participants in the process. The latter point is that citizens
are not pre-judged as wiser or less wise in a way that affects their rights to participate. 295
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The prohibition against invidious comparisons would equally follow from the PEC. No
individual is to have anything but an equal right to decision-making power, regardless of
any impression that some are morally smarter than others. Insofar as that constraint is in
part derived from the fact that individuals reasonably disagree, there is no basis upon which
to designate some as wiser than others.
On Estlund’s account, the democratic process, where that includes majority voting
procedures, has a better-than-random epistemic capacity to hone in on the correct solutions
to our humanitarian problems.

Thus, complying with a democratic law is a fair

instrumental contribution toward an end that the democratic process identifies as morally
compelling. This would contrast with a system of anarchy according to which individuals
themselves choose what course of action to take aside from whether it is mandated by the
democratic process. The democratic process will have the capacity to create binding moral
obligations insofar as it is “more likely to promote substantive justice than the anarchic
arrangement, and [is] also better than a random procedure for choosing decisions.” 296 The
democratic process has the capacity to do that because it pools the wisdom of the citizenry
through the voting process much like a market pools the wisdom of potential buyers to
assign prices to goods in a market. 297
An initial concern is that even if democratic processes are better than random and
better than any alternative institutional arrangement, we cannot infer that democratic
processes are morally binding in all cases. That would be what we need to ground anything
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that looks like a general moral authority to impose obligations. In addition, to say that
democratic procedures are simply better than a number of bad alternatives is not a robust
defense of democracy. Estlund admits as much. 298 But according to him, it is not that
democracy merely performs better than a decision process that chooses randomly (e.g., a
coin flip). 299 Rather, democratic processes are much better than a random procedure and
very reliable when it comes to avoiding “primary bads”: “war, famine, economic collapse,
political collapse, epidemic, and genocide.” 300 Since democracy is much better than
random at avoiding primary bads, Estlund continues, we can infer that it is also at least
better than random at determining what justice requires more generally. 301
That argument is unconvincing. First, it seems only to have the potential to justify
compliance with the law in cases where primary bads are at stake. One might just concede
that if there is a risk of famine that is somehow dependent on certain political decisions,
then those decisions should be made according to binding democratic processes. However,
one might suggest that such high stakes cases are exactly the sort of cases where we do not
want decisions to be democratically made. Second, in cases where primary bads are not at
issue, Estlund has not provided an argument that would explain why a decision maker
whose deliberative capacity is better than a coin flip has any reason to go along with the
democratic decision rather than their own assessment of what course of action to take. It
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just seems completely contingent whether democratic institutions will outperform other
arrangements and/or deliberative individual deliberative citizens faced with what to do.
Those more specific concerns are part of a more general concern about the
epistemic proceduralist account of authority. This is a difficulty that we have seen faces
any account that relies on the idea that one institutional arrangement is comparatively better
than others. The account is simply an account of the justification of democratic procedures,
not their legitimacy. Even if democratic procedures can bring about better results and/or
solutions to our collective problems, we need a way to translate that into an account of the
legitimacy of democratic law.
I think Estlund is sensitive to that broader concern. As he notes, even if we can
have duties to contribute to the solution of humanitarian problems, “something more would
be needed to explain why I would be obligated to follow orders, to do what I am told
because I am told.” 302 That problem is resolved by what Estlund calls, “normative
consent.” Democratic processes must and will he thinks garner normative consent.
According to Estlund, “[n]ormative consent names a moral obligation, when there is one,
to consent to proposed new authority. It is . . . morally equivalent to a promise to obey. In
the context of [the state of nature] it would be a moral obligation to consent to the proposed
new authority.” 303 If an individual has an obligation to consent and does not do so, then
their non-consent is void. The moral situation therefore is as if they had consented.
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Recall our discussion in Chapter Four of consent theories in the context of moral
task accounts. One version of the moral task account of political authority (Murphy) argues
that the authoritative state is necessary to resolve certain collective moral tasks and that in
virtue of that need individuals reasonably can, should, or must consent to the state having
authority over them. In such an account, actual consent is necessary for authority.
Normative consent, however, does not require actual consent. One normatively consents
insofar as one would have an obligation to do so. If one consents to democratic authority,
then obedience is required. If an individual has an obligation to consent but fails to consent,
their non-consent is nullified anyway and they have given normative, but not actual,
consent to be bound. Thus, normative consent is normatively equivalent to a promise to
obey.
The existence of an important moral task that must be resolved in a fair manner can
ground the authority of epistemically respectable democratic processes if one would also
be obligated to promise to obey such processes:
[n]ormative consent theory proposes that in the case of some urgent tasks,
but not others, those who are commanded would, if asked, be wrong not to
consent to the commander’s authority for these purposes. The wrongness
of refusing consent, rather than urgency itself, would be the explanation for
why some urgent tasks ground authority and others do not. 304
Estlund’s account of normative consent is problematic. The problem is that normative
consent is entirely superfluous, and Estlund offers no good reasons to conclude otherwise.
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Estlund’s account aside, I have already provided a general account of the conditions under
which the state can possess legitimate political authority. In this chapter, I added the
additional requirement of the PEC. With that in mind, we might ask what additional
theoretical work could be done by adding the concept of normative consent.

Put

differently, if the fact that an individual does not consent has no normative consequences
anyway, why would there be a superfluous obligation to consent in the first place? 305 Given
that the lack of consent is nullified because of the moral necessity of resolving moral tasks
fairly, the latter argument should already directly establish the moral obligation to obey
authority.
Estlund is aware of that problem too:
[A] formidable objection is that the duty to consent already depends on prior
moral facts, which might as well be taken as the moral basis for the authority
itself, as well as for the duty to consent. The direct authority objection
claims that the consent-requiring facts are already authority-establishing
facts. This objection . . . claims that the facts are already a sufficient moral
basis for authority. 306
So, why the detour?
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One might argue that even if normative consent is doing no normative work, it might
be doing dialectical work in a theoretical conversation with consent theorists. Perhaps,
normative consent permits us to engage with consent theorists on their own terms without
looking like we are begging the question. In the end, however, I doubt a consent theorist
would be persuaded by the idea that non-consent can be voided.
306
Ibid., 130.
190

Estlund offers two reasons, neither of which work. First, he maintains that “[m]oral
agents possess a special kind of freedom from each other’s authority. It cannot simply
befall us, but can only arise subject in some way to our own will.”307 However, normative
consent countenances obligations that “simply befall us” insofar as it does not require
actual consent to political authority. Such obligations would only be subject to our own
will insofar as we actually choose them or consent to them. So, normative consent does
not even address that supposed problem.
Second, Estlund argues that consenting, like promising, can have value independent
of the value of the reason for which you consent. 308 For example, doctors take an oath —
they make a promise — never to do harm. They also have an independent moral obligation
never to do harm. According to Estlund, there is moral value both in doctor’s taking an
oath and in their abiding by the obligation not to do harm. 309 The point is that oath taking
has some moral value independent of the moral value of the obligation to do no harm. We
need not be exact about what that independent moral value is. Perhaps there is intrinsic
moral value in a public expression of one’s commitment to satisfy one’s obligations, or
there might be instrumental value insofar as people are more likely to do things when they
promise. In any case, the problem for Estlund is that normative consent does not generate
that sort of moral value absent an actual promise or an actual act of consent. And, even if
it could bring about some extra moral value, that fact would not address but would confirm

307

Ibid., 151. This route is a bit perilous. The consent theorist is going to agree with
Estlund here and say that the requisite connection to the will is actual consent.
308
Estlund calls this a “commitment task.” Ibid., 152-56.
309
Ibid., 151-54.
191

the fact that there is already a sufficient moral basis for political authority provided by the
moral task argument.
6.5 - Specificationism and the Indeterminacy of Equality of Authority
I want to end this discussion of the relationship between authority and democracy
by addressing the status of the principle of bare majority rule and bringing the discussion
back to specificationism more generally. That the account I have offered can distinguish
between the legitimacy of non-democratic rule and democratic rule is an important
outcome. We might ask whether the account can also distinguish between different kinds
of democratic arrangements, including those that do without the principle of majority rule.
Does the PEC decisively choose among different specifications of democracy? One
concern about egalitarian conceptions of equality-based conceptions of democracy is that
such views are indeterminate with respect to what form democracy is to take. 310 Given
what I have said thus far about specificationism, reasonable disagreement, and equality,
such indeterminacy is a virtue of the account. It suggests yet another place in which
effective legal institutions are necessary to specify relationships of equal freedom. What I
want to argue here is that our folk understanding of democracy, which regards the principle
of bare majority rule as sacrosanct, is just one specification of a system of political authority
that satisfies the PEC.
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As Christiano explains, “[s]ome have wondered whether the kind of egalitarian
argument . . . could not just as well some system in which decisions [are] made by lotteries
wherein each person had an equal chance to affect the outcome.” Christiano, The
Constitution of Equality, 108 (citing David Estlund, “Beyond Fairness and Deliberation:
The Epistemic Dimension of Democratic Authority,” in Philosophy & Democracy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 69-91.).
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Theories of democratic equality in the literature tend to fall into one of three
categories:
1. Equality in Influence
2. Equality in Opportunity for Influence
3. Equal Chance to Influence.
Equality of Influence requires not that one have an equal right to choose to have an equal
influence but that one in fact have an equal influence. 311 The most basic idea would be
that legitimacy turns on whether everyone actually participates in the democratic process
in an equal way (e.g., everyone must vote, everyone donates the same amount to
campaigns). 312
Equality in Opportunity for Influence demands not equal actual influence of
democratic decision making but an equal opportunity to choose to have influence. Such a
view would include any of the variety of views that require equality in the resources
individuals either posses or have the (formal) opportunity to procure, with which they can
participate in the process (or not by choice). Theories might demand equality in any one
or a number of resources. So, a theory might only demand equality in opportunity to
influence with a vote, such that all have an equal right to vote. But there are other possible
resource equality metrics: money permitted for political use, including personal or
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We might include any account that requires unanimous agreement on the outcome too.
But that would run afoul of the requirement that reasonable disagreement and that the need
for authority be taken seriously.
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Such a view would be more likely to emerge from a Self-Rule Model of democracy, but
there could be other reasons to demand complete participation. Anyhow, it is not on its
face inconsistent with the PEC or anything I have argued thus far.
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campaign expenditures; information; time to participate in political discussion and
deliberation; equal access to political officials; and so on.
Finally, Equal Chance to Influence would cover a variety of lottery-based
democratic institutions. The most rudimentary form involves giving each citizen an equal
chance to be the individual who decides on a common policy for a given period of time.
For example, a democratic state might enter each citizen into a lottery with an equal chance
of winning the position of king of the country and the exclusive power to legislate (perhaps
within constitutional limits), for a given period of time. Or, such can be done to choose
representative or government officials more generally. 313 Another form of lottery system,
which is a hybrid with a equality in voting system, would be a point voting system. With
this system, citizens vote and each alternative is assigned a chance of winning that is
proportionate to the number of votes tallied for each alternative. For instance, if candidate
A carried fifty-one percent of the vote, then candidate A would be given a fifty-one percent
chance of winning in a subsequently held lottery to determine the winner. Thus, receiving
the majority vote in the initial election does not mean that one wins; it just means the
majority winner ends up with a better chance of winning the lottery. 314
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All of the options I just described are consistent with the PEC, meaning no one ends
up subject to the private authority of another because any person has an equal right to
authority as anyone else. Of course there may end up being differences in such views with
respect to how effective they are over time and whether they sufficiently meet the
substantive threshold for legitimacy in practice. Such issues are more for political science
than political philosophy. My point here is to address the concern that any of these views
in some sense violates the PEC or is otherwise less favorable in consideration of the PEC.
The primary criticism against views that demand fewer equalities in resources (e.g.,
equal votes but not equal political contributions) is that such views, in demanding only
formal equality, permit individuals or coalitions of individuals to buy or otherwise
manipulate political officials for their own private gain. That is obviously a problem, but
it is not a problem because anything like the PEC is violated. Instead, we see that political
officials and a certain subset of citizens are using their power for obvious personal gain
and using others for personal gain. That would be prohibited by the fact that the state’s
task is to secure equal freedom, not the private interests of the rich. The real question is
whether there is any problem with an individual investing unequal resources in advocating
for a particular political decision because they reasonably believe that to be the best way
to secure equal freedom for all. The PEC would not reject that possibility insofar as a
commitment to equality in authority is a commitment to affirming the equal moral capacity
and right of all individuals to make binding decisions.
With respect to lotteries, we can offer a similar response. Against lotteries,
Christiano maintains that “the kind of equality realized by lotteries is thinner than the
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equality realized by a system of ordinary voting.” 315 With respect to the ruler-for-x-days
scenario, he urges that it “precludes a huge amount of negotiation and deliberation.” 316 It
is unclear why that is the case, as any institutionalization of equal freedom would not
prohibit negotiation and deliberation. Instead, we might see the lottery as specifying a
robust commitment to equality: no matter who is picked, they have as much a right to do
the job as I do. Christiano offers a similar complaint against point-voting lotteries, as he
concludes that they offer a thinner version of equality because they take away the chance
that any individual’s vote will be decisive in determining the outcome of the election. 317 It
is unclear why the issue of whether an individual’s vote can be decisive is relevant from
the standpoint of resolving moral disagreement consistent with equality. To be sure, there
is little chance that any individual’s vote will be decisive in most any democratic
arrangement. We clearly should not care that much about that. But more importantly, a
commitment to equality in the face of reasonable moral disagreement amounts to refusing
to insist that one’s say be decisive by contrast with that of any of one’s other fellow citizens.
What is special about point-voting lotteries is that they give minority viewpoints an extra
opportunity to carry the day, which surely cannot be inconsistent with a commitment to an
equal right to an equal say.
The upshot of this discussion is that various theories of democratic equality are
really various specifications of legitimate democratic arrangements. Insofar as such
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arrangements are adequately effective at securing equal freedom and credibly seeking to
do so, they are legitimate, and we must work within their reasonable terms.
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CHAPTER 6 - PARTICULARITY PROBLEMS
It is a common position or assumption that there exists a special moral tie or bond
between an individual and their own state, or an individual and their own political
community. As Anna Stilz casts the position, “we think a citizen or resident ought to take
her membership to have a kind of moral salience, one that marks this particular relationship
as a source of special duties.” 318 Beyond being a substantive commitment, defensible or
not, we might also think that the positing of a special moral relationship is a necessary
condition for any adequate theory of political obligation or political authority. 319 For, as
some theorist think, a political obligation, by its very nature, just is a special moral bond.
As Simmons explains, “[P]olitical obligation is the moral bond which ties an individual to
one particular political community or set of political institutions in a special way.” 320 Thus,
we might inquire into the extant to which a theory of legitimate political authority must
posit a special moral relationship between an individual and their own state, or an
individual and their political community of citizens. In the literature, all of those issues
have been discussed under the heading of “particularity” or the “particularity problem.”
In this final chapter I want to discuss several issues related to particularity. First, I
will discuss how discussion of how the idea of particularity evolved in the literature. Next,

318

Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 3.
For this position, see Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 30-31;
Green, The Authority of the State, 227-28; Perry, “Political Authority and Political
Obligation,” 29.
320
Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 155. Green describes the issue
in comparable language: “Political obligation is not just some general duty to humanity
which requires compliance with governments, but rather a special moral relationship
between a citizen and the state.” Green, The Authority of the State, 228.
198
319

I will explain that particularity is not a univocal concept but instead refers to several related
but different kinds of special moral relationships a citizen may be said to have with their
own state or their own fellow citizens. I will explain that particularity of political authority
ought not be confused with particularity of obligation, political or otherwise. The larger
point generated by that distinction is that being subject to the authority of a particular state
does not imply that one’s political obligations cannot or do not extend beyond state borders.
Finally, I will end by discussing how my own moral task account addresses the particularity
problem. I will argue that particularity arises primarily as a consequence of the limited
effective control that states are capable of having over the lives of discrete groups of people.
Because effectiveness is reasonably localized, as are a number of justice-related moral
problems, it makes sense that political authority is localized and particular. Accordingly,
considerations of effectiveness ought not be denigrated as merely practical or contingent
considerations that are not morally relevant. 321
6.1 - The Origin and Nature of the Particularity Requirement
The “particularity requirement” was first articulated by Simmons in 1979 in the
course of a wide-ranging and powerful critique of the most prominent theories of political
obligation. Simmons articulate the issue in the following manner:
What precisely are the sorts of moral requirements in which a theory of
political obligation is interested? . . . I do want to suggest that we are only
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interested in those moral requirements which bind an individual to one
particular political community, set of political institutions, etc. . . . [W]hile
is may seem innocuous on the surface, this “particularity requirement,” as I
shall call it, will exclude many traditional attempts to answer questions
about political obligation. 322
Since then, theorists have rightly assumed that any successful account of political
legitimacy or political obligation must account for some sort of special normative
relationship between individuals and their own political communities. 323 For example,
Green identifies “particularity” as a criterion for any successful account of a general
obligation to obey the law, describing it as meaning that “[c]itizens are normally bound
only to the laws of their own state.” 324 The apparent consequences of that requirement for
theories of political legitimacy and political obligation, according to Green, are “wideranging, for most ordinary moral reasons do not respect the boundaries of states in the
appropriate way.” 325 Thus, defenders of the state cannot just give up the particularity
requirement because to do so would be to “assert that persons are, in the moral sense,
stateless.” 326

Later, I am going to focus on the conceptual dissimilarities in how

particularity is described by theorists. For now, I want to focus on how Simmons

322

Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 30-31.
See, e.g., Perry, “Political Authority and Political Obligation,” 29; Wellman and
Simmons, Is There a Duty to Obey the Law?, 34-46; Green, The Authority of the State,
227-28; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 31-35.
324
Green, The Authority of the State, 227.
325
Ibid., 228.
326
Ibid.
200
323

articulated the idea in the context of his criticism of natural-duty accounts of the obligation
to obey the law.
In articulating the particularity problem, Simmons’s primary target was Rawls’s
natural duty of justice account of the obligation to obey the law. Recall that Rawls argued
that the obligation to obey the law, and political obligation more generally, are derived
from the natural duty to support just institutions. According to Rawls, individuals have a
fundamental and non-voluntary natural duty of justice “to support and to comply with just
institutions that exist and apply to [them].” 327 That duty “also constrains us to further just
arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to
ourselves.” 328 The primary virtue of the natural duty account is that it does not rest political
obligation on any sort of voluntary (or even involuntary) act or transaction, including
consent or receipt of benefits, on the part of an individual before they could be bound to
follow the law. The state does not condition exercises of its authority or the enforcement
of its demands on the existence of such transactions. As Rawls makes clear, “[e]ach is
bound to these institutions independent of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise.” 329
The particularity requirement, however, disqualifies the natural duty of justice as a
sufficient account of the obligation to obey the law:
While it [might] follow[] that I have an obligation to support my
government, it does not follow that there is anything special about this
obligation. I am equally constrained by the same moral bond to support

327

Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 115.
Ibid.
329
Ibid.
328

201

every other just government. . . . If political obligation and citizenship are
to be related . . . , we need a principle of political obligation which binds the
citizen to one particular state above all others, namely that state in which
he is a citizen. 330
Rawls, of course, did not think that the natural duty of justice was particular in nature. That
duty “hold[s] between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships; [it] obtain[s]
between all as equal moral persons.” 331 So, the duty will require one to contribute in some
way, within reason, to supporting just institutions that exist beyond the borders of one’s
own state without regard to one’s institutional relationship with one’s own state or fellow
citizens. But, there is the rub. The duty to obey the law is particular in nature, which means
one is only required to obey the laws of one’s own state insofar as that is where one is
located, and not the laws of some other state. Rawls offers no explanation of how we are
to derive a particularized duty to obey the laws of one’s own state from a non-particularized
duty to support just institutions wherever they might be located and wherever one might
be located.
The concern can also be framed a different way. If the duty to obey the laws of a
just state is how one is supposed to support just institutions, it should follow that one can
and must follow the laws of all just states no matter where they are located and no matter
where one is located. 332 It is not enough to simply state or assume that some institutions
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apply to us and others do not, because the issue of which apply to us and which do not is
the basic issue that needs to be explained. 333
The basic point is that the natural duty of justice alone does not offer any account
of why one’s relationship with one’s own state or one’s own laws is special. That basic
point also seems to extend to other accounts that rely on what seem like more generalized
moral requirements or moral reasons: “More general moral duties . . . , such as duties to
promote justice, justice, equality, or utility, cannot explain (or justify, or be) our political
obligations, for such duties do not necessarily tie us either to one particular community or
to our own community.” 334 The idea is that those values, insofar as they are to be promoted,
are to be promoted wherever and for whomever they can be promoted.
Christiano therefore faces a similar difficulty in trying the rest particularity simply
on the value of equality. As explained in the previous chapter, Christiano contends that
“each has a duty to comply with their own democratic institutions since these institutions

within the state’s border and some laws are binding only for residents or citizens of a state.
The difficulty is that a theory needs to account for why states cannot issue directives across
borders. For example, assume that New York State passes a law requiring all citizens of
the U.S. to pay a tax to New York regardless of where they reside. Assume New York is
just and is seeking support. A particularized theory of legitimate authority should be able
to account for why that law is not binding for individuals outside of New York but could
be binding for residents of New York.
333
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are necessary to treating their fellows publicly as equals.” 335 That presumably is also a
kind of natural duty. With respect to the particularity requirement, Christiano maintains
that one must abide by the law’s of one’s own state because “one would be treating one’s
fellows publicly as inferiors” if one were “to support the construction of democracy in
other parts of the world” in lieu of complying with one’s own institutions. 336 That
argument, however, is problematic for reasons similar to those noted earlier. First, it
imports the notion of “one’s fellows,” the very notion that needs to be explained. Second,
the response, following Simmons’s charge, is that equality should demand not just that one
not treat one’s fellow citizens as inferiors but that one not treat one’s fellow world citizens
as inferiors either. The problem is not to explain why one should not support justice or
equality elsewhere in the world instead of complying with the law. The problem is first to
explain why equality does not also demand that one’s comply with and support laws in
other parts of the world in addition to those of one’s home state. And, second, to explain
how the non-particular value of equality or the duty not to treat others as inferiors could
generate particularized duties. The duty not to treat others as inferiors alone does not seem
to be particular in nature. So, at best, Christiano’s argument must be supplemented.
Before delving deeper into the particularity requirement, it should be noted that
natural-duty accounts surely get some things correct. For example, the natural duty of
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justice seems to capture the broad scope of our political obligations or reasons considered
in the abstract regardless of how we might account for how it is that a state’s laws can be
morally binding. First, minimally, it is at least true that we have a duty not to undermine
just institutions. If a state is not violating rights and doing its job according to the terms of
our best moral theory of the state, justice as equal freedom for example, surely one has an
obligation not to undermine such a state. That should hold true of any political entity
whether or not it’s one’s own. And, it should hold true whether or not it turns out that a
voluntary transaction is necessary to ground a state’s legitimacy or authority over those
subject to it. Such a duty is not special in any way. Therefore, as a U.S. citizen, I have a
duty of non-interference in the administration of just institutions in the U.S. But Chinese
citizens have the same duty of non-interference with respect to just political institutions in
the U.S. That obligation is discharged by not interfering, for example, by not supporting
jihadists seeking to undermine just political institutions at home or abroad.
Second, it is quite reasonable to think that we can have a natural duty to support
just institutions abroad, at least insofar as that can be done through an effective and
reasonable system of shared responsibility, and such support is needed. As a U.S citizen,
I have a duty to support the just political institutions of the U.S. The nature of that support,
whether through following the law or not, is a separate matter. Yet, it is reasonable to think
that one can have a duty to support just institutions outside the U.S. where those institutions
require support. If there are just political institutions outside the U.S. that require support,
then I can have obligations to support those institutions. Of course, the nature of that
support and the manner in which that requirement is to be discharged is debatable.
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However, it is reasonable to think that one’s political obligations do not end at the border
of one’s state. I will return to this point below.
Finally, although not explicit in Rawls’s discussion of the natural duty of justice,
we all have political obligations not to support governments that are unjust or illegitimate,
wherever they may be. I cannot send money to North Korea to fund prison camps for
political dissidents. In this way, the political institutions of other states are not distinct
from those institutions in one’s own state. One would equally have a duty not to support
such institutions in one’s own state.
All of these non-particular natural duties of justice bind in light of the moral
necessity of political institutions that secure freedom wherever that task exist. As I have
argued to this point, political institutions are morally necessary to specify and protect the
equal freedom of human beings. Our political rights and responsibilities derive in part
from that basic point. Regimes that discharge that mandate should not be interfered with.
Regimes that require support in securing that mandate must be supported. Regimes that
ignore that mandate must not be supported.
6.2 - The Particularity in Transactional and Associative Accounts
The difficulty that the particularity requirement creates for natural-duty accounts is
generally recognized. By contrast, transactional and associativist accounts are often
regarded as fairing better than natural-duty accounts when it comes to the particularity
requirement. 337 Transactional accounts contend that our political obligations arise from
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certain sorts of voluntary undertakings or agreements, including consent and receipt of
benefits. Whereas associativist accounts explain those obligations as arising from one’s
participation or membership in certain sorts of valuable social groups. However, it is not
clear why those accounts fair any better than natural-duty accounts when it comes to
particularity.
Begin with transactional theories. There are no principles internal to those theories
that would limit the quantity or quality of one’s transactions, and therefore obligations,
with various states or political communities. Presumably one could consent or promise to
be bound by the laws of any number of states absent some sort of antecedent moral
requirement that one not do so. In which case, there need not be anything particular or
special about one’s relationship with any particular state. 338 Similarly, as benefits and
people can travel across borders, one can accept benefits from any number of states.
Likewise, with associativist accounts. One can associate or participate in social
groups in any number of states. There are no principles internal to associative theories that
would reasonably limit the quantity or quality of one’s participation within, and therefore
obligations within, various states. For example, on Dworkin’s theory of associative
obligation “the members of a group must by and large hold certain attitudes about the
responsibilities they owe one another [and] . . . must regard the group’s responsibilities as
special, holding distinctly within the group, rather than as general duties its members owe
equally to persons outside it.” 339 On its face, the primary difficulty with the view has to
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do with how an individual’s (or a group’s) attitudes with respect to one’s obligations
generate bona fide enforceable political obligations. Setting that worry aside, however,
surely one could hold such attitudes toward and within a number of different political
associations just like one could hold such attitudes within a number of different friendships.
Insofar as there are cases in which we legitimately do have special relationships
within more than one state or political community, there is an additional worry that arises
for some associativist accounts that use membership or participation as a constraint on
more general moral values. The problem can be seen in the context of states nested within
states, a common institutional arrangement. For the sake of explication, let’s focus on
Dworkin’s account. Recall that Dworkin urges that such special responsibilities are
grounded in moral obligations of equal concern for the well-being of those in the group, in
contrast with those who do not share membership in the group. 340 If those conditions are
met in a political community, like friendships and families, special obligations will arise
amongst and between members of the political community. Those obligations do not
extend to outsiders. Thus, as a citizen of the U.S. with associative political obligations, on
Dworkin’s account, one’s must credibly be part of a community that practices equal and
special concern for other members of the U.S. That concern should extend to the citizens
of New Jersey because those individuals are members of the U.S. The difficulty is that at
the same time, the account should also explain the particularity of the obligations one has
within one’s own state of the U.S. For example, a Pennsylvania citizen would presumably
have special responsibilities of equal concern with respect to Pennsylvania citizens and the
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laws of Pennsylvania. A citizen of Pennsylvania therefore will be part of a Pennsylvania
community that practices equal but special concern for Pennsylvanians. In light of that,
surely one must also not have equal concern for the citizens of New Jersey. But, that
conflicts with one’s U.S. membership responsibilities and perhaps our basic intuitions
about the actual scope of our political obligations. It is unclear how to resolve that
inconsistency, which is problematic insofar as it is commonplace to be a part of political
authority structures that are nested within each other. Particularity concerns not just one’s
special relationship with one’s own nation but also one’s own state or municipality. 341
The difficulty raised for Dworkin by the case of nested legal systems connects with
a broader problem with how political theorists think about the issue of particularity. There
is a tendency to think about particularity and political obligation more generally in
nationalist terms. So the issue of particularity would be framed in terms of whether our
political obligations, those connected with distributive justice for example, are limited by
national borders rather than extending beyond those borders to global citizens generally.
Those are obviously important issues. But when we are thinking about moral obligations
to follow the law and the moral authority of law, we need to be sensitive to the more
familiar features of modern legal systems. Hart maintained that the paradigm instance of
a legal system was the “modern municipal legal system.” 342 Surely, the same can be said
for modern state and federal legal systems as well. The point is that individuals in modern
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societies are subject to a number of nested systems of law that are interrelated in complex
ways. So a complete account of the particularity of political authority should address
particularities wherever they exist. And, particularities do not exist just at the national level
between a nation state and members of a nation. They also exist between an individual and
their local municipality and their local state.
6.3 - Types of Particularity
Unfortunately, discussions of particularity in the literature have failed to make clear
several conceptual distinctions. The core idea behind the particularity requirement is the
idea of a special relationship or special bond. There is a special relationship insofar as the
relationship described between an individual and “their own” legal system or fellow
citizens, and not between an individual and citizens or legal systems more generally. That
issue is not limited to the more familiar question of whether one has a special relationship
with one’s country or nation. Particularity is a requirement wherever there are political
structures that distinguish between insiders and outsiders. As noted, that distinction plays
out at all levels of government.
What sort of moral relationship are we talking about? There are several candidates
that could define the special relationship captured by the particularity requirement. Here I
want to focus on two candidate relationships from the literature that might satisfy the
particularity requirement. These particularities employ some of the basic Hohfeldian
elements and relationships discussed in previous chapters.
The first species of particularity is particularity of authority and most directly
addresses the scope of the state’s authority, and the scope of the state’s jurisdiction over
210

persons, actions, and property. In which case, a state’s authority is particular insofar as it
only has authority over a particular class of people and that class of people is subject to
that state’s authority. As was explained in Chapter One, built into that are a variety of
relationships. At the very least, it means that the state has a power-liability relationship
with a particular class of people within a particular territory. The point is that the state
only has the moral power to change the moral situation of a particular class of individuals
through its legal directives. Correlatively only individuals in that particular class are liable
to have their moral situation changed by that state, and, therefore, only individuals in that
class are morally obligated to comply with the laws of that state.
The particularity of authority is emphasized by Green and Perry. As Green explains
the particularity requirement in this sense, he explains that “[c]itizens are normally bound
only to the laws of their own state.” 343 And, Stephen Perry, following Green, maintains
that the particularity condition “states that an obligation to obey the law must arise only for
the directives of a citizen’s (or subject’s) own state, and not for the directives of other
states.” 344 Accordingly, this understanding of the relevant special relationship focuses on
the state’s political authority as exercised through the legal system.
The second species of particularity I will call particularity of political obligation.
That notion most directly addresses the scope of the state and its subjects’ obligations and
to whom those obligations are owed. To say that one’s political obligations are particular
is to say that one only owes one’s political obligations to particular states or political
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communities. To satisfy this particularity requirement there must be a basis for the
conclusion that one’s political obligations are owed to one’s own state or one’s fellow
citizens rather than states or people more generally. What we are describing then is a
correlative claim-obligation relationship rather than a power-liability relationship.
Particularity of obligation imports the idea of to whom are one’s political obligations owed,
which is distinct from the question of who can impose an obligation on whom.
Some theorists seem to be exclusively focused on particularity of obligation when
they discuss particularity. Simmons generally frames particularity in terms of a special
bond, by which he means an obligation: “[P]olitical obligation is the moral bond which
ties an individual to one particular political community or set of political institutions in a
special way.” 345

That notion is then leveraged, as we have seen, to challenge the

particularity of natural duties to support just political institutions:
While it follows that I have an obligation to support my [just] government,
it does not follow that there is anything special about this obligation. I am
equally constrained by the same moral bond to support every other just
government. . . . [W]e need a principle of political obligation which binds
the citizen to one particular state above all others, namely the state in which
he is a citizen. 346
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Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, 155.
Ibid., 31-32. In later work, Simmons frames the issue in the same way: “We can
understand why our government’s being just might establish a moral bond to support it,
but not why this would establish a bond to support it over other just governments.”
Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 47.
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Anna Stilz follows Simmons in that regard. Stilz articulates particularity as the idea
“that there is a special bond or obligation that ties the citizen or resident to her state, and to
her compatriots, and not to others, and requires her to support these people and these
institutions and not others.” 347 She therefore also links particularity with the debate
between cosmopolitans and nationalists about the scope of our political obligations:
“Cosmopolitans have argued that . . . we ought to hold that special obligations of citizenship
are fundamentally incompatible with a liberal theory of justice. On the cosmopolitan view,
then, the particularity assumption cannot be justified . . . .” 348 Thus, an moral theory of the
particularity of one’s obligations would explain how one’s political obligations are only
owed to the citizens of one’s own legal unit, whether that be a nation, a state, or a
municipality. 349
I have articulated the above distinction because at best it is often not clearly
articulated in the literature and at worst it is often confused. For example, after Green
states, “Citizens are normally bound only to the laws of their own state,” he explains:
This condition seeks to capture the directionality common to political
obligation and other special obligations. Just as promising creates duties to

347

Stilz, Liberal Loyalty, 6.
Ibid., 9. Dworkin also seems to understand the problem this way. Dworkin, Law’s
Empire, 193.
349
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and states of the world more generally but that political obligations to one’s own state or
fellow citizens take priority over any such worldly obligations.
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particular persons only and not to the world at large, political obligations
bind them to certain states only. 350
That blends issues of authority and issues of obligation. Moral powers, while relational,
are not directional like moral obligations. The existence of a moral power does not entail
anything about to whom one’s obligations are owed, whether those obligations are the
product of an exercise of a moral power or not.
Simmons has also contributed to confusing the two issues. For example, in his
earliest statement of “the problem of political obligation,” he says that “a political
obligation is a moral requirement to support and comply with the political institutions of
one’s country of residence.” 351 Aside from focusing exclusively on countries rather than
other legal units, combines both the issue of particularity of authority and particularity of
obligation under the single heading of political obligation. In later work, he continues to
blend the issue of obedience, which is connected to the moral power to impose duties, with
the scope of our general political obligations:
Political obligations are felt to be obligations of obedience and support
owed to one particular government or community (our own), above all
others.

Citizen’s obligations are special ties, involving loyalty or

commitment to the political community in which they were born or in which
they reside. More general moral duties . . . , such as duties to promote
justice, justice, equality, or utility, cannot explain (or justify, or be ) our
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political obligations, for such duties do not necessarily tie us either to one
particular community or to our own community.” 352
Here is another example of shifting quickly between particularity of obligation and
particularity of authority:
[E]ven if you had perfectly general duties to promote justice and happiness,
. . . these duties would require of you that you support all such states,
providing you with no necessary reason to show any special favoritism or
unique allegiance to your own state, and providing none of those states with
an special right to impose on you additional duties. 353
Yet, the two kinds of particularities ought not be confused.
Drawing the distinction permits us to recognize examples where the scope or
particularity of legitimate political authority ought not to be confused with the scope of our
legitimate political obligations. First, as emphasized in our discussion of natural-duty
accounts, some of our political obligations are not particular in that they are not only owed
to those with whom we share a nation. Some of our political obligations — obligations
that are within the state’s legitimate authority to enforce — are owed to individuals residing
beyond the borders of one’s nation. For example, a federal tax to pay for aid to build
schools in Niger is fundamentally owed to those individuals in Niger who require schools,
not the U.S. government or one’s fellow citizens in the U.S. 354 The Niger government does
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not have the legitimate authority to impose a tax on citizens of the U.S. for that purpose.
But, the U.S. government has that power. On the other hand, the U.S. government does
not have the authority to impose similar obligations on individuals in Niger. Nonetheless,
it may have the capacity and responsibility to support and secure a school-building program
in Niger. The example shows that the particular class of people subject to a state’s authority
need not coincide with the class of people to whom our political obligations are owed.
While a state’s authority may be limited to its own citizen’s, the same limit need not be
placed on the class of people to whom our political obligations are owed.
Second, when we look at federalist systems that have nested authority structures,
like the United States, we also see scope distinctions. Return to thinking about the
relationship between the citizens of New Jersey and the citizens of Pennsylvania. In one
sense, Pennsylvania citizens have a particular relationship with their own state.
Pennsylvania has authority over Pennsylvania residents. At the same time, it is not as if
Pennsylvania citizens do not have political obligations to New Jersey residents. In fact,
those obligations are generally discharged through federal law as a result of exercises of
federal authority. The point is that being a part of a particularized authority relationship
does not preclude having political obligations that extend beyond the territorial borders of
that authority.
6.4 - Task Efficacy, Justice, and Particularity

insofar as the U.S. government’s responsibility is a collective responsibility of U.S.
citizens, individual U.S. citizens will have duties of fairness to share in that responsibility.
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Before discussing more about why it is important to draw the distinction just made,
it will help to outline how my own view addresses the particularity requirement. I have
argued that political authority is morally necessary to secure equal freedom. Accordingly,
any entity or organization that has the effective capacity to secure equal freedom has a
responsibility to do so. Along with that responsibility comes a host of enabling rights that
constitute the state’s authority, including the power to impose obligations. In turn, the state
is tasked with specifying our political obligations in a way that is fair and consistent with
the equal freedom of those subject to its authority. One’s enforceable political obligations
consist in whichever obligations emanate from the state’s exercise of its authority.
The particularity of a state’s political authority is limited by the state’s
effectiveness. The basic idea is that the state’s authority is limited by its ability effectively
to coordinate behavior to secure equal freedom. If a state cannot effectively exercise it
coordinative capacities over a particular people in a particular territory to solve the moral
problems discussed earlier, then it has no or limited authority to make and enforce it
demands. But if a particular class of people in a particular territory will abide by its
commands, then it both has the capacity and the right to exercise authority over those
people in that territory.
Notwithstanding, the scope of the state’s political authority, one’s enforceable
political obligations can extend beyond the state’s borders. The state, however, has a right
and responsibility to specify and mediate those obligations. Insofar as it can do so, it
should. The view then is comparable to David Estlund’s “think globally, act locally model
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of political authority.” 355 Global problems can be solved and global obligations can be
discharged through localized and particular authority structures.
In claiming that Rawls’s natural duty to comply with just institutions only “sidestep[s]” the particularity condition, Green says,
We normally regard political institutions as applying to us only if they either
exert real control over our lives or if we stand in a relation of moral
obligation to them. But the latter is the very problem at issue, and the former
renders senseless the thought that there is some special, directional
relationship involved. 356
Green is surely correct about the latter prong. But in light of what I have argued, Green
gives the former prong inadequate consideration. 357 One of the core elements of legitimate
political authority is the state’s capacity for effective control. Only if the state is able to
discharge its tasks of coordinating action and securing equal freedom can it do so with any
claim to legitimacy. And, if it does in fact possess effective control and discharges its
obligation responsibly then this takes us pretty far toward a case for the legitimacy of its
authority. The particularity analysis, then, should begin with the question of the extent to
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different. My view says that because de facto effective control is range-limited, political
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Perry. See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 250; Perry, “Political Authority and
Political Obligation,” 68-69.
218

which a given state has the capacity for effective control. The scope or the particularity of
the state’s authority is then measured by that effectiveness.
6.5 - Why the Distinction Matters
It will be helpful to look at some accounts in which failure to draw the above
distinction leads us in the wrong direction. In “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” and other
work, Waldron defends a Kantian natural-duty account that shares elements similar to the
account presented here. 358 Waldron’s natural-duty account aims to explain the idea that
we owe a special allegiance to and have special ties with the particular state in which we
reside.
The core of the account lies in Waldron’s distinction between principles of justice
that are “range-limited” and those that are not. 359 A range-limited principle of justice
distinguishes between “insiders” and “outsiders.” That is just another way in which to say
that a moral principle is particularized. Formally, a person is an insider with respect to a
principle if she is a member of the set of persons whose conduct and interests the principle
applies to. 360 As a substantive matter, “an individual is within the range of a principle if it
is part of the point and justification of the principle to deal with his conduct, claims, and
interests along with those of any other persons it deals with.” 361
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Waldron’s overall point is that “a [citizen’s] special relation to the legal institutions
of [his country] is largely captured by the fact that he is an insider with regard to the set of
range-limited principles administered by those institutions.”362 The distinction between
insiders and outsiders is “a distinction in principle. . . . It is a difference in the content and
structure of the natural duty, not a difference that depends on contingent facts and
opportunities.” 363 Correctly, Waldron notes that principles of justice do not administer
themselves; rather, principles must be administered by institutions. 364 That is the heart of
what I have argued here, namely that the law is necessary to specify what counts as acting
consistent with the freedom of others. The state must administer and enforce those
specifications.
Waldron offers two examples of range-limited principles. The first example is that
a principle of distributive justice may be range-limited in that only insiders have a right to
distributive goods whereas outsiders do not. That point captures the basic dispute between
democratic egalitarians and cosmopolitan egalitarians. Democratic egalitarians argue that
distributive goods ought be distributed among citizens, rather than non-citizens, because
the point of distributive justice is to establish just social relations amongst members of a
democratic society. In contrast, cosmopolitan egalitarians believe that distributive goods
ought to be distributed globally beyond the bounds of any given society. 365 Waldron’s
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second example involves possible conflict that arises when individuals interact with their
“near neighbors,” namely those who share a territory, which is “any area in which conflicts
must be settled if any stable system of resource use is to be possible among inhabitants.”366
These include the issue of the nature of our private rights and the terms by which we
interact with each other, as well as disputes that arise between interacting individuals. 367
The scope of a territory can obviously change over time as the domain of expected human
interaction expands. Nonetheless, there is necessary task of justly “settling those conflicts
that are immediately unavoidable.” 368
Beyond being basically just according to range-limited principles, Waldron adds
two further requirements before a political institution administering range-limited
principles of justice will have a “claim on our allegiance.” 369 First, the organization must
be “capable of doing justice in the territory.” 370 That is a basic effectiveness requirement,
which I have already explicated. Second, the organization must be “legitimate,” which for
Waldron amounts to the claim that the organization is the “exclusive” organization
administering justice. 371 Justice could not be effectively coordinated and secured if
competing organizations are mutually undermining. In a sense, the latter requirement is
redundant.
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As noted above, the scope of legitimate political authority and the scope of political
obligation are not synonymous. Although the state’s political authority might extend only
over those over whom it has effective control, that assumption does not entail that the state
or its citizens’ political obligations are owed only to such individuals. Put differently,
although authority might be “range-limited,” our principles of justice, or political
obligations, need not be. Thus, in a sense, Waldron’s view is the reverse of my own.
Because effective control is range-limited, political authority is range-limited. Principles
of justice need not distinguish between insiders and outsiders, even though political
authority seemingly must be range-limited to be effective. Some problems of justice are
local and some are global. Local effective political authority has the capacity to address
both.
Note that the two examples Waldron offers are quite different in character. The
scope of our distributive obligations, however conceived, are not necessarily territorially
localized. And, disputes about distributive justice do not arise as an inevitable consequence
of the interactions between individual’s living in close proximity with each other. Such
disputes are different than the disputes that arise from the interactions one has with the
persons and property of those living in close proximity. One’s rights concerning one’s
front yard can only generate local problems, while distributions of resources are not so
localized. The distinction therefore is not really a distinction in principle but a distinction
generated by geography.

Political authority that is range-limited and tasked with

administering truly range-limited principles of justice (e.g., principles requiring local
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property rules) can equally be tasked with administering principles of justice that are not
so limited (principles requiring foreign aid to build property regimes in other countries). 372
For the same reason we should not link the dispute between cosmopolitans and
liberal nationalists with the particularity requirement, as Stilz does. 373 The dispute between
cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists is a dispute about the scope of our political
obligations and whether justice traverses state borders. A theory that explains why political
authority is particular and localized need not demand that the scope of our political
obligations also be localized. Therefore, there is no reason to think, following Stilz, that
“the particularity assumption cannot be justified” on the cosmopolitan view. 374
Before concluding I want to address some difficulties in Stilz’s own defense of
particularity, as Stilz roughly makes the same Kantian argument that I have made with
respect to legitimate political authority and the morally necessary role that it plays. Stilz
offers a quite different account of why one’s relationship with their own state is special.
Stilz specifically dismisses arguments that appeal to “to salience, natural boundaries, social
ties, or considerations of administrative effectiveness.” 375 My own view presumably relies
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on the first and last considerations, and would not reject the other considerations outright.
Instead, she argues that particularity is explained by “[t]he mere fact of [an individual’s]
political history.” 376 Such a history
gives participants reasons to do their part in sustaining their particular state.
The difference between my state and another equally just state isn’t that I
am especially biased in favor of it, feel especially patriotic about it, or share
its national culture (necessarily), but simply that I have been part of this
practice, which gives me special reason to value and contribute to it. This
fact is enough to particularize my natural duty to a given scheme of political
cooperation and gives me reason to do my part here rather than there. And
I think this fact is sufficient to make my concern to do my part in this
particular state not an act of arbitrary favoritism but rather a rational
response to a valuable relationship in which I have been involved. 377
Stilz is concerned to address several moral problems, including why one only has an
obligation to obey the laws of one’s own state, why a U.S. citizen one should not set up a
tax shelter in the Cayman islands, and why one should participate in the political process
of one’s own state. 378 The argument is reasonably interpreted as associative in character.
Dworkin’s associative account, for example, is premised on the idea that we are part of “a
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history of events and acts that attract obligations.” 379 It therefore may share some of the
difficulties facing associative theories more generally. 380
I will not rehearse those difficulties here but want to raise several concerns about
Stilz particular account. The first difficulty is that what Stilz has described are not
particularized political obligations but rather particularized permissions. The mere fact
that some action is “a rational response to a valuable relationship” does not entail that that
the action is obligatory or sufficiently valuable to obligatory. 381 Nor would it even be
sufficient to permit criticism of the person for failing to act in a manner that supported the
relationship. For example, take Stilz example of the person who domiciles himself in the
Cayman islands to save money in taxes that can instead be paid to support just institutions
in the Cayman islands. Now, if the person decided against the Cayman plan, on Stilz
account, we could say that the decision was a rational response to a valuable shared history
with citizens of the U.S. But, that does not mean that choosing the Cayman plan is not a
rational response to something else of value. For example, the man may want to support
just institutions in the Caymans or support communities in the Caymans where he has
shared histories with other. All Stilz has accounted for is why the man would not be acting
arbitrarily in choosing to domicile in the U.S. rather than the Caymans. Therefore, the
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value of shared history can be fairly easily outweighed by the value of some other personal
pursuit.
In any event, it is unclear how the account does not yield odd results in more
everyday cases. For example, say a lifelong and politically active resident of Pennsylvania
decides to move to New Jersey. She simply wants a change. Are we to say that she is in
some sense subject to moral criticism? That would seem to be absurd. Instead, we value
and protect personal choice such that the mere fact of choice in this circumstance makes
the choice beyond reproach. Moreover, where a person does make such a move across
borders they immediately take on the legal obligations that apply to residents of the new
state. Their legal obligations do not wait for shared histories to develop. Someone can live
a long politically active life in Pennsylvania, but as soon as they become a resident of New
Jersey, they incur New Jersey obligations. There is no time lag for shared histories or
practices to develop.
In this Chapter, I have argued that it is important to be clear about the requisite
relationship necessary to meet the particularity requirement.

There should be no

requirement on a theory of political authority or an account of the obligation to obey the
law that our political obligations are specially owed to our own fellow citizens. However,
it is a requirement that one be subject only to the laws of the state in which one is a citizen
or in which one is physically located. The broader ends of freedom and justice, local or
global, largely require the institution of localized authority.
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